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Foreword
India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (MGNREGS) is one of the world’s largest experiments in 
running a public employment generation scheme. The Act to ini-
tiate this program was passed by the Indian parliament in 2005, 
making a certain minimal amount of paid employment a justiciable 
right of rural Indian households. Soon thereafter, MGNREGS was 
rolled out in India’s most backward districts, spanning the length
and breadth of the nation. During this process MGNREGS was,
by turns, praised, criticized, hailed, and castigated, but what was 
unquestionable and recognized by all was the ambitious scale of the 
experiment.
Not surprisingly, many studies of MGNREGS have been under-
taken, from anthropological sketches to village-level statistical, 
econometric analyses. However, a scientifi cally controlled, evidence-
based, large-scale study of this important program was still needed, 
especially in regions in which administrative and organizational 
capacity is not high. This book, by Puja Dutta, Rinku Murgai, 
Martin Ravallion, and Dominique van de Walle, focuses on Bihar, 
India’s third largest state, and one of its poorest. The book fi lls that 
analytical need and will no doubt be viewed as one of the most 
comprehensive and dispassionate research monographs on the sub-
ject. I expect this book to be of value not just to the government 
and researchers in India but also to economists the world over and 
to policy makers in other emerging market economies who want to 
learn from India’s experience on job creation to inform their fi ght 
against extreme poverty. They will learn from MGNREGS’s suc-
cesses (the study fi nds, for instance, that the rationing process is pro-
poor and the scheme is reaching poor families) and from its failures 
(for instance, large leakages, and large unmet demand for work—
unmet demand that is not revealed by the administrative data).
The study draws on a wide variety of methods, including sub-
jective assessments by respondents, observational (econometric)
and experimental methods, and qualitative fi eld work. A specially 
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designed panel survey of 3,000 households, representative of all of 
rural Bihar, was implemented. A distinctive feature of the method-
ology was the use of individual-specifi c counterfactual questions to 
assess the micro-impacts of the program. This technique allowed 
the authors to provide a very detailed picture of the impacts of the
scheme.
What makes this study especially important and topical is that 
employment is, today, a major concern across the world. Evidence 
indicates that, worldwide, the aggregate wage-bill-to-GDP ratio is
declining. This outcome seems to go hand in hand with a propensity 
to have fewer jobs and lower wages, which is, of course, a matter 
of some concern since such a large fraction of the world population 
lives by wages alone. If this trend persists it will weaken our ability 
to fi ght poverty and deprivation, and can become a source of social 
unrest and political turbulence.
It is not surprising that “jobs” is a matter of concern across 
the world, from the United States and Europe to South Asia and
Sub-Saharan Africa. The problem is exacerbated by the march of 
technology, which brings more and more workers from far corners 
of the world into a common labor market. Our focus on labor 
market policies and the challenges therein is bound to increase. 
The problem will have to be tackled by many different methods, 
and one contender in emerging economies is public employment 
programs. The fi nal word is not out on the role and effi cacy of 
such government-run employment programs. Important questions 
remain about their fi scal viability, infl ationary impact, and effect on 
the incidence of poverty. The present book does not try to answer 
all these questions, but focuses on some important ones, especially 
those pertaining to chronic poverty. The questions it takes on, it 
answers more fully and comprehensively than any other book or 
paper that I have read. The book clearly sketches out areas where 
the program has succeeded and those where it has failed. It also 
sheds light on the challenges of running such a program in poorer 
regions where the need for jobs is great but the available organiza-
tional capital is low.
I hope this book will not just answer important questions, as 
it does, but will also provide a foundation for asking other ques-
tions, especially those relating to the macroeconomic consequences
of large-scale public employment programs. I expect the book to 
enable policy makers, even when they design and operate temporary
employment programs to battle famine and other short-term calami-
ties, as they have done for centuries, to glean ideas to increase their 
effectiveness in creating meaningful employment.
FOREWORD xv
India’s MGNREGS is the largest state-run employment- generation 
scheme in the world. This book is the most comprehensive study of 
this scheme. It is natural to expect it to fi nd a large readership with
or without my urging, but let me, nevertheless, use this Foreword to 
put my urging on record.
Kaushik Basu
Chief Economist and Senior Vice President
The World Bank
Washington, DC
January 2014
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Introduction
In 2006, India embarked on an ambitious attempt to fi ght poverty
by attempting to introduce a wage fl oor in a setting in which many
unskilled workers earn less than the minimum wage. The 2005 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act creates a justiciable
“right to work” by promising 100 days of wage employment in 
every fi nancial year to all rural households whose adult members
volunteer to do unskilled manual work. Work is provided in public 
works projects at the statutory minimum wage notifi ed for the pro-
gram by state governments that are responsible for implementing the 
Act under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guar-
antee Scheme (MGNREGS). Work must be made available within
15 days of receiving an application to work, failing which, the state 
government is liable for paying an unemployment allowance.
MGNREGS is the largest antipoverty public employment pro-
gram anywhere. Yet until recently, it has been subject to very little 
rigorous evaluative research. If the scheme worked in practice the 
way it is designed, there would be little or no unmet demand for 
work among unskilled workers. Anyone who wanted work at the 
stipulated wage rates would get it. Under ideal conditions, such a 
scheme could almost certainly have a large impact on poverty in 
India. The work requirement will create a “self-targeting” mecha-
nism, in that nonpoor people are unlikely to demand such work. The 
scheme could also help reduce future poverty through its second-
round effects, including providing insurance in risk-prone environ-
ments, empowering workers and  villagers generally, and creating 
useful assets.
This study asks: Are these ideal conditions met in practice? How 
much impact on poverty do the earnings from the scheme have? 
Why might that impact fall short of its potential? How can the 
scheme bridge that gap?
The impacts can be expected to vary across the states of India, 
as well as within them. The extent of poverty (or its correlates) can 
be expected to condition the impact. We confi rm expectations that 
the demand for this work tends to be higher in the poorer states. 
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However, actual participation rates in MGNREGS are not (as a 
rule) any higher in poorer states. A likely reason for the lower par-
ticipation is that poorer states face extra constraints on their ability 
to implement the scheme effectively. Among the important factors, 
they face shortages in the types of skilled manpower needed for 
effective administration of such a complex scheme. A common char-
acteristic of poor states and countries is that skilled manpower is 
scarce, which constrains their ability to absorb funds and implement
such schemes. Without reasonably rigorous and professional super-
vision and monitoring at the local level, with fi rm reporting links up
the chain of command, and strong overall leadership, one might fi nd 
that the scheme works less well in poor areas—ironically, the places 
where it is probably needed most. That is indeed what we fi nd across
the states of India: the incidence of unmet demand for work tends 
to be higher in poorer states, even though demand for the scheme 
is higher there. On balance, the scheme is no more effective in the 
states where it is needed the most.
Thus, the bulk of this volume tries to provide a better understand-
ing of this fi nding by undertaking a closer study of the performance
of MGNREGS in what is by most measures one of India’s poor-
est states, Bihar. To address the questions about the scheme, we 
implemented a panel survey of 3,000 households in the rural areas
of Bihar during the months of May and June in 2009 and 2010. In 
using the results of the survey and administrative data to address the 
key questions about performance of the scheme in Bihar, we draw 
on a variety of methods, including subjective assessments by respon-
dents, observational (econometric) and experimental methods, and 
qualitative fi eld work. A distinctive feature of this methodology is 
the use of  individual-specifi c counterfactual questions in assessing 
the microimpacts of the program. This methodology allows us to 
provide a very detailed picture of the impacts of the scheme.
The results confi rm the potential for the labor earnings from this 
scheme to reduce poverty in Bihar, but also point to a number of spe-
cifi c performance issues that impede realization of that potential in 
practice. We fi nd that there is large unmet demand for work on the 
scheme—unmet demand that is not revealed by the administrative 
data. However, we also fi nd that the rationing process is pro-poor
and the scheme is reaching poor families, though richer households 
also share in the gains.
Among those who do participate, we also fi nd a sizable gap 
between the wages actually reported by workers and those they are 
supposed to receive under the scheme. A similar gap is revealed by 
administrative records on wage disbursements. The gap is nowhere 
near as large as some casual observers have claimed; grossing up our 
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representative sample estimates to the state as a whole, we fi nd that
one-fi fth of the claimed wage payments are unaccounted for. Leak-
age is the likely explanation for the discrepancy between the survey 
results and the administrative data.
So workers are not getting all the work they want, and they are 
not getting the full wages to which they are due. Unsurprisingly, 
we fi nd that their participation in the scheme is far from costless 
to them. Many participants report that they had to give up another 
income-earning activity when they took up work on the scheme.
These factors have greatly reduced the scheme’s impact on pov-
erty. Whereas we estimate that under ideal conditions the extra labor 
earnings from the scheme would bring down the poverty rate in 
Bihar 14 percentage points or more, in actuality the impact is closer 
to 1  percentage point. We fi nd that more than two-thirds—about 
10  percentage points—of “lost impact” is attributable to the ways 
in which the scheme is not fulfi lling the provisions of the Act. In par-
ticular, if there were no rationing (so that anyone who wanted work 
got work), the impact of the scheme on poverty would be 8 percent-
age points. The gap between actual wages received and stipulated 
wages accounts for 2 percent of the gap. The rest is due to forgone 
income, which is hard to avoid. Thus, unmet demand for work is the 
single most important policy-relevant factor in accounting for this 
gap between actual performance and the scheme’s potential.
In probing the factors underlying this performance gap, we fi nd 
very low public awareness of what needs to be done to obtain work 
and low participation by poor people in decisions about the scheme.
Knowledge is lower for women than for men, and higher for those 
who are better educated. The sharing of information between men 
and women within the household appears to be weak. There are also 
strong village effects on knowledge about the scheme. Holding con-
stant individual and household characteristics, levels of awareness 
of the scheme are lower in villages with higher inequality and where 
there are more signs of tension between different social groups. The 
characteristics of the village leader (such as whether he or she lives 
in the village) also matter.
We use a randomized control trial of an awareness intervention—
a specially designed fi ctional movie—to show how knowledge of 
rights and processes can be enhanced as a key step toward better 
performance. The main story line centered on a temporary migrant 
worker returning to his village to see his wife and young daughter. 
He learns that there is work available in the village, even though it 
is the lean  season, so he can stay there. The movie was effective in 
raising awareness, but had little discernible effect on actions such as 
seeking employment when needed.
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A number of specifi c supply-side constraints to work provision 
are also identifi ed, including poor implementation capacity and 
weak fi nancial management and monitoring systems. The resultant 
bottlenecks in the funds fl ow and planning and work sanctioning 
processes indicate that the implementation of the scheme differs sig-
nifi cantly from the intent. We fi nd evidence of unpredictability of 
work  provision, delays in wage payments, and deviations from the 
scheme guidelines in the management of worksites and provision 
of facilities to workers. These factors both discourage participation 
and lead to the creation of poor-quality assets, thereby reducing the 
overall impact on poverty.
We argue that if the potential impact of MGNREGS is to be 
realized, eliminating the extensive unmet demand for work under 
the scheme is crucial—to make it a genuine “employment guaran-
tee.” The extent of unmet demand we demonstrate in poor states, 
including Bihar, is undermining the ability of the scheme to reach 
those in need, and also greatly reducing the insurance and empower-
ment benefi ts of the scheme, making it less likely that women will be 
reached by the scheme, creating opportunities for leakage, and vastly 
decreasing the overall impact on poverty.
Addressing this problem will require coordinated action on two 
fronts. First, enhanced central and local administrative capacities 
for implementation and monitoring are needed. Second, far greater
public awareness of the obligations, rights, and rules of the scheme,
more active public mobilization, and better mechanisms for address-
ing grievances are required. These two sets of reforms are comple-
ments; doing one without the other may have little impact.
1Overview
Fighting poverty in poorer places may be hard for many reasons. 
Credit market failures may be more severe, leaving many more 
 unexploited investment opportunities than in better-off economies, 
leading to lower long-term growth rates and less poverty reduction. 
Poor nutrition and health (especially in the early years of life) can 
have the same consequences. The various dimensions of inequality 
that often accompany high poverty may limit the scope for coopera-
tive action to fi ght poverty. Thus, poverty can self-perpetuate.
Poverty can persist for another potentially important reason: 
poorer places tend to have weaker public administrations. Employees
with the skills to implement and monitor public programs, includ-
ing programs for fi ghting poverty, are relatively scarce in poorer 
 economies. Even when governments care about reducing poverty 
today, they can face trade-offs with other demands on their budgets 
and staff resources that also have a bearing on future poverty. No
doubt other factors come into play to infl uence the terms of this 
trade-off, such as strong political will to fi ght poverty, but a trade-
off can still be expected.
In attempting to fi ght poverty in poor places with weak administra-
tive capabilities, the idea of “rights” has often been invoked. Although 
rights-based ideas about distributive justice have a long history (back 
to the 18th century), they have not had great traction in development 
policy discussions until recently. We have seen calls for the “right 
to health care,” “right to schooling,” “right to food,” and “right to 
work.” Because poor people tend to have few rights, it is hoped that 
creating new rights will empower them to take actions that will help 
them escape poverty. Whether this tactic will work is another matter. 
The same factors that made people poor in the fi rst place may operate 
to undermine attempts to expand their effective rights.
This book aims to contribute to the understanding of the effi cacy 
of poor states in fi ghting poverty using an ambitious rights-based 
program—the largest antipoverty public employment program in 
India, and possibly anywhere in the world. We study how that 
 program works in one of India’s poorest states—where one would 
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hope that such a scheme would work well. Some comparisons are 
also made with other, less poor Indian states.
The program we study is India’s Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), which was launched 
to implement the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (here 
the Act for short; the abbreviation NREGA is common in India). 
The Act was passed by the Indian  Parliament in  September 2005. 
It created a justiciable right to work for all households in rural 
India by promising 100 days of work per fi nancial year to all rural 
households whose adults are willing to do unskilled manual labor 
at the statutory wage established for the program. Work is to be 
made available to anyone who demands it within 15 days of receipt 
of an application, failing which the applicant is entitled to an unem-
ployment allowance. The work is supposed to be undertaken with 
a view to creating sustainable assets in rural  villages to promote
future livelihoods. In addition, the scheme’s delivery  processes, par-
ticularly the stress placed on community participation, transpar-
ency, and accountability, are designed to strengthen village-level 
governance.
MGNREGS is a prominent example of a class of direct inter-
ventions against poverty, also called workfare or public works 
programs, that impose work requirements on participants. Such 
programs have desirable incentive effects as second-best policies for 
situations in which the set of feasible redistributive policy instru-
ments is  limited.1 It is also known that, under certain conditions,
these programs can yield effi ciency gains, given the existence of 
 factor-market distortions (see, for example, Ravallion 1990; and 
Basu, Chau, and  Kanbur 2009).
The program became operational in February 2006. In the fi rst 
phase, MGNREGS operated in the country’s 200 most backward 
districts and was expanded to an additional 130 districts in 2007.2
The remaining districts in the country were eligible under the Act
beginning April 1, 2008. Since 2008, the program has reached the 
entire country with the exception of districts with entirely urban 
populations. A description of the key features of MGNREGS is 
 provided in box O.1.
India has long experience with using rural public works to 
implement antipoverty and famine-relief policies.3 However, sev-
eral aspects of MGNREGS distinguish it from earlier public works 
 programs: 
• MGNREGS recognizes the right to work as a legal right. 
The state government is legally bound to provide employment to 
a household within 15 days of its demanding work or to pay the 
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Box O.1 Key Features of MGNREGS
Each rural household guaranteed 100 days of work per year upon 
demand. Each rural household is entitled to a free job card with pho-
tographs of all adult members living in the household. Adult members
of these registered households with job cards may then apply for 
employment, and the government is obligated to provide the work 
within 15 days, failing which the applicant is entitled to an unemploy-
ment allowance. Furthermore, work must be provided within 
5  kilometers of the applicant’s residence or there is a 10 percent 
 premium on the scheme’s wage. How the household distributes the 
100 days among its members is entirely the household’s decision. 
All-India uniform wage of 100 rupees (Rs) per day established in
the scheme, but adjusted for state-specifi c infl ation. In 2009, the 
central government uncoupled MGNREGS wages from state-level 
statutory minimum wage rates.a Payment is made according to a 
Schedule of Rates that is based on the amount of work done by a 
person. The Act requires the Schedule of Rates to be set such that an
able-bodied worker working for nine hours, with one hour of rest, is
able to earn the established program minimum wage.
Wages paid directly into post offi ce or bank accounts. Beginning
April 1, 2008, all MGNREGS wages began to be paid directly into 
workers’ bank or post office accounts (opened free of charge). 
 Exceptions are made if a state government acquires an exemption 
from the central government. Wages should be paid no later than a 
fortnight after work completion.
Provision of basic facilities at the worksite. Basic facilities include
shade, drinking water, child care for children under age six, fi rst aid 
facilities to attend to the injured in case of an accident, and a notice
board with all relevant information about the worksite.
Several provisions of the Act encourage the participation of 
women. First, the Act mandates that one-third of the workers be 
women. Second, it ensures equal wages for men and women, with 
gender-specifi c productivity norms in the Schedule of Rates. Finally, 
the scheme mandates provision of work locally (within 5 kilometers 
of one’s residence) and child care facilities (if more than fi ve children
younger than age six are present at a worksite).
Focus on labor-intensive rural development works, with a heavy 
focus on water and irrigation activities as well as connectivity. In
addition to the list of specifi c types of works allowed under the Act,
additional types of works may be acceptable based on consultations
between the state and the central governments. Overall, the scheme 
maintains a 60:40 labor-to-capital ratio. Use of contractors or 
machinery in the execution of works is banned.
(Continued on the following page)
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unemployment allowance. The scheme is universal in that all rural 
households can apply for work. In this, the MGNREGS follows a 
demand-driven, rights-based approach that differs from the supply-
based approaches adopted by most earlier public works schemes. 
It is closest in spirit to the Maharashtra Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (MEGS) initiated in the 1970s.4
Local village governments (referred to as Panchayati Raj 
 Institutions [PRI ]) and communities play a central role. PRI leaders
and communities are meant to identify the list of works through dis-
cussions in village meetings (Gram Sabha). PRIs also participate in the
execution (at least 50 percent of works by value are to be imple-
mented through the Gram Panchayat), supervision, and monitoring 
of works (including through social audits).
A dedicated administrative structure for MGNREGS implemen-
tation. The Act makes specifi c provision for administrative costs to 
be borne by the center and supplemented by states. There is provision
for a dedicated cadre of MGNREGS offi cials and functionaries at the 
district, block, and Gram Panchayat levels that are responsible for 
implementing the program.
Emphasis on accountability through the use of information and 
communication technology tools and by relying on communities and 
third-party monitoring. Management information systems have been
developed based on administrative reporting of employment  generated 
and assets created. Field-based monitoring is carried out through the 
Ministry of Rural Development’s national fi eld-level monitors and local 
Village Vigilance and Monitoring Committees. Community-based mon-
itoring through social audits is also occurring in some states.
Center and state fi nancing. The central government share amounts
to 90 percent of total expenditure on the program. This share includes
100 percent of wage costs and 75 percent of the nonwage component
(including materials and wage payments to skilled and semiskilled 
workers, and most administrative tasks, subject to a maximum limit), 
working under an assumed 60:40 labor-to-capital ratio. States are 
responsible for paying 100 percent of unemployment allowance costs.
Source: World Bank 2011, based on MGNREGS operational guidelines
(www.nrega .nic.in) and various government orders.
a. Wage determination rules may change further because setting MGNREGS 
wages below the state-mandated minimum wage rates under the Minimum 
Wages Act has been challenged in court as a violation of the law and tanta-
mount to “forced labor.” This stand was upheld in September 2011 by a 
Karnataka High Court verdict that affi rms that the central government is obli-
gated to pay wages in line with the state minimum wage rate. In January 2012, 
the Supreme Court refused to stay the Karnataka High Court verdict. 
Box O.1 (Continued)
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• Wage payments under MGNREGS are entirely in cash, unlike 
previous programs that also had food components.
• MGNREGS is the fi rst social protection scheme to devolve 
 signifi cant resources to Gram Panchayats (GPs) and under which 
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) are given a central role in plan-
ning, execution, and oversight.5 In practice, the leader of the GP—
called the Mukhiya in Bihar—plays an important role in how the 
Act is implemented.
• The design of MGNREGS emphasizes transparency and 
accountability to a greater degree than previous schemes.
Advocates of this scheme have claimed that it could largely elimi-
nate poverty in rural India. For example, Drèze (2004) claims that 
the scheme “would enable most poor households in rural India 
to cross the poverty line.” That might appear to be a tall order, 
but there can be no denying that this is an ambitious and well- 
intentioned effort to fi ght poverty in India and that, in principle, it
has tremendous promise. 
Such a workfare scheme tries to reduce poverty in a number of 
distinct ways. The most direct and obvious way is by providing extra 
employment and income to the poorest in rural areas. The long-
standing incentive argument is that the work requirements in such a 
scheme mean that it will be self-targeting, that is, the nonpoor will 
not want to do such work, and poor people will readily turn away 
from the scheme when better opportunities arise.
Furthermore, by linking the wage rate to the statutory minimum 
wage rate, and guaranteeing work at that wage rate, the scheme 
becomes a means of enforcing that minimum wage rate on all casual
work, including work not covered by the scheme. Indeed, the exis-
tence of such a program can radically alter the bargaining power of 
poor men and women in the labor market, and also of poor people 
living in not-so-poor families, by increasing the reservation wage 
(the fallback position if a bargain is not struck). They may then 
benefi t even if they do not participate (Dasgupta 1993). 
Such second-round effects may be huge. Murgai and Ravallion 
(2005b) show that before the program started (based on the 2004/05 
National Sample Survey [NSS] round), three-quarters of India’s 
casual laborers were paid less than the country’s state-level statu-
tory minimum wage rates. The 2009/10 NSS round indicates that 
two-thirds of agricultural labor days were paid less than the mini-
mum wage for agricultural unskilled labor. Probably the only way 
to enforce a living wage in a developing rural economy is for the 
government to act as the employer of last resort. The spillover effect
on nonparticipants could account for a large share of the  poverty 
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impact of such a scheme, as shown by Murgai and Ravallion (2005a, 
2005b). 
The scheme also tries to address some of the underlying causes of 
poverty in rural India. It can help reduce future poverty by creating 
useful assets. For example, it can help regenerate the natural resource
base and expand rural connectivity through road rehabilitation.
The guarantee of work can provide valuable insurance against the
many risks faced by India’s rural poor in their daily lives and help 
underpin otherwise risky investments. Even those who do not nor-
mally need such work can benefi t from knowing it is available. The 
gains to the poor can also be accompanied by effi ciency gains given 
existing labor market distortions.6 Also, by its bottom-up, demand-
driven nature, the scheme aims to empower marginalized communi-
ties. It would be naive to think that self-effi cacy in demanding work 
will emerge overnight among poor people. However, creating the 
legal right is certainly a fi rst, positive step.
The idea of an employment guarantee is important to the 
 realization of these benefi ts. The gains depend heavily on the scheme’s 
ability to originate a supply of work to match the demand. Doing 
so is not going to be easy, given that it requires an open-ended pub-
lic spending commitment; similarly to an insurance company, the 
government must pay up when shocks hit. This kind of uncertainty
about disbursements in risky environments would be a challenge for 
any government at any level of economic development. Even if fl ex-
ibility in spending is not an issue, accommodating supply to demand 
will require state and local government administrative capabilities 
that could be a challenge, particularly in poor areas. If creating a 
right to work is not in the interests of those in power locally, and 
public capabilities for enforcement are weak, rationing can emerge
at the local level even when the central government is committed to 
providing funds.
Along with fi nancial resources and government capacity to imple-
ment, public awareness is also essential for success. Interest in the 
use of information-based interventions to improve service delivery 
and governance has increased recently. The premise is that lack of 
information is a decisive demand-side factor inhibiting successful 
participatory action by poor people to get the services to which they 
are entitled. Past studies lend support to this premise.7 However, 
incomplete information is only one of the reasons that poor people 
do not access the services due to them.8 Imparting information about
the available services does not necessarily make that information 
relevant and meaningful in their daily lives. People might not know 
their legal rights because there is no point to knowing them when the 
reality of their lives will never admit those rights. Greater knowledge 
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will not then be suffi cient for people to be willing and able to take 
action to get what they are due. The same factors that make poverty 
and underdevelopment persist may also make information about 
one’s legal rights largely irrelevant to one’s agency in  accessing 
services.
The word “public” in “public awareness” is key. Specific 
 individuals may know that they were denied work, but may not 
be aware that this is true of others as well. Local offi cials can 
exploit a degree of “plausible deniability” of large-scale rationing 
of work, as long as it is not too obvious. Supporters of MGNREGS 
have argued for active monitoring through social audits and local 
public disclosure of payments (see, for example, Drèze 2004). The 
little quantitative evidence available on the performance of Gram 
Sabhas (GS) suggests that when the GS is held it does improve the 
performance of public programs in reaching the poor in southern 
states (Besley, Pande, and Rao 2005).9 However, generalizing from
this evidence to the rest of India would clearly be hazardous; some 
states, including Bihar, have weak PRIs, which have a critical role 
in MGNREGS implementation.10 At the same time, the experience 
of civil-society-led social audits across the  country (particularly 
in Rajasthan) shows that mobilization of village communities is 
possible. However, making social audits a regular public scrutiny 
process in the absence of strong local community organizations 
is a challenge. Andhra Pradesh is one example in which the state 
government has developed an institutional mechanism for under-
taking audits of all MGNREGS works across the state (Aiyar, 
Kapoor Mehta, and Samji 2011; Aiyar and Samji 2009; Aakella 
and Kidambi 2007).
The Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
Bihar is the third largest, poorest, and most densely populated state 
in India. With a population of 104 million, which is 8.6 percent of 
India’s total, it is the largest state after Uttar Pradesh and Maha-
rashtra. Population density is very high and nearly four times the 
national average. One in six poor Indians lives in Bihar. In 2009/10, 
more than half (55 percent) of the rural population lived below the 
poverty line.11 Because of population growth, between 2004/05 and
2009/10, the number of rural poor people increased to 50 million 
from 45.4 million. Poverty rates have remained persistently high.12
The state has had one of the lowest long-run trend rates of poverty 
reduction in India; indeed, there is virtually no long-run trend reduc-
tion for the period 1960–2000 (Datt and Ravallion 2002). 
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Bihar is predominantly a rural state. The average level of urban-
ization in India is low, but at 11.3 percent it is even lower in Bihar 
(about one-third of India’s average). Changes in the structure of the 
economy are proceeding rapidly. During the past decade, agricul-
ture’s share in total output has fallen from 30.6 percent (in 2001–03) 
to 18.2 percent (in 2009–11). However, the drop in output has come 
at a time when the agricultural workforce has declined very slowly, 
leading to stagnant household incomes from farming. The state has 
one of the highest levels of rural landlessness and fragmented land 
holdings in the country. Because of its topographic and climatic con-
ditions, Bihar is also vulnerable to natural disasters (for example, 
droughts in the region south of the Ganges). About 73 percent of 
the state’s geographical area is fl ood prone, particularly in the north.
Bihar accounts for 17 percent of the fl ood-prone area and 22 percent
of the fl ood-affected population in India.13
For these reasons, MGNREGS should have great signifi cance 
to Bihar. The government of Bihar launched the program in 
22 districts in February 2006 with central government funding.14
Simultaneously, it launched the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (BREGS) in the remaining 16 districts with state government
 funding. The two schemes followed a common set of guidelines and 
processes, so in effect the scheme started in all districts in 2006 albeit 
with different sources of funding. In the second phase, beginning 
April 1, 2007, central government fi nancing was extended to all 
districts. This study refers to the whole scheme in Bihar as BREGS.
The formal processes followed by BREGS closely follow the Act, 
as fi gure O.1 illustrates. The starting point is when the  household 
obtains a job card, which forms the basis of identification for 
demanding employment. Job card holders can make an applica-
tion seeking work to the GP or block offi ce, stating the time and 
duration for which work is sought. Applicants are issued a dated 
receipt against which the guarantee of providing employment within 
15 days  operates. On the supply side, open assemblies of the GS 
are intended to identify suitable projects. The expressed demand 
for work is then to be accommodated on those projects emerging 
from the GS that obtain administrative and technical clearances.15
 Failing this, the worker is entitled under the Act to an unemploy-
ment allowance.
The scale of the program is unprecedented for Bihar.  Expenditure
on public works increased nearly four times from Rs 7,183  million 
in 2006/07 to Rs 26,320 million in 2010/11 (table O.1). By 
2010/11, about 13 million households—more than three-quarters 
of rural households—were registered for the program, that is, 
they had been issued job cards (table O.1). Administrative data 
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indicate that 4.7 million households—nearly 30 percent of rural 
 households—were provided employment, amounting to approxi-
mately 160  million person days. Of this, nearly half was performed 
by Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) workers and nearly 
30 percent by women.16 These fi gures suggest signifi cant expansion 
relative to previous public works programs in Bihar. For instance, 
previous programs generated only about 62 million person days in 
2005/06, just before the introduction of BREGS. Although about 
half of this employment was provided to SC/ST households, only 
about 21  percent was provided to women.
Figure O.1 Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
Flowchart
Source: Based on government of Bihar guidelines available at http://rdd.bih.nic.in/. 
Note: GP = Gram Panchayat; JE = junior engineer; km = kilometers; PTA =  panchayat
technical assistant; PRS = panchayat rozgar sewak.
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This Study
This study shows that BREGS has the potential to substantially reduce 
poverty in Bihar. If every rural household that indicates they want 
this work were to get the full 100 days at the stipulated wage rate, 
and did not have to give up any other source of income to take up this 
work, the poverty rate in rural Bihar would have been 37.6  percent in 
2009—12 percentage points lower than the 50  percent rate obtained 
by using median household consumption per capita as the poverty 
line, or a 14 percentage point impact compared with the estimated 
poverty rate in the absence of the program. Therefore, an idealized 
version of BREGS has the potential to achieve a sizable reduction in 
poverty in one of India’s poorest states.
But that potential is a long way from being met in practice. 
The estimates suggest that BREGS reduced poverty in 2009 by 
1  percentage point.
To inform policy discussions about how to ensure greater future 
impact, we need to understand why the scheme is falling so far short 
of its potential. There are a number of ways that an ambitious anti-
poverty intervention such as this might not realize its potential in 
practice:
• The work requirements may deter some of the poorest, who 
may not be fi t for such work as the result of undernourishment or 
disability, or poor health generally. 
• The process of actually applying for work may also discourage 
some poor people, notably those who have faced a history of social
exclusion and marginalization that has led to limited self-effi cacy in 
expressing their demand for any form of public entitlement.
• There may be unmet demand for work, in that not everyone 
who wants work can get it, or some get fewer days of work than they 
want. Inadequate funds, restrictions on the fl ow of funds, or limited
administrative capacity for implementation at the local level can 
result in less work being available on the scheme than is demanded, 
leading to rationing of the work. 
• The full wage rate stipulated under the scheme might not be 
received by workers because of leakage. 
• There is also likely to be forgone income, that is, some opportu-
nity cost to the worker from some forgone economic activity; these 
costs are largely unavoidable “deadweight losses.”
• The selection process for projects may be captured by local 
elites, and not refl ect the needs of poor people. 
To try to shed light on the overall impact and the importance 
of these various factors, we rely on a wide range of sources: 
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 administrative data, household surveys, a randomized intervention, 
and qualitative observations from fi eld work. Administrative data 
sources are known to be questionable in some respects, notably in 
assessing demand for work on the scheme (Drèze and Oldiges 2011). 
For that purpose, household surveys are clearly better instruments.
In fact, very little systematic information about demand for work is 
currently available. 
This book presents survey-based estimates for India as a whole as 
well as results for Bihar. Results for India are based on the 2009/10 
National Sample Survey (Schedule 10.0). The bulk of the  analysis 
on Bihar draws on a panel survey of rural households  commissioned 
by the authors for the purpose of this study (referred to as the 
BREGS survey). Two surveys were carried out in 2009 and 2010 
and spanned 150 villages spread across all 38 districts in Bihar. 
These data are supplemented by qualitative research in six districts
to  better  understand supply-side challenges.
This study is not a standard “impact evaluation” in which 
 average outcomes for those who participate in a program (some-
times  randomly assigned to it, sometimes not) are compared with 
outcomes for those who do not participate. We cannot observe any 
areas of Bihar in which the program was not in effect because Bihar 
fully scaled up almost immediately, rather than phasing the program 
into operation as occurred elsewhere in India.17
We need a different approach that still respects the principle 
of evaluation, namely, that impact is assessed relative to explicit 
counterfactuals. A distinctive feature of our methodology is that 
we identify the key counterfactual outcomes of interest—that is, 
what BREGS participants would have done in the absence of the 
program—by directly asking individual BREGS participants.18 The
advantage of this approach is that it produces an individual-specifi c 
estimate of impact—exploiting the information available for each 
participant—rather than delivering only a mean impact. Thus, it 
is well suited to distributional analysis. Its disadvantage is that it 
requires that a counterfactual question be asked, which is never easy 
(although not fundamentally different from the common method of 
asking about expectations of the future).
A potential shortcoming of this methodology is that counterfac-
tual outcomes reported by households do not provide a valid esti-
mate of mean impact on the treated for an employment guarantee 
scheme such as MGNREGS if the guarantee is being implemented. 
As Ravallion (1990) argues, the gains from such a program are very 
likely to spill over into the private labor market. If the employment
guarantee is effective, the scheme will establish a fi rm lower bound
to the entire wage distribution—assuming that no able- bodied 
worker would accept any work, including in the private sector, at a 
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wage rate below the public works wage. In such a case, one will 
incorrectly conclude that the scheme has no impact, because even 
the  counterfactual wages will be the same for participants and non-
participants. That would entirely miss the impact, which could be 
large for both groups.19 However, as we show later in this book,
although we cannot rule out the possibility that the scheme is caus-
ing a tightening of the agricultural labor market, the extent of the 
unmet demand for BREGS work does make one skeptical. 
Another potential shortcoming of the analysis is that we follow 
the standard practice in India of using household consumption per 
person as the welfare indicator when measuring poverty and assess-
ing performance in targeting the poor. However, this practice does 
not allow for the likely disutility of doing casual manual wage labor. 
This type of work (including working on MGNREGS) is physically 
taxing, of uncertain duration, and provides no employment benefi ts. 
Yet the consumption-based measures of welfare used for measuring 
poverty and assessing targeting performance in India attach no disu-
tility to doing such work. Two people with the same real consump-
tion expenditure are deemed to be equally poor regardless of how 
each derives that consumption.
We fi rst examine participation in MGNREGS across states using 
the 2009/10 National Sample Survey (Schedule 10.0). Chapter 1 
uses these data to document a substantial degree of unmet demand 
(“rationing”) in the scheme across states. The chapter identifi es 
likely reasons for rationing, including that state governments also 
care about the cost of providing employment under MGNREGS. 
These costs comprise identifying, hiring, training, and supervising 
the skilled manpower needed for organizing and supervising proj-
ects as well as establishing adequate systems for ensuring smooth 
fl ow of funds to local implementing agencies and for monitoring 
scheme performance. A state government may value the objectives 
of the Act, but it still faces a trade-off between guaranteeing employ-
ment to all who want it (as stipulated by the Act) and the costs of 
doing so.20
Alarmingly, we fi nd that the degree of rationing is greatest in the
poorer states that arguably need the scheme more. By and large, 
MGNREGS is working best where it is needed least. As chapter 1 
also shows, Bihar stands out as having not only the highest extent of 
rationing, but also above-average rationing given its level of poverty. 
The rest of the volume analyzes why the scheme seems to be working 
worst in one of the very poorest states.
In chapter 2 we use the BREGS survey to look at the demand 
for work and how much of that demand is actually being met. We 
 demonstrate that the unmet demand for work on the scheme in 
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Bihar is large. We also show considerable churning in the form of 
exits and entries into the scheme, and argue that this churning was 
largely involuntary in that many more households than did so would 
have liked to enter as well as remain employed in the scheme over 
time. We turn in chapter 3 to the task of providing a profi le of people 
attracted to the program, and of these, who gets work. Chapter 4 
examines the wages received, and we demonstrate that there is a 
 sizable gap between the wages reported by workers in the survey and 
the stipulated wages for the scheme as well as wages for other casual 
work. There is a similar gap with the wages recorded in the adminis-
trative data. We also explore the differences in wages between men 
and women and how wages are determined in the scheme versus 
in the casual labor market. Chapter 5 uses the survey responses to 
assess likely forgone incomes from BREGS participation. 
By combining the main elements in these chapters, we are able 
in chapter 6 to assess how closely BREGS is able to approximate 
the potential impact on poverty. Instead of a 14 percentage point 
reduction in poverty as would be expected under ideal conditions—
though (we would contend) not unlike the conditions envisaged 
by the scheme’s designers—we estimate that BREGS has reduced 
 poverty by about 1 percentage point. 
We then turn to the task of trying to explain why the actual 
 performance of BREGS in reducing poverty falls so far short of poten-
tial, and suggest specifi c actionable areas for reform. Both demand- 
and supply-side factors constrain participation. Chapter 7 describes
the impact on awareness of a randomized awareness intervention 
using a specially designed fi ctional movie about BREGS rights and 
entitlements. Finally, chapter 8 provides insights into  supply-side 
constraints to work provision. 
Main Lessons from the Study
India cannot claim success for its MGNREGS unless the scheme is 
working adequately where it is needed most, that is, in the country’s 
poorest areas. This study investigates the scheme’s performance in 
what is by some measures the country’s poorest state, Bihar, and 
provides comparisons with other states.
Under the idealized conditions that the scheme’s founders appear 
to have had in mind, everyone who wants work at the stipulated 
minimum wage rates should get it, up to 100 days per household 
per year, without having to give up any other income source to take 
up the work. We show that BREGS should then have a large impact 
on rural poverty in Bihar, bringing the poverty rate down by some 
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14 percentage points. If anything, this is likely to be an underesti-
mate given that it ignores likely spillover effects to casual wage rates 
for other unskilled work; it also ignores consumption gains from the 
extra assets created. However, the reality falls far short of this ideal. 
We estimate that the actual impact is about 1 percentage point.
When we use the survey data to understand this clearly disap-
pointing performance we learn a lot about how the scheme might 
work better. Even though public awareness of the existence of the 
scheme is growing, we fi nd that there is little understanding of even 
its most basic features. Few people understand that after getting a 
job card, they need to apply for work to get employment. In that 
sense, the fundamental principle of employment on demand has 
yet to sink in. Similarly, knowledge of other entitlements, such as 
the statutory wage, employment within 15 days, weekly wage pay-
ments, unemployment allowances, and facilities to be provided at 
the worksite, is minimal. 
We find compelling evidence that the scheme is reaching 
 relatively poor families. Certain types of households are rationed,
in that they want this work but do not get it. The rationing exhibits 
a clear gender dimension—households with large shares of adult 
women and female-headed households will not get the work they 
want. In general, the rationing process tends to favor those with 
characteristics associated with poor households: among richer 
households, those who have Below- Poverty-Line cards are less 
likely to be rationed. Those who lack the typical profi le of the poor 
appear to be more likely to be excluded from access to the scheme 
when they want it. This is evident in the effects of education and 
landholding on participation in the scheme, given other controls 
(including wealth).
Among those who do participate, we also fi nd a sizable gap 
between the wages actually reported by workers and the wages they 
are supposed to receive under the scheme. So workers are not getting 
all the work they want, and they are not getting the full wages to 
which they are due. In addition, leakage to unintended benefi ciaries 
(estimated as the gap between survey-based estimates and adminis-
trative records on wage disbursements) is substantial even though it 
is nowhere near as large as some casual observers have claimed or 
in comparison with that in other antipoverty programs.
If the potential gains to India’s poor are to be realized by 
MGNREGS, policy makers will need to focus on the substan-
tial unmet demand for work. Given the scheme’s current level of 
complexity, meeting this unmet demand will probably not be pos-
sible unless administrative capacity for implementing the scheme 
is strengthened. Better performance will require better state- and 
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local-level administration, monitoring, and reporting. The short-
age of the skilled manpower needed for these tasks clearly con-
strains the state’s ability to absorb funds and implement the 
scheme. Developing local administrative capabilities through 
training and providing incentives to staff and setting up strong 
fi nancial management and monitoring systems are high priorities. 
In particular, initiatives such as creating a state-level corpus fund 
and putting in place a centralized fund management system can 
smooth fund fl ows, thereby limiting one potential source of work 
rationing.
These enhanced administrative capabilities can also be used 
to ensure local public knowledge of households’ rights and of the 
scheme’s rules and local monitoring and grievance redress, and to 
facilitate better administrative response to demands for work. The 
essential aim is to radically change the entire calculus of costs and 
benefi ts facing local leaders and offi cials. If workers know and are 
confi dent that they can demand work at the stipulated wage, they 
will resist any attempts by offi cials to deny them or to take a cut 
from their wages. We have demonstrated that a public information
campaign using a movie can signifi cantly enhance workers’ knowl-
edge. However, it has little discernible average impact on actions 
such as seeking employment when needed or on the key scheme 
outcomes of wages and employment. Among selected subgroups, the 
only exception to the latter fi nding is that the movie helped illiter-
ate people secure extra work on existing BREGS projects. If such a 
campaign can be combined with more effective implementation of 
the scheme’s supply-side provisions and a more rapid fl ow of funds,
it should be possible to realize a greater share of the potential impact 
on poverty of this ambitious scheme.
It is important that reform efforts for MGNREGS work on both
of these aspects—a stronger, more capable, local administration, 
plus more effective participation by civil society. One without the 
other will not ensure a true “right to work.” 
Notes
 1. For further discussion, see Ravallion (1991) and Besley and Coate 
(1992).
 2. During the fi rst two phases, districts that were not covered by 
 MGNREGS continued to be covered by previous public works programs 
(that is, the Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana and the National Food for
Work Program).
 3. See the discussions in Drèze (1990) and World Bank (2011).
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 4. On this scheme see the discussions in Echeverri-Gent (1988), Drèze 
and Sen (1989), and Ravallion, Datt, and Chaudhuri (1993).
 5. The GP is a cluster of villages and is the primary unit of the three-tier 
structure of local self-governance in rural India. The next higher level of 
administration is the block, followed by the district. Locally elected bodies
at the GP, block, and district levels are referred to as the PRIs. The 73rd 
Amendment (1992) to the Indian Constitution mandated the devolution of 
powers and responsibilities to PRIs.
 6. The distortions could be caused by monopsony power in rural labor 
markets (Basu, Chau, and Kanbur 2009) or labor-tying (Basu 2013). Nor 
does the distortion need to be felt only in the rural labor market; it could
instead be manifested in the urban labor market by generating excess migra-
tion to urban areas (Ravallion 1990).
 7. Strömberg (2004) reports evidence that U.S. antipoverty programs 
have worked better in places with greater access to radios. For India, 
Besley and Burgess (2003) fi nd that the governments of states in which 
newspaper circulation is greater are more responsive in their relief efforts 
for negative agricultural shocks. In Uganda, Reinikka and Svensson (2005)
fi nd  signifi cant impacts on schooling of a newspaper campaign. Access to a 
televised soap opera in Brazil is found by La Ferrara, Chong, and Duryea
(2012) to lower fertility, especially among poor women. Jensen and Oster
(2009) fi nd that access to television led to less domestic violence and lower 
fertility rates in India. Not all studies have been supportive. Results of 
Banerjee and others (2010) are less encouraging on the scope for using 
information interventions to improve the monitoring of education service 
providers in India. Using a different community-based information cam-
paign, Pandey, Goyal, and Sundararaman (2009) report more supportive 
results in the same setting.
 8. What follows is not a complete list of the reasons. Useful overviews 
of the arguments and evidence on other social and behavioral factors 
 relevant to the success of information campaigns can be found in Keefer and 
Khemani (2005) and, in the context of immunization campaigns, Cappelen,
Mæstad, and Tungodden (2010).
 9. A GS is a body of all persons in the electoral roll for a Gram Panchayat. 
The Gram Panchayat convenes meetings of the GS to disseminate informa-
tion as well as to enable all households to participate in decisions relating
to development of the village.
 10. Bihar was one of the fi rst states to introduce PRIs, and GP elections 
were held every three to six years from 1952 until 1978. However, subse-
quently, no GP-level elections were held in the state until as late as 2001. 
For evidence on the differing performance of the panchayats across India,
see Mathew and Buch (2000).
 11. Estimates are based on offi cial Planning Commission poverty lines 
for 2009/10.
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 12. In a marked departure from past trends, offi cial estimates for 2011–12 
indicate a steep reduction in rural poverty to 34 percent in the two-year period 
since 2009–10.
 13. Flood Management Information System, Water Resources  Department, 
government of Bihar, available at http://fmis.bih.nic.in/history.htm.
 14. These districts were Araria, Aurangabad, Bhabhua, Bhojpur, 
Darbhanga, Gaya, Jamui, Jehanabad, Katihar, Kishanganj, Lakhisarai, 
Madhubani, Munger, Muzaffarpur, Nalanda, Nawada, Patna, Rohtas,
Samastipur, Sheohar, Supaul, and Vaishali.
 15. Works can also be introduced by the block- and district-level bodies, 
but have to be approved by the GS, which may accept, amend, or reject 
them.
 16. SC/STs comprise population groupings that are explicitly recognized 
by the Indian Constitution. SC/STs are earmarked for special treatment such 
as reservations in public sector employment and government-run educa-
tional institutions.
 17. A number of studies use the phasing in of the scheme across districts 
to evaluate the impacts of MGNREGS using a double-difference approach 
(see Azam 2011; Liu and Deininger 2013; Ravi and Engler 2013; Imbert and
Papp 2012; and Berg and others 2012).
 18. Jha, Gaiha, and Pandey (2012) also ask survey respondents working 
on MGNREGS whether they thought any other work was available. They
do not, however, ask for forgone incomes, but instead use prevailing wage 
rates for the imputation.
 19. See Ravallion (2008). Note that this would be true even if one could 
observe a group of participants randomly assigned to the program and com-
pare them with those “randomized out” of the program, or if a counterfac-
tual outcome were estimated by propensity score matching procedures.
 20. Very few states actually exhaust the central funds for administrative 
expenditure so do not, in general, have to invest from their own budgets. 
However, there are opportunity costs of time with regard to state capabili-
ties being mobilized to develop systems and recruit and manage the skilled
manpower, such as the panchayat rozgar sewak, and so forth.
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Does India’s Employment
Guarantee Scheme Guarantee
Employment?
The idea of an “employment guarantee” is clearly important for 
the full benefi ts of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employ-
ment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) to be realized. The gains 
depend heavily on the scheme’s ability to accommodate the supply 
of work to the demand for it. If MGNREGS in practice worked 
the way it was designed, there would be no unmet demand for 
work on the scheme. Anyone who wanted that work would get 
it. This is, of course, an exacting standard. In reality there may 
be frictions in implementation leading to some unmet demand for 
work, such that those wanting work do not get it in a timely man-
ner. The extent to which the employment guarantee is honored
will depend, in part, on how effectively and quickly the scheme 
responds to demand.
We begin this chapter with some theoretical arguments about 
why we might observe rationing of MGNREGS work even when 
there are no such frictions in responding quickly to demand. In other 
words, the employment guarantee required by the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (the Act, or NREGA) is not necessarily
attainable for more fundamental reasons. We then turn to the evi-
dence for India as a whole before, in subsequent chapters, taking a
much closer look at the scheme’s performance in Bihar. 
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Why an Employment Guarantee Need Not Be Attainable
The simplest way that unmet demand can emerge is when an 
employment guarantee scheme faces a hard budget constraint and 
the wage rate is set too high, given the demand for work on the 
scheme. A condition must be satisfi ed—expenditure on the program 
must not exceed the budget available—and rationing may be the 
only way to keep expenditure in check given the wage rate and the 
budget. For example, compelling evidence indicates that rationing 
emerged in the antecedent scheme to MGNREGS, Maharashtra’s
Employment Guarantee Scheme, when the wage rate on the scheme
was increased substantially in line with revised statutory minimum 
wage rates (Ravallion, Datt, and Chaudhuri 1993).1 The rationing
occurred mainly because of sluggishness in the opening of new work 
sites in response to demand.
Unmet demand can also emerge as an equilibrium outcome even 
when the central government makes an open-ended commitment 
for funding. We consider three ways this can happen. First is the 
scheme’s role in local electoral politics. MGNREGS provides impor-
tant resources for locally elected leaders to use to attract voters (see, 
for example, the interesting discussion in  Witsoe 2012). For this pur-
pose, local offi cials up for reelection must be able to control access
to the scheme—to be seen as the benefactor, not simply the conduit 
for the central government. Thus, the very idea of an “employment
guarantee” can be antithetical to local political processes. Those in 
power locally have little or no incentive to give up their ability to 
control who benefi ts from public spending, for that is in large part 
the way they maintain their power. 
Second, local administrative costs, not all of which are evident 
in offi cial data, must be considered. The provisions of the Act do 
not imply that there will be zero cost to local (state or lower level) 
budgets when employing workers under MGNREGS. As described
in box O.1, the center covers a large share of the cost, but rela-
tively skilled manpower at the local level is still required for orga-
nizing projects and workers. This cost will tend to be higher for 
governments with generally weak administrative capabilities or 
weak  Panchayati Raj Institutions, which have a key role to play in 
MGNREGS implementation. This need not be true of all govern-
ments in poor areas. However, as a rule, just as unskilled manpower 
tends to be abundant in poor areas, skilled manpower is scarce. And 
relatively skilled manpower is needed to manage a scheme such as 
MGNREGS, including for registering demand, vetting project pro-
posals, drawing up the technical estimates and engineering plans, 
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ensuring the required monitoring and reporting take place, and 
managing scheme funds, including reporting back to the center to 
access funds. The scarcity of skilled manpower or strong Panchayati 
Raj Institutions tends to make it harder, and more costly, for poor 
areas to implement such a complex scheme. The limited available 
skilled manpower will have a high opportunity cost if diverted to 
MGNREGS projects.
Arguably no less important to the functioning of the scheme at 
the local level will be the availability of “brokers” (variously called 
vichawlia or dalal) who can be trusted by local leaders to mediate
between them and the various stakeholders, including workers but 
also local offi cials and landowners. Based on close observation from 
fi eld work, Witsoe (2012, 50) explains the role of NREGA brokers 
in Bihar as follows: 
NREGA brokers had to be trusted allies of the mukhia [Mukhiya] 
(or else the mukhia would be unwilling to delegate so much 
power to them), had to have experience working with the block 
staff and bank manager, had to be able to recruit and manage 
laborers, while also “managing” landowners, and had to have 
the liquidity and drive to “invest” in a potentially rewarding 
but also somewhat risky enterprise. People with such a special-
ized skill set were in short supply. Given the complexities of 
implementing NREGA, and the realities of weak state capacity 
at the local level, without brokers, the project would likely not 
have functioned at all.
Thus, the local administrative cost of such a scheme may be quite 
high, especially when one takes into account these typically hidden
and scarce brokerage functions. To see what the scarcity of capacity 
implies for the scheme, we assume that the local government faces 
a trade-off between the administrative cost incurred per worker 
employed on MGNREGS and the benefi ts of extra local  employment. 
(“Local government” can mean any level below the center; similar 
trade-offs will presumably apply for both the state government 
and the local village-level government.) Of course, the local govern-
ment cares about the cost, given by the unit cost times the number of 
workers employed under the scheme. At the same time, we assume 
that it also cares about the amount of unmet demand for work on 
MGNREGS. The local government has the option of not hiring 
everyone who wants work, but it does not want to drive employment 
on the scheme down to zero. We can imagine that the central govern-
ment imposes some explicit penalty (in this case, an unemployment 
allowance), or that the local government is sympathetic with the 
objectives of the scheme, or that it perceives a likely political penalty 
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of unmet demand for work. For example, unemployment might gen-
erate protests from those whose demands for work are unsatisfi ed or 
from civil society groups sympathetic with the interests of potential 
MGNREGS workers. Future prospects for reelection might also be 
jeopardized. These penalties can be assumed to fall to zero when 
there is no unmet demand for work on the scheme but to rise with 
higher unmet demand. It seems plausible that the penalties will rise 
more steeply as the excess demand rises; at very high levels of unmet 
demand the protests may be vastly greater than at low levels.
So in implementing the scheme, the local government faces a 
trade-off between the cost of employing workers under MGNREGS 
and its desire to meet the demand for work as required by the Act. 
In the states with high administrative capability, there may be little 
trade-off. Indeed, if the unit administrative cost is suffi ciently low 
(in the precise sense defi ned in box 1.1), the local government will 
choose to honor the employment guarantee. But that cost may be 
quite high in very poor states with weak capability for organiz-
ing, supervising, and administering the work. Scarce skilled man-
power within the local administration will need to be diverted to
the scheme, at a potentially high opportunity cost, which cannot be
covered by the center. 
In fact, with a suffi ciently high administrative unit cost facing 
the local government, its desired level of employment has a particu-
larly simple form, as described in box 1.1. There will be a critical 
minimum level of demand before any work will be provided on the 
scheme. The higher the unit cost of providing work, the higher will 
be this critical minimum. As long as demand rises above this point, 
work will be provided, given by the difference between the level of 
demand actually observed in the state and its own critical minimum. 
At suffi ciently low administrative costs, the local government will 
choose to comply with the employment guarantee and employ all 
those who want work.
The third way that the guarantee might not be attainable locally is 
through what is often called “local corruption” (see box 1.2). Much 
discussion of corruption on MGNREGS has occurred,  particularly 
in the Indian media. Some have also tried to explain, model, or 
assess leakage (Niehaus and Sukhtankar forthcoming; Imbert and 
Papp 2011). Of course, corruption is hardly unique to this scheme,
and is also found in schemes that favor the nonpoor. However, the 
fact that MGNREGS is intended to fi ght poverty adds extra indigna-
tion about corruption.
“Corruption” is not easily identifi ed, though we note a number
of suggestive instances from both the fi eld observations and the sur-
vey data; for example, corruption is one possible interpretation of 
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Box 1.1 Effect of Local-Level Costs on Meeting Demand
under MGNREGS
The central government dictates that the local government should 
provide work for all those who want it at the stipulated wage rate. 
The central government pays the unskilled labor cost. The local gov-
ernment chooses the level of employment E to minimize a generalized
cost function:
 cE + p(D – E) subject to E ≤ D, (1.1.1)
in which c is the unit administrative cost of the skilled labor that the 
local government must fi nance and p(·) penalizes the unmet demand
for work, given an exogenous demand for work, D. It is assumed that 
the penalty function p is strictly increasing and convex with p(0) = 0. 
Let E* denote the level of employment that equates the marginal pen-
alty with the unit cost of skilled labor: p′(D – E*) = c. Inverting this 
function we have
 E* = D – f(c), (1.1.2)
in which f(·) is the inverse function of p′(·). The value of f(c) can be
interpreted as the minimum level of demand for work before the local
government will begin to hire any MGNREGS workers. It is readily
verifi ed that f(c) > 0 and f ′(c) > 0. If there is rationing in equilibrium,
it will be in the amount f(c). Above this, E* rises one for one with D. 
We can distinguish two regimes: In Regime 1, the level of c is
 “suffi ciently high,” in that c > c* where c* = p[f(c)]/f(c), which is the
Figure B1.1.1 Theoretical Relationship between Work Provided and
Demand for Work
Slope = 1
minimum
demand f(c) 
work
provided
(E) 
demand for
work (D) 
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the discrepancies between the survey-based estimates of wages paid 
and the administrative data for Bihar, although measurement errors 
may also be playing a role. However, we do not pay a great deal
of explicit attention to corruption in this book. Instead, we focus 
on the public administrative processes that can either foster or help 
reduce corruption. 
Nonetheless, one issue pertaining to corruption merits attention 
here, namely, the possibility that it might undermine the guarantee. 
At fi rst this claim seems surprising. One might expect corruption at 
the local level on such a scheme to eliminate any unmet demand for 
MGNREGS work. By this view, corrupt local offi cials will gain by 
hiring more workers and taking their “slice” of wage outlays. Thus, 
corruption would eliminate any rationing. 
However, this argument ignores the complexity of MGNREGS 
and how it works in the context of village politics. There are many 
checks in force, as is evident from the description of the scheme in 
box O.1. These checks mean that local offi cials can face a steep 
marginal cost of corruption. Corruption may then be perfectly con-
sistent with unmet demand for work in equilibrium. To make this 
point sharply, box 1.2 describes a simple model of local corruption 
that will yield rationing of work as an equilibrium outcome. There
is a demand constraint, but it only requires that the offi cials cannot 
employ more workers than want work; the constraint is not nec-
essarily binding. Beyond some level of employment, local offi cials 
will risk being exposed for the corruption. For example, they may 
need to go beyond their “comfort zone” in the people (especially 
the aforementioned “NREGA  brokers”) they trust to collude in the
corruption. The “bribes bill” will start to rise sharply. The steep 
marginal cost faced by local leaders will then limit the scope for 
expansion in the scheme, leaving unmet demand in equilibrium. 
penalty at the minimum level of demand per unit of demand. If c
exceeds this critical level, the cost of employing E* workers is less than
the cost of employing all those who want work. Then E* is the opti-
mal level of employment provided and there will be unmet demand 
in equilibrium, in that E* < D with f(c) workers rationed out of jobs. 
A reduction in the unit administrative cost will increase employment 
and reduce rationing. In Regime 2 we have c ≤ c*, so the local govern-
ment will choose to comply with the dictate to employ all those who
want work.
Box 1.1 (Continued)
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Box 1.2 Corruption and the Unmet Demand for Work
Suppose that local offi cials choose the level of employment E given an
exogenous demand for work on the scheme D to maximize profi t:
R(E) – C(E) subject to E ≤ D. (1.2.1)
Here R(E) is the offi cial’s own revenue from corruption at employ-
ment level E and C(E) is the cost of corruption. The marginal benefi t 
(MB) is R′(E) and the marginal cost (MC) is C′(E). It is assumed that
R′′(E) < C′′(E). Then there will be unmet demand in equilibrium if 
E* < D, where R′(E*) = C′(E*), as illustrated in fi gure B1.2.1. (The MB
function need not be decreasing, though we draw it as such.)
To make these functions more concrete we can suppose that for 
each person employed, the local offi cial gets a share of their wage on 
the scheme, but is constrained by the local market wage rate for
unskilled labor, denoted w. The offi cial’s share will then be 1 – w/wEGS
and R(E) = (wEGS– w)E. One can generalize this further by allowing
for the possibility that higher E puts upward pressure on the market
wage rate, implying that MB is not constant. The cost of corruption
C(E) can be interpreted as the side payments that the local offi cial
must make to cooperating agents. The total cost rises with the number
of workers employed because more workers will require that more
worksites be opened and that “ghost workers” be paid more, with
further side payments required to cooperating offi cials. It can also be
expected that the marginal cost will rise as employment rises; the local
offi cial may have to expand the set of people he bribes beyond his own
“comfort zone” of those he trusts, and even those he trusts will face
larger risks of exposure at large scale, and so require higher
compensation.
Figure B1.2.1 Theoretical Model of the Optimal Employment
Provided by a Corrupt Local Offi cial
MB
MC
DE*
employment provided
under the scheme 
marginal cost or marginal
benefit to local official 
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This model suggests that efforts to reduce local corruption by 
increasing its marginal cost will increase the extent of rationing 
(box 1.2). To the extent that efforts to “tighten up” the scheme 
focus on poor states and aim to increase the marginal cost of local 
 corruption—such as by introducing more checks or imposing stricter 
reporting requirements or higher penalties that vary with the scale 
of the corruption uncovered—this model can explain why we might 
fi nd more rationing in poor states, especially if they already have 
weaker monitoring mechanisms. 
The solution to corruption in this situation is to make the model 
outlined in box 1.2 irrelevant to the behavior of local offi cials. That 
requires that local offi cials have no power to enforce rationing in the 
fi rst place, so that the demand constraint becomes binding on their 
behavior. For the demand constraint to be binding those who want 
work under the scheme must be aware that the law entitles them to 
that work (or to an unemployment allowance if the work cannot be 
provided) and must be able to act on that awareness. Thus, adequate 
administrative and legal processes must be in place for addressing 
grievances and for punishing local offi cials who do not comply with 
the law. Ultimately, a demand constraint that is not binding on local 
offi cials can be taken to refl ect in no small measure the administra-
tive capabilities of the state. 
Performance in Meeting the Demand for Work 
across States 
The participation rate P in MGNREGS can be defi ned as the pro-
portion of rural households that obtain work on the scheme. The 
participation rate can be thought of as the product of the demand 
rate D, defi ned as the proportion of rural households that want 
work on the scheme, and one minus the rationing rate R, defi ned as
Two remarks can be made about the implications of this model. 
First, notice that an increase in the marginal cost of corruption facing
the local offi cial will decrease employment and increase rationing (as
can be seen in the fi gure B1.2.1). Second, notice that an increase in 
the wage rate on the scheme (where R(E) = (wEGS – w)) will increase
employment on the scheme, even though there is rationing. However, 
the gain in wages will go entirely to the local offi cials, not to the work-
ers on the scheme.
Box 1.2 (Continued)
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the proportion of those who wanted work but did not get it. Thus, 
for state i we have the following identity: 
Pi = (1 − Ri)Di, (i = 1, ..., n). (1.1)
Notice that the share of households that are rationed is the prod-
uct of the rationing rate and the demand rate. We shall call this the 
unmet demand, denoted Ui ≡ RiDi = Di − Pi.
How can the true demand for work, and hence the rationing rate,
be measured? The administrative data indicate virtually no unmet 
demand for work on MGNREGS. According to the administrative 
data, 52.865 million households in India demanded work in 2009/10,
and 99.4 percent of them (52.530 million) were provided work.2
However, these numbers are deceptive. What is called “demand for 
work” in the administrative data is the offi cial registration of demand,
recorded by local offi cials. For instance, in Bihar, as in several other
states, the administrative data claim that exactly 100 percent of those 
who demanded work got it. Yet we know from several studies that 
the work application process and the system for recording demand 
for work accurately are not yet in place (Khera 2011). Furthermore, 
state and local governments have an incentive not to report unmet 
demand given that they should then be paying unemployment allow-
ances (box O.1). Also, some people will undoubtedly be deterred from
formally demanding work from the offi cials, or do not even know that
they have the right to make such demands.
A better measure of demand for work can be obtained by ask-
ing people directly in their homes and independently of the scheme.
That is what the surveys used in this study provide. In this  section 
we will rely on the 66th Round of the National Sample Survey 
(NSS), conducted between July 2009 and June 2010, in all states. 
The Employment-Unemployment module (Schedule 10.0) of the sur-
vey included questions on participation and demand for work in 
MGNREGS, which allows us to estimate the demand and rationing 
rates across states. Three questions on the program were included: 
(1) whether the household has a job card; (2) whether it got work 
on the scheme during the last 365 days, for which responses were 
coded under three options—got work, sought but did not get work, 
and did not seek work on MGNREGS; and (3) if the household got 
work, number of days of work and mode of payment. In addition, 
the “daily status” block collected information on activities for all 
household members during the week preceding the survey, includ-
ing number of days worked and wages received, if they worked on 
MGNREGS public works.
In this chapter we limit the defi nition of participation and  rationing 
to whether households got work or did not get work. Unmet demand 
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can also take the form of getting fewer days of work than desired. 
Many households that participated were no doubt rationed in that 
they would have liked more days of work and still had fewer than 
the 100 days stipulated by the Act. We have no choice but to ignore 
this aspect of the scheme’s performance because the NSS did not ask 
how many more days of work the household wanted; all we know 
is whether the household wanted more work on the scheme. (We 
were able to relax this constraint in the Bihar survey, as is discussed
in later chapters.)
Table 1.1 gives the results by state for the participation rate, the 
demand rate, and the rationing rate. (The table also gives the female
share of employment, to which we return later.) “Demand” is defi ned 
as either getting work on the scheme or seeking work but not getting 
it. For India as a whole, 45 percent of rural households wanted work
on the scheme. Of these, 56 percent got work—a national ration-
ing rate of 44 percent. The rationing rate varied from 15 percent 
in Rajasthan to 84 percent in Maharashtra. Only three states have 
rationing rates of less than 20 percent. Bihar has the third-highest 
rationing rate. There is clearly large excess demand for work.
The data in table 1.1 display a puzzling feature: participation rates
are only weakly correlated with rural poverty rates across states as 
further illustrated in fi gure 1.1. If MGNREGS worked the way the
Act intended, this weak correlation would be surprising because one 
would expect the scheme to be more attractive to poor people, and 
hence to have higher take-up in poorer states. The same point holds 
for public spending on MGNREGS. Table 1.2 provides summary 
statistics on spending per capita for 2009/10 and 2010/11. The cor-
relation between MGNREGS spending per capita and the poverty 
rate is −0.02 using spending in 2009/10 and 0.04 for 2010/11.
Bihar stands out in these data as having one of the highest rural 
poverty rates and one of the lowest MGNREGS participation 
rates. Bihar’s participation rate is 0.22 below the regression line in 
 fi gure 1.1, making it an outlier (t-statistic = −3.16, using a White 
standard error).3 This is in stark contrast to states like Chhattis-
garh, Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal, which per-
form better in providing employment under the scheme. As noted 
above, at the all-India level, 56 percent of those households that 
wanted work on MGNREGS actually got it. In Bihar, rationing
was 78 percent; fewer than one-quarter of those rural households
that reported in the NSS that they wanted work on the scheme 
actually got it.
However, when we look at variation in the demand rate, we see 
the expected positive correlation with the poverty rate (with a cor-
relation coeffi cient r = 0.50) (fi gure 1.2). Poorer states tend to have 
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a higher percentage of households that want work on MGNREGS,
as one would expect. The reason this is not evident in fi gure 1.1 is
that the rationing rate also varies and is no lower in poorer states;
indeed, it is positively correlated with the poverty rate, though only 
weakly so (r = 0.183). It is this interstate variation in the rationing 
rate that explains why the participation rate is uncorrelated with the 
poverty rate across states.
The demand for MGNREGS work is also lower in Bihar than
would be expected, even given the state’s high poverty rate. Bihar
is an outlier in fi gure 1.2, with a demand rate for MGNREGS 0.14
below the regression line (t = −2.58). At a similar poverty rate, 
Chhattisgarh has a participation rate almost fi ve times higher than 
that in Bihar. Public spending in Bihar is also lower than one would 
expect, and roughly one-third the level in Chhattisgarh.
Poorer states have greater excess demand for MGNREGS, as
can be seen in fi gure 1.3. Figure 1.3 plots the share of the rural
population that is rationed—that is, the rationing rate times 
the demand rate—against the poverty rate. The extent of this
unmet demand is not only greatest in Bihar but high given its
poverty rate, with a value 0.05 above the regression line, making
Figure 1.1 There Is No Correlation between Participation
Rates in MGNREGS and the Incidence of Poverty across
Indian States
Source: Table 1.1.
Note: MGNREGS = Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme.
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it a  statistical outlier (t = 2.93). Therefore, the extent of unmet
demand is greater in Bihar for reasons in addition to its high
poverty rate. Something else is going wrong. We will learn more
about this in later chapters.
The rationing rate is highly negatively correlated with the partici-
pation rate (r = −0.882). This outcome is not surprising given how 
the rationing rate is defi ned, though the strength of the correlation
will also depend on the way the participation rate varies with the
demand rate, to which we now turn.
Although rationing is common, there is much less evidence of 
rationing at the margin than on average. As the model in box 1.1
indicates, the average participation rate could be lower than the
marginal participation rate among those who wanted work on
MGNREGS, given that a certain minimum level of demand in a
Table 1.2 Program Expenditure per Capita across States
Expenditure per capita (rupees)
State 2009/10 2010/11
Andhra Pradesh 749 896
Assam 406 358
Bihar 214 309
Chhattisgarh 723 884
Gujarat 214 226
Haryana 87 128
Himachal Pradesh 936 837
Jammu and Kashmir 221 445
Jharkhand 586 539
Karnataka 742 683
Kerala 186 276
Madhya Pradesh 734 707
Maharashtra 54 60
Orissa 281 455
Punjab 89 98
Rajasthan 1,133 647
Tamil Nadu 555 744
Uttar Pradesh 389 365
Uttarakhand 406 539
West Bengal 335 399
All India 464 477
Sources: Cumulative expenditures (including wage and nonwage spending) in cur-
rent prices during the 2009/10 and 2010/11 fi scal years were obtained from the 
Ministry of Rural Development website (http://nrega.nic.in). 
Note: To calculate expenditure per capita, the population projections for 2009 and 
2010 from the Registrar General of India were used.
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Figure 1.2 Demand for MGNREGS Work Is Greater in
Poorer States
Source: Table 1.1.
Note: MGNREGS = Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme.
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Figure 1.3 Poorer States Have Greater Unmet Demand for
Work on MGNREGS
Source: Table 1.1.
Note: MGNREGS = Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme.
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given state is probably necessary before work is provided. Indeed,
the marginal rate could also exceed unity. For example, it is possible
that when an extra household expresses demand for work, not only 
does that household get work, but there is a spillover effect on others 
who wanted work but had not yet gotten it.
The data across the states provide striking confi rmation of the model
in box 1.1. Figure 1.4 shows the relationship between the MGNREGS
participation rate and demand for MGNREGS work. Whereas the
average participation rate among those who want work is 0.56, the
marginal rate (as indicated by the regression coeffi cient of employment
on demand for work) is 0.91 (with a robust standard error of 0.09); the
intercept on the horizontal axis is 0.17 (standard error = 0.03), imply-
ing that the scheme would not have come into action if demand for
work was less than 17 percent of the  population of rural households.
Thus, once the minimum level of demand for work is reached,
extra demand is being met, on average. The low average  participation
rate refl ects the existence of the positive lower bound on demand,
below which work is not provided. Following the logic of box 1.1, 
this lower bound can be interpreted as the effect of the costs incurred
by state and local governments.
Figure 1.4 There Is Less Rationing at the Margin Than on
Average across States
Source: Table 1.1.
Note: MGNREGS = Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme.
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Again, Bihar is performing poorly relative to other states. Bihar 
has roughly the national average demand for work on MGNREGS, 
with 46 percent of rural households saying they want this work, as 
compared with 45 percent in India as a whole. However, as we have 
already seen, the extent of rationing is particularly high in Bihar; the 
actual level of employment on MGNREGS is 10 percent of Bihar’s 
rural households, while the relationship for all of India implied by 
the regression line in fi gure 1.4 indicates that 26 percent of rural 
households in Bihar would have gotten work.4
Why is MGNREGS not more active in poorer states? We 
postulate that being a poor state has two opposing effects on 
participation. First, greater poverty has an effect via a higher 
demand for  MGNREGS work. Call this the “demand effect” of 
poverty. We see confi rmation of this in fi gure 1.2, which illus-
trates the expected positive  correlation between demand for work 
and the poverty rate. The second effect is that poorer states tend 
to have greater unmet demand for work on the scheme. Call this 
the “rationing effect.” 
We suggest three reasons for the rationing effect on participation 
to work in a direction opposite that of the demand effect. First, 
poorer states will be less able to afford that share of the costs that 
are borne by state and local governments. Second, poorer states 
will tend to have weaker capacity for administering such a scheme, 
or may have weak Panchayati Raj Institutions, which have a key 
role in implementation. Third, the poor may be less empowered in 
poorer states. As shown in the next section, both poor and nonpoor 
people have a demand for work on the scheme, though the demand
is greater among the poor. If poor people tend to have less power 
to infl uence local decision making (refl ected in lower awareness of 
their rights under the Act), a higher poverty rate will lead the state 
government to put less weight on the need to accommodate their 
demand for work.5
These data tell us nothing about the relative importance of these 
three factors on the overall rationing effect. But we can certainly con-
fi rm evidence of a rationing effect. Poorer states have greater unmet 
demand for MGNREGS, as can be seen in fi gure 1.3.  However, the 
variation among poorer states should be noted. Some of the poorest 
states (Bihar, Jharkhand, and Orissa) have low participation rates 
and high levels of unmet demand. In contrast, other poor states such 
as Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and West Bengal per-
form better in providing employment under the scheme. For example, 
even with a similar poverty rate, Chhattisgarh has a participation 
rate almost fi ve times that of Bihar (table 1.1).  Public spending is 
also lower in Bihar, at roughly one-third of the level in Chhattisgarh.
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Using the identity in equation (1.1), a simple regression decompo-
sition can be used to identify these two effects in the data:6
Di = αD + βDHi + εiD, (1.2)
Ui = αU + βUHi + εiU. (1.3)
(Here εik for k = D, U are zero-mean regression error terms, and αk, βk are parameters.) Thus, equation (1.2) minus equation (1.3) gives 
how the overall participation rate varies with the state headcount
index of rural poverty H. The regression coeffi cient of demand for 
MGNREGS (based on the NSS responses) on the state poverty rate is 
0.583 (standard error = 0.189), meaning that a 10 percentage point
increase in the poverty rate comes with about a 6 percentage point
increase in the share of rural households demanding MGNREGS 
work, on average. The regression coeffi cient of U on H is 0.434 
(standard error = 0.097). The net effect (the estimate of βD − βU) is
0.149, but it is not signifi cantly different from zero (standard error 
= 0.293). Statistically, the two opposing effects can be said to can-
cel each other out, giving the relationship in fi gure 1.1, whereby 
poorer states have no higher participation in MGNREGS, despite 
the greater demand for work on the scheme.
Note that Bihar is, again, an outlier, with a participation rate 
that is about 7 percentage points lower than one would expect given 
both its demand for work and its poverty rate. Something else is 
going on in Bihar. We have seen that demand for work is lower than 
expected given Bihar’s poverty rate (fi gure 1.2). The chapters that 
follow examine the role of both of the factors identifi ed above—
weak capacity to implement and lower awareness of entitlements 
and processes among poor people. Furthermore, we argue that 
changing one alone will not ensure that the scheme will achieve its 
potential in Bihar. Effective action on both fronts will be necessary.
Targeting
By insisting that participants do physically demanding manual work 
at a low wage rate, workfare schemes such as MGNREGS aim to be 
self-targeted, in that nonpoor people will not want to participate. 
The substantial unmet demand demonstrated above raises the ques-
tion of how well this self-targeting mechanism works in practice. 
The rationing of the available work does not mean that targeting 
will not be pro-poor. For one thing, the manual work requirement
at a low wage rate will still discourage many nonpoor people from 
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wanting to participate. For another, the local authorities doing the 
rationing may favor the poor. The local offi cials who are deciding 
who gets work could either enhance or diminish the scheme’s target-
ing performance. A number of quantitative studies have explored 
the targeting performance of MGNREGS based on selected samples. 
The tests used have often been problematic.7 Dutta and others (2012) 
use India’s 2009/10 NSS to provide the fi rst comprehensive national 
assessment of targeting performance. Liu and Barrett (2013) expand 
on that analysis to provide more state-specifi c detail. What, then, 
does the evidence from the NSS survey for 2009/10 suggest? 
Table 1.3 gives the participation rate, demand rate, and rationing 
rate by rural household quintiles defi ned using household consump-
tion per person from the NSS.8 Results for both India as a whole 
and Bihar are provided.
As expected, demand for work on MGNREGS declines with 
consumption per person. Richer households are less likely to want 
to do this work, although there is demand even from the richest 
quintile in rural areas. Consistent with the incidence of expressed 
demand, the proportion of households that have obtained job cards 
declines with consumption per person. But notice that the demand 
rate is higher than the proportion with job cards; there are many 
households that expressed demand for work but have not obtained 
job cards.
Strikingly, however, across India as a whole, and for Bihar in 
particular, the rationing rate also tends to rise with consumption per 
person. The local-level processes of deciding who gets work from 
among those who want it mean that poorer households are less 
likely to be rationed, although the difference is modest.
The quintile averages in table 1.3 hide much detail. Figure 1.5 
provides a fi ner representation of the data from the NSS. The top 
panel illustrates the nonparametric regression function of the house-
hold participation rate against consumption per person, with the 
latter converted into ranks and normalized to be between 0 and 
100. Thus, the horizontal axis gives the percentile of the consump-
tion distribution.9 The lower panel illustrates the rationing rate. 
(The demand rate exhibits a similar pattern to the top panel, so is 
not shown separately.) Both panels show the regression functions 
 adding state dummy variables to control for state effects.10
The participation rate declines rather slowly until about the 
50th percentile of the rural distribution. In fact, no decline in 
 participation between the 30th and 40th percentile, in the neighbor-
hood of the national poverty rate, can be discerned; households just 
below the poverty line are no more likely to participate in MGNREGS 
than those just above the line. The marked decline in participation 
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rates does not emerge until the upper half of the rural consumption 
distribution. By the 90th percentile, the participation rate reaches 
about 10 percent. Although far fewer “rich” rural households 
 participate, some do. This phenomenon could refl ect recent shocks, 
or poor individuals within generally well-off households.
Figure 1.5 Participation and Rationing by Consumption per
Person, Rural India
Source: Estimates from Schedule 10.0 of the National Sample Survey (2009/10).
Note: LOWESS = locally weighted smoothed scatter plot; MGNREGS = Mahatma
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme; PLREG = partial linear 
regression.
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The rationing rate follows a U-shape, declining initially as 
 consumption increases until about the median, but then rising. 
However, this path clearly stems from the high rationing rates in 
most poor states demonstrated above. Thus, when we add state 
fi xed effects, a steady increase in the rationing rate emerges as con-
sumption increases across the whole distribution (the lower panel 
of fi gure 1.5). The greater unmet demand observed in poorer states 
is clearly not because the rationing process within states is biased 
against the poor. As emphasized, the more plausible interpretation
is that implementation capacity is weaker in poorer states.
The lower rationing rate for the poor does not, however, imply 
that more rationing would improve targeting. What the numbers 
in table 1.3 and the lower panel of fi gure 1.5 refl ect is the ration-
ing process at a given level of participation. When the participation 
rate rises as a result of a reduction in rationing, the self-targeting 
mechanism will start to play a bigger role. We will see evidence of 
this when we compare targeting performance across states with very 
different participation rates.
Also notice that, among participants, the days of work received
shows a slightly positive gradient with consumption per person. The 
pro-poor targeting is achieved through both demand for work and 
the rationing of work, not by the amount of work actually received.
It is of interest to compare targeting performance across states. 
Many measures of targeting performance in the literature might be 
used for this purpose. Ravallion (2009) surveys the various measures
and tests their performance in predicting the impacts on poverty of 
a large antipoverty program in China, called the Di Bao program. 
(This program provides cash transfers targeted to those with income 
below the locally determined Di Bao poverty lines.) Among all stan-
dard targeting measures, the one that performed the best (and by a 
wide margin) in predicting the program’s impact on poverty was the 
“targeting differential” (TD). The TD better refl ects differences in 
coverage, that is, the proportion of the poor receiving the program, 
than do other standard measures, which focus more on how well 
the scheme avoids leakage—the proportion of the nonpoor receiving
the program.
In the present context, the TD can be defi ned as the difference 
between the MGNREGS participation rate for the poor and that for 
the nonpoor. To interpret the TD, note that when only the poor get 
help from the program and all of them are covered, TD = 1, which is 
the measure’s upper bound; when only the nonpoor get the program 
and all of them do, TD = −1, its lower bound. This measure is easy to 
interpret, and it automatically refl ects both leakage to the nonpoor 
and coverage of the poor.
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Table 1.4 gives the TD and participation rates for the poor and 
nonpoor. Participation rates among the poor vary enormously
across states, from a low of 0.10 in Maharashtra to a high of 0.73
in Rajasthan. They also vary among the nonpoor. Although par-
ticipation rates are always higher for the poor, the gap with that
for the nonpoor is not large. The targeting differential for India as 
a whole is 0.12. (The TD for China’s Di Bao program was 0.27.)
Madhya Pradesh has the highest TD, at 0.22, while Kerala has the
lowest, at 0.01.
Table 1.4 also gives the rationing rates for the poor and nonpoor. 
Consistent with the all-India results in table 1.3, the nonpoor are
rationed more than the poor in almost all states (the only exceptions
are Kerala and Rajasthan).
The TD in equation (1.4) is determined by how the demand rates
and the rationing rates vary between the poor and nonpoor. A sim-
ple decomposition method can be used to show how much of the
targeting differential for state i is due to each factor: 
TD P P R D D
D residual
i i
poor
i
nonpoor
i
poor
i
nonpoor
i
poor
i
nonpoor
(1 )( )
( )R R .
= = − − −
 (1.4)
The bars above the variables in equation (1.4) denote fi xed reference
values, while Pk, Dk, and Rk are the participation rates, demand
rates, and rationing rates, respectively, for k = poor, nonpoor. TD
can thus be interpreted as the “self-targeting effect” (greater demand
for work among the poor—the fi rst term on the right-hand side of 
equation 1.4) net of the rationing effect (the extent to which the poor 
might be rationed more—the second term). (Because the decomposi-
tion is not exact—given the nonlinearity in equation (1.1)—there is 
also a residual.) 
Applying this decomposition, and using the all-India values
for the reference, we fi nd that 85.6 percent of the national TD is
attributable to the difference in demand between the poor and
nonpoor while 13.7 percent is due to the difference in rationing
rates. (The residual is negligible.) There are differences across states,
though the demand effect dominates in 17 of the 20 states. So, despite
rationing, the bulk of the pro-poor targeting is coming through the
self-targeting mechanism.
Targeting performance is better in states with higher overall
 participation rates. Figure 1.6 plots the two participation rates
from table 1.4 against the overall participation rate (table 1.1).
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The TD—the gap between the two lines—rises with the overall par-
ticipation rate, and the two are strongly correlated (r = 0.748).
Targeting performance also tends to be worse in the states with 
higher levels of rationing (the correlation between TD and ration-
ing rate is −0.71). However, this arises because (as already seen)
overall participation rates are low in states with higher degrees of 
rationing. Once the participation rate is controlled for, there is no
signifi cant partial correlation between the TD and the rationing rate
(the t-statistic is −0.611).11
Table 1.4 Targeting Performance of MGNREGS across
States
State
Participation
rate for the
poor
Participation
rate for the
nonpoor
Targeting 
differential
Rationing 
rate for 
the poor
Rationing 
rate 
for the 
nonpoor
Andhra 
Pradesh 0.513 0.322 0.191 0.215 0.259
Assam 0.233 0.149 0.085 0.523 0.590
Bihar 0.127 0.075 0.052 0.756 0.816
Chhattisgarh 0.571 0.386 0.186 0.260 0.366
Gujarat 0.298 0.185 0.114 0.319 0.490
Haryana 0.106 0.037 0.069 0.701 0.760
Himachal
Pradesh 0.510 0.318 0.192 0.173 0.206
Jharkhand 0.237 0.163 0.075 0.613 0.641
Karnataka 0.126 0.065 0.061 0.503 0.703
Kerala 0.116 0.112 0.005 0.535 0.516
Madhya
Pradesh 0.534 0.319 0.215 0.297 0.438
Maharashtra 0.096 0.025 0.071 0.738 0.898
Orissa 0.317 0.135 0.182 0.509 0.650
Punjab 0.145 0.035 0.110 0.729 0.872
Rajasthan 0.728 0.579 0.149 0.166 0.150
Tamil Nadu 0.484 0.302 0.182 0.093 0.219
Uttar 
Pradesh 0.242 0.120 0.122 0.483 0.582
West Bengal 0.559 0.379 0.179 0.282 0.376
All India 0.325 0.210 0.115 0.428 0.463
Source: Calculations from the National Sample Survey (2009/10).
Note: Households are classifi ed as poor or nonpoor based on poverty lines for
the National Sample Survey Schedule 10.0 that would yield the same state-specifi c
poverty rates as estimated from the National Sample Survey Schedule 1.0, and
reported in table 1.1. All-India fi gures reported in this table include only the states
shown. MGNREGS = Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme.
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So we fi nd that targeting performance tends to improve with 
higher overall participation rates, which also tend to come with 
lower rationing rates. The fact that targeting performance improves 
as the program expands makes this an example of what Lanjouw 
and Ravallion (1999) call “early capture” by the nonpoor, which 
they show to be a common feature of access to safety nets and 
schooling in India (using data for the 1990s).12 Lanjouw and 
Ravallion (1999) also show in a theoretical model of the political 
economy of targeted programs that for programs with relatively 
large start-up costs, early capture by the nonpoor may be the only 
politically feasible option (especially when the start-up costs must 
be fi nanced domestically). So this feature of MGNREGS is possibly 
not surprising.
Targeting by social groups (castes and tribes) is another dimension 
of interest in India. Qualitative studies have suggested that Sched-
uled Castes (SCs), Scheduled Tribes (STs), and women—groups that 
have traditionally been excluded—have benefi ted disproportion-
ately from the scheme (Drèze and Khera 2011). We shall return to 
discuss participation by women. The focus here is on the scheme’s 
performance in reaching ST, SC, and Other Backward Class (OBC) 
households.
Figure 1.6 Targeting Performance Rises with the Overall
Participation Rate across States
Source: Estimates from Schedule 10.0 of the National Sample Survey (2009/10).
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Table 1.5 gives the participation rates by these groupings. 
Nationally, 42 percent and 34 percent of rural ST and SC house-
holds, respectively, participated. Participation was lower for OBCs 
at 21 percent, and lowest for all others at 16 percent. But there is 
a wide range across states. For STs, the range is from 6 percent of 
households in Maharashtra to 82 percent in Rajasthan, whereas for 
SC households it is from 2 percent to 65 percent, and for the same
states. Table 1.5 also reports the targeting differential for STs, SCs, 
and OBCs together, defi ned as their weighted average participation 
rate less the participation rate for “others.” This “caste TD” varies 
from −0.02 in Assam to 0.29 in Chhattisgarh, with a national mean
of 0.12, almost identical to the national “poverty TD” in table 1.4.
As with the poverty TD, the caste TD is positively correlated with 
overall participation rates (r = 0.723). This correlation is also evi-
dent in fi gure 1.7, which plots participation rates against the overall 
participation rates across states. The participation rates for STs, SCs, 
and OBCs rise faster than that for “others” as the overall participa-
tion rate rises, suggesting that the targeting of disadvantaged castes
improves with program expansion. 
Wages and Rationing on MGNREGS
A number of concerns about the stipulated wage rates for the pro-
gram have arisen. On the one hand, it has been argued that setting 
scheme wages below the state-mandated rates under the Minimum 
Wages Act is a violation of the law and tantamount to “forced 
labor,” a stand that was upheld by the Supreme Court in January 
2012.13 On the other hand, concerns have been raised that the wage 
rate on MGNREGS is being set too high relative to actual casual 
labor market wages. The concern is that the scheme will divert 
workers from market work and so bid up the market wage rate.14
(Supporters of the scheme usually count this as a benefi t.)
What does the evidence suggest? Table 1.6 reports average wage 
rates from the administrative data. These are calculated as total 
MGNREGS spending on unskilled labor divided by total person 
days of employment provided.15 The table also reports estimates for 
average wages in private casual labor from the NSS for the same 
year.16
The MGNREGS wage rate is not well above the market wage rate 
everywhere. Indeed, for India as a whole the two wages are quite 
close. If rural India were a single labor market, it could be conjec-
tured that the scheme has brought the two wage rates into parity. 
However, rural India is not one labor market because mobility is 
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imperfect. In half of the states, the MGNREGS wage rate in 2009/10 
was actually lower than the average wage rate for casual labor. 
Given the extent of rationing in a number of states (including most
of the poorest half), it seems implausible that the scheme would be 
having a large impact on wages for other casual work in those states, 
let alone resulting in a higher casual wage than for MGNREGS. For
example, with only 17 percent of those who wanted work on the
scheme in Punjab getting that work, the casual (non-public-works
[non-PW]) wage rate being greater than the MGNREGS wage rate
is not likely to be due to competition for workers.
The relative wage—the mean wage rate for casual non-PW labor 
divided by the MGNREGS wage—does tend to be lower in states
with higher levels of unmet demand. Let Wi /WiEGS be the relative
wage in state i, where Wi is the wage rate in the non-PW casual
labor market and WiEGS is the MGNREGS wage rate. The corre-
lation coeffi cient between ln(Wi /WiEGS) and unmet demand (Ui) is
–0.558, which is signifi cant at the 1 percent level.17 However, there
Figure 1.7 Participation Rates for Scheduled Tribes,
Scheduled Castes, and Other Backward Classes Rise Faster
Than That for “Other” Castes as the Overall Participation
Rate Increases across States
Source: Estimates from Schedule 10.0 of the National Sample Survey (2009/10).
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are reasons to question whether this really refl ects greater tighten-
ing of the casual labor market in states where there is less unmet 
demand for work on the scheme. The implied relative wage rate at 
zero rationing seems too high to be believed. To see why, postulate 
that the relative wage depends on the excess demand as follows:18
 ln(Wi /WiEGS) = α + β(Di − Pi) + εi. (1.5)
Table 1.6 Average Wages on MGNREGS and in Casual
Labor, 2009/10
State
Average 
wage rate on
MGNREGS
(rupees/day)
Average casual wage rate 
(rupees/day)
Overall Male Female
Andhra Pradesh 91.9 98.5 115.4 75.7
Assam 87.0 90.1 94.4 74.9
Bihar 97.5 79.4 81.0 65.8
Chhattisgarh 82.3 68.8 70.8 65.5
Gujarat 89.3 83.3 87.3 71.0
Haryana 150.9 139.6 146.1 99.1
Himachal Pradesh 109.5 139.6 141.4 110.2
Jammu and Kashmir 93.3 158.3 157.5 —
Jharkhand 97.7 101.2 103.6 82.2
Karnataka 86.0 84.5 96.9 62.8
Kerala 120.6 206.5 226.6 119.3
Madhya Pradesh 83.7 69.0 74.5 58.1
Maharashtra 94.3 75.2 86.0 58.2
Orissa 105.9 75.6 81.0 59.1
Punjab 123.5 130.4 133.5 91.8
Rajasthan 87.4 125.7 132.3 94.3
Tamil Nadu 71.6 110.8 132.1 72.6
Uttar Pradesh 99.5 94.3 97.0 69.2
Uttarakhand 99.0 118.7 122.1 96.7
West Bengal 90.4 85.3 87.8 65.9
All India 90.2 93.1 101.5 68.9
Sources: Casual wages from Key Indicators of Employment and Unemployment 
in India, 2009/10, National Sample Survey Organization, government of India
(June 2011). MGNREGS expenditure and employment data are from the state-wise
Monthly Progress Reports available at www.nrega.nic.in.
Note: MGNREGS wage rates estimated as total expenditure on wages for unskilled 
labor divided by total number of person days of employment for fi scal year 2009/10
(April 2009 to March 2010). Casual wages for June 2009 to July 2010 period are 
based on the National Sample Survey 66th round. “All India” includes smaller states 
not reported. Female wage rate for Jammu and Kashmir not reported on account of 
small sample (seven observations). MGNREGS = Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme; — = not available.
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The expected value of the log relative wage rate when all demand 
for work on MGNREGS has been satisfi ed is then given by α. Using
the data in tables 1.1 and 1.6, the estimated (least squares) value of 
α is 0.398 (standard error = 0.105) and the estimate of β is –1.777 
(standard error = 0.519; R2 = 0.311). These results imply that, when
all demand for work is satisfi ed, the market wage rate would be 
50 percent higher than the MGNREGS wage rate.19 Yet the work is 
very similar, and there is no obvious reason why such a differential
would exist in equilibrium. The incidence of rationing across states 
could be picking up some other factor correlated with it. Following 
the earlier discussion, poverty is a plausible candidate. Adding the 
poverty rate to equation (1.5), the effect of unmet demand becomes
insignifi cant (probability = 0.19) whereas the poverty rate is signifi -
cant (a coeffi cient of 0.828, with standard error of 0.333). A higher 
poverty rate may be associated with greater landlessness and hence 
a larger supply of casual labor, bringing down the wage rate.
So the argument that these data suggest a causal effect on relative 
wages of greater competition between the scheme and the casual 
labor market in India’s poorer states is not persuasive. We return to 
this issue for Bihar in chapter 4.
Participation by Women
Nationally, almost half (48 percent) of the employment registered 
in the administrative data for 2009/10 was for women.20 This share 
is very high for a country in which a minority of women participate 
in the paid labor force; for example, it is about twice their share of 
other (non-PW) casual wage work.21 The variation across states is
striking; between the two extremes, only 7 percent of the work goes
to women in Jammu and Kashmir as compared with 88 percent in 
Kerala (table 1.1). The female share on MGNREGS work is greater
than their share of the work in the casual wage labor market in all 
states, but the gap tends to be larger in states in which women par-
ticipate less in the casual labor market (fi gure 1.8).
In this respect also, poorer states are different. Women are less 
likely to participate (relative to men) in MGNREGS in poorer 
states. Figure 1.9 plots the share of person days of employment 
going to women against the poverty rate. We see a negative cor-
relation (r = −0.47). By contrast, women’s share of casual (non-PW)
wage work tends to be slightly higher, on average, in poorer states, 
although the difference is not statistically signifi cant (r = 0.09).
Why is less of the available work going to women in poorer states? 
The NSS does not allow rationing at the individual level to be  identifi ed 
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(it is a household variable). However, some clues to how rationing has 
affected women can be gained from the interstate comparisons. It 
would seem unlikely that the effect of household poverty on demand 
for work among women is any different than among men.22 Assum-
ing that the effect of being a poorer state on demand for work is the 
same for men and women, the pattern in fi gure 1.10 suggests that the 
rationing process is worse for women in poorer states. 
Do women have equal access to the scheme when they need it? 
Again, the NSS data do not provide a direct answer. However, the
patterns in the interstate data are suggestive. We observe a  negative 
correlation between the female share of work and the overall ration-
ing rate (fi gure 1.10). It might be conjectured that this negative 
 correlation refl ects differences in the extent of poverty. Women may 
be less aware of their rights and less empowered to demand work in 
poorer states. For example, when other work is scarce, women may 
get crowded out by men. However, the negative correlation between
the female share of work and the rationing rate persists when we 
control for the poverty rate, as can be seen in table 1.7, which gives 
regressions for the female share of employment on MGNREGS 
Figure 1.8 Women Get a Larger Share of MGNREGS Work
Than of Casual Wage Labor across States
Source: Estimates from MGNREGS administrative data and Schedule 10.0 of the 
National Sample Survey (2009/10). 
Note: MGNREGS = Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme.
0
20
40
60
80
100
5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
female share of work in the casual labor market (%)
Kerala
Tamil Nadu
Jammu and
Kashmir
Rajasthan
r = 0.45
fe
m
al
e 
sh
ar
e 
of
 w
or
k 
on
 M
gn
re
gs
 (
%
)
Line of
equality
Regression
line
INDIA’S EMPLOYMENT GUARANTEE SCHEME 55
against both the rationing rate and the poverty rate. This negative 
correlation between the overall rationing rate and the share of work 
going to women implies that women are more likely to be rationed 
out of work than are men.
Chapter 2 directly measures rationing at the individual level in 
Bihar, using the specially designed survey. That chapter provides 
direct evidence that the rationing rate is higher for women than for 
men in Bihar.
Gender differences in the opportunities available in the casual 
labor market can also be expected to infl uence demand for work. We 
fi nd that the female market wage rate has a signifi cant negative effect 
on women’s share of the work provided, whereas the male wage rate 
has the opposite effect (table 1.7).23 This outcome suggests that there 
is an intrahousehold substitution effect; for example, when casual 
labor market opportunities are good for men but bad for women, 
women fi nd it easier to get the (limited) number of jobs available 
Figure 1.9 The Share of Work Going to Women Tends to Be
Lower in Poorer States
Source: Estimates from MGNREGS administrative data and Schedule 10.0 of the
National Sample Survey (2009/10).
Note: MGNREGS = Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme; PW = public works.
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on the scheme.24 The wage effect is strong statistically, and greatly 
increases the explanatory power.25
The negative effect of rationing on women’s access to the scheme
also persists when we control for differences in the wages received
for private (non-PW) casual work. The fi nal column gives the pre-
ferred regression in which the share of MGNREGS work going to 
women depends on the overall rationing rate—implying that women 
are more rationed than men—and the female market wage relative 
to the male wage.
Conclusion 
Demand for work on MGNREGS tends to be higher in poorer states. 
This higher demand appears to refl ect the scheme’s built-in “self-tar-
geting” mechanism, whereby nonpoor people fi nd work on the scheme
less attractive than do poor people. However, actual participation rates 
in the scheme are not, as a rule, any higher in poorer states, where it is
needed the most. The reason for this paradox lies in the differences in 
the extent to which the employment guarantee is honored. The answer 
Figure 1.10 The Share of Work Going to Women Tends to
Be Lower in States with Higher Rationing
Source: Estimates from Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Scheme (MGNREGS) administrative data and Schedule 10.0 of the National Sample 
Survey (2009/10).
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to the question posed in the title of this chapter is clearly “no.” Ration-
ing is common, but far more so in some of the poorest states.
We do not fi nd that the local-level processes determining who 
gets work among those who want it are generally skewed against 
the poor. There are sure to be places where this is happening (and 
 qualitative fi eld reports have provided examples), but it does not 
appear to stand up as a generalization. We do fi nd evidence that the
poor fare somewhat less well when it comes to the total number of 
days of work they manage to get on the scheme. However, despite 
the pervasive rationing, it is plain that the scheme is still reach-
ing poor people and also reaching the Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled 
Castes, and Other Backward Classes.
Participation rates on the scheme are higher for poor people than 
for others. This fi nding holds at the offi cial poverty line, but the 
Table 1.7 Regression Results for Female Share of 
Employment in MGNREGS
Full 
sample
Sample with
headcount index
available
Sample with male
and female wages
available
Constant 0.676
(8.671)
0.829
(5.341)
0.193
(0.887)
0.131
(0.246)
0.697
(3.922)
Rationing rate −0.505
(−3.758)
−0.419
(−2.898)
−0.307
(−2.904)
−0.456
(−5.108)
−0.469
(−5.972)
Headcount index of 
rural poverty
−0.515
(−1.538)
0.241
(1.518)
Female casual
non-PW wage 
(log) 
−0.549
(−2.056)
−0.744
(−3.475)
Male casual non-PW 
wage (log)
0.675
(5.156)
0.806
(3.556)
Female wage
 relative to male
wage (log)
−0.836
(−3.301)
R2 0.336 0.467 0.811 0.692 0.687
Standard error of 
estimate 0.164 0.145 0.093 0.111 0.108
Number of 
 observations 20 18 18 19 19
Source: Estimates from National Sample Survey 2009/10 data.
Note: The dependent variable is the share of total person days of employment 
on MGNREGS going to women. The rationing rate is the share of households who 
wanted work but did not get it. The headcount index is the percentage of popula-
tion below the poverty line. The t-ratios in parentheses are based on White standard 
errors. MGNREGS = Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme; PW = public works.
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scheme is also reaching many families just above the offi cial line. 
It is only at relatively high consumption levels that participation 
drops off sharply. This participation of people above the poverty 
line should not be interpreted as indicating that well-off families 
in rural India are turning to MGNREGS. There may be shocks
that are not evident in the household consumption aggregates, and 
there may be individual needs for help that are not evident in those 
aggregates.
Targeting performance varies across states. The overall participa-
tion rate seems to be an important factor in accounting for these inter-
state differences, with the scheme being more pro-poor and reaching 
Scheduled Tribes, Scheduled Castes, and Other Backward Classes 
more effectively in states with higher overall participation rates. 
Although the allocation of work through the local-level rationing 
process is not working against the poor, there are clearly many poor 
people who are not getting help because the employment guarantee 
is not in operation almost anywhere (Himachal Pradesh, Rajasthan, 
and Tamil Nadu could be the exceptions, where 80 percent or more 
of those who want work got it). And other potential benefi ts of the 
scheme, notably the empowerment gains and the insurance benefi ts, 
are almost certainly undermined by the extensive rationing. The 
fi rst-order problem for MGNREGS is the level of unmet demand.
The scheme is popular with women—their participation rate is 
double their participation rate in the casual labor market—but the 
rationing process does not appear to be favoring them. We also 
fi nd evidence of a strong effect of relative male-to-female market 
wages on women’s  participation. As one would expect, poor fami-
lies appear to choose whether it is the man or the woman who goes 
to the scheme according to relative wages. 
It has been claimed by some observers that the scheme is driving 
up wages for other work, such as in agriculture; some observers see 
this as a good thing, others not. For India as a whole, we fi nd that 
the scheme’s average wage rate was roughly in line with the casual 
labor market in 2009/10. This equivalence might look like a com-
petitive labor market equilibrium, but that view is hard to reconcile
with the extensive rationing we fi nd. It is interesting that we do fi nd 
a signifi cant negative correlation between the extent of rationing and 
the wage rate in the casual labor market relative to the wage rate 
on the scheme. Although this is suggestive, on closer inspection we 
are more inclined to think that other economic factors are at work. 
Indeed, the correlation largely vanishes when we control for the level 
of poverty. Poorer states tend to see both more rationing of work 
on the scheme and lower casual wages—possibly as the result of a 
greater supply of labor given the extent of rural landlessness.
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Notes
 1. There is also evidence that the scheme’s targeting performance 
 deteriorated when the wage rate rose substantially (Gaiha 1997). 
 2. See government of India website for MGNREGS (http://nrega.nic 
.in).
 3. Note that Bihar’s participation rate of 10 percent in table 1.1 is well 
below the 26 percent implied by the administrative data reported in 
table O.1. We turn to the issue of discrepancy between survey aggregates 
and administrative data in chapter 4.
 4. The standard error of the predicted value for Bihar is 1.9 percent, so 
the 95 percent confi dence interval is from 23 percent to 30 percent.
 5. Note that this third reason for the direct effect of poverty is not 
consistent with a model of public decision making based on standard utili-
tarian calculus, for then one would expect the policy weight on accommo-
dating the demand for work to be higher in states with a higher share of 
poor people who need that work more than do the nonpoor. 
 6. Dutta and others (2012) provide a “structural model” of participa-
tion rates as a function of demand rates and poverty incidence, also suggest-
ing that states with higher poverty incidence tend to have greater unmet 
demand for work on the scheme.
 7. Jha and others (2009) report evidence that households with larger 
landholdings were more likely to participate in the scheme in Andhra Pradesh
(AP), though they fi nd evidence of better targeting in Rajasthan. They conclude 
that the scheme is being “captured” by the nonpoor in AP. Note, however, that 
their regressions control for other variables that may capture poverty, includ-
ing occupation and whether the household has a Below-Poverty-Line (BPL)
card. The full regressions are not presented in their paper, but it may be that, 
for example, having a BPL card is already capturing the pro-poor targeting of 
MGNREGS, but that the BPL card puts too high a weight on landlessness from 
the point of view of explaining  participation. Then the amount of land may 
appear to have the wrong sign, even though the scheme is targeting the poor.
By contrast, the results of Liu and Deininger (2013) suggest quite pro-poor 
targeting of MGNREGS in AP. Shariff (2009) reports participation regres-
sions for MGNREGS in selected backward districts of northern states (includ-
ing some districts in Bihar). Some of the regression coeffi cients also suggest 
perverse targeting. Shariff is careful in interpreting the results though the same 
inferential concerns hold as for the study by Jha and others (2009).
 8. Household quintiles were drawn after correcting per capita con-
sumption for cost-of-living differences across states using the price defl ators
implicit in the Tendulkar poverty lines.
 9. Alternatively, one can just use, for example, log consumption per 
person. However, given the uneven spread of the data across levels of 
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 consumption, this can be deceptive at the tails. Using percentiles instead 
ensures a uniform distribution of the data.
 10. The curve without controls is based on a locally weighted smoothed 
scatter plot (LOWESS). The curve with state controls is fi tted using a partial
linear regression model procedure described in Lokshin (2006).
 11. The TD is also positively correlated with the demand rate (r = 0.671), 
but this too vanishes when one controls for the participation rate (the 
t-statistic for the partial correlation coeffi cient is 0.151).
 12. Lanjouw and Ravallion (1999) study public works programs, the 
Integrated Rural Development Program, the Public Distribution System, 
and school enrollment.
 13. The Supreme Court has refused to stay a September 2011 Karnataka 
High Court verdict that affi rms that the central government is liable for 
paying wages in tandem with the states’ minimum wage rates.
 14. Evidence for the impact of the scheme on raising market wages is 
reported by Imbert and Papp (2012) who compare districts that started 
early on the scheme with those that started later. However, they do not 
examine the extent of rationing.
 15. The scheme stipulates both piece rates and daily rates. Under the 
piece rate, whether a given worker can earn the mandated wage rate depends
on her work effort. If the scheme attracts workers with lower-than-average
physical ability, the realized average wage rate by our calculations can fall
short of the mandated wage.
 16. Note that the reference periods for MGNREGS and casual market 
wages reported in the table are slightly different.
 17. The fi t is slightly better using the log relative wage; using Wi /WiEGS
instead, the correlation coeffi cient is −0.520.
 18. Using Wi /WiEGS as the dependent variable, the estimated intercept is
1.466 (standard error = 0.132). Given the uncertainty about the true func-
tional form, we also tried a quadratic function of excess demand but it did
not improve the fi t. 
 19. Note that exp (0.398) = 1.489 is the implied ratio of the levels of wages.
 20. Although the administrative data are inadequate for measuring 
aggregate demand for work, there is no obvious reason to question their 
veracity for measuring the gender composition of the work provided.
 21. We estimate that the share of women in the total person days of 
casual labor in 2009/10 was 23.3 percent, based on the 2009/10 NSS.
 22. Alternatively, the point could be made that men may be more likely to 
be unemployed in poorer households and that the effect of household poverty 
on demand for MGNREGS work may be different for men and women. 
 23. We tested an encompassing specifi cation in which the log of the male 
wage rate, log of the female wage rate, and log of the MGNREGS wage 
rates entered separately. The homogeneity restriction that the sum of the 
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coeffi cients equals zero could not be rejected (F(1,14) = 0.41; probability 
= 0.53), but nor could we reject the null that it was the log of the female 
wage relative to the male wage that mattered, with the MGNREGS wage 
having no effect (F = 1.49; probability = 0.26). Also, the MGNREGS wage
rate on its own was not signifi cant. So we opted for a specifi cation in which 
the log of the relative wage is the regressor as in table 1.7. Table 1.7 also
gives a specifi cation with male and female wages entering separately.
 24. A similar result was found by Datt and Ravallion (1994) in studying 
time allocation within households in response to the availability of work 
under Maharashtra’s Employment Guarantee Scheme.
 25. We also tested for an effect of the female share of other (non-PW) 
casual labor. This is endogenous but it allows us to control for local social 
norms that infl uence the propensity for women to do any casual wage labor.
The new variable was not, however, signifi cant, and the coeffi cients on the 
other variables were affected little.
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2
Unmet Demand for Work on
the Bihar Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme
In this chapter and the next, the survey data collected for Bihar are 
used to better understand the issues raised in the all-India  analysis, 
including why the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(BREGS) falls so far short of meeting its promise of guaranteeing 
employment. Given that BREGS work is in short supply relative to 
demand, we ask, who gets BREGS jobs, and who is rationed out? Is 
it the poor who do not get the extra work they want? How do the 
answers to these questions vary by gender and caste? Does location 
matter? We fi rst describe the panel household survey, representative
of rural Bihar, that was fi elded for this study and is the basis of the
analysis that follows.
The BREGS Survey
The BREGS survey collected two rounds of data from 150 villages 
across Bihar. The fi rst round of the survey was implemented between 
May and July of 2009 and the second during the same months 
one year later. Because both surveys included questions with recall 
periods of one year, we refer to them as covering 2008/09 and 
2009/10.1 The fi rst of the survey periods included a time of severe
fl oods during the monsoon (July–August of 2008) in six districts 
falling in the catchment area of the Kosi River. In contrast, rainfall 
was scant during the 2009 monsoons and drought was declared in 
26 districts.2
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A two-stage sampling design was followed, using the 2001 census 
list of villages as the sampling frame. In the fi rst stage, 150 villages were 
randomly selected from two strata, classifi ed by high and low BREGS 
coverage based on administrative data for the scheme for 2008/09. In 
the second stage, 20 households per village were randomly selected, 
drawing from three strata (proportions in parentheses)—those with 
at least one member who had been employed at public works in the 
past year (7 of 20), those with a member who had engaged in other 
(non-public-works) casual work (7 of 20), and all other households 
(6 of 20). This stratifi ed approach ensured that the sample included 
both scheme participants and households with likely participants to
ensure that we could compare their activities and outcomes, and assess 
the degree of demand and rationing. All results reported in the study 
are weighted with appropriate sample weights to refl ect the sampling 
design and are representative for the state. The annex to this chapter 
describes the survey instruments and sampling design in more detail 
and provides defi nitions of key variables used in the analysis.
Data were collected through several survey instruments to bring 
together evidence on both the demand- and supply-side aspects of 
the scheme:
• Household surveys. These surveys collected information on a 
range of household-level characteristics, including demographics, 
socioeconomic status (including asset ownership and consump-
tion), employment and wages, political participation and social 
networks, as well as information on BREGS participation and 
process-related issues. To collect information on consumption, the 
abridged consumption block of the Employment Schedules of the 
National  Sample Survey was used.
• Individual surveys. Two individual household members (one
male and one female) were also interviewed for information on indi-
vidual participation in BREGS; experience of BREGS functioning at 
the most recent worksite; and perceptions of the program, the village 
labor market, the role of women, and so forth.
• Village surveys. In each village, key informants were interviewed
to collect information on the physical and social infrastructure in the 
village and on access to government programs.
• Gram Panchayat surveys. A survey of Gram Panchayats (GPs), 
in which the sampled households lived, focused on the administra-
tive capabilities of GPs as well as perceptions of implementation
challenges by program functionaries (such as the panchayat rozgar 
sewak3 and the Mukhiya) to generate insights into the institutional 
factors at the local level that contribute to program implementation 
and outcomes.
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• Block surveys. This survey instrument collected basic informa-
tion from block offi cials on the capabilities and perceptions of imple-
mentation challenges at the block level.
Whereas the household and individual questionnaires provided 
insights on program performance, the village, GP, and block ques-
tionnaires helped identify supply-side constraints on delivery. This 
information was supplemented by the following qualitative research:
(1) detailed process assessments in purposively selected villages in 
six districts in north and south Bihar (Gaya, Khaimur, Kishanganj, 
Muzaffarpur, Purnea, and Saharsa) during February and August 
2009;4 and (2) in-depth case studies of the delivery mechanisms 
adopted in Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan.5
A pilot information campaign was conducted between the two 
survey rounds in February and March 2010 in 40 villages randomly 
selected from the BREGS sample. The campaign took the form of a 
movie on BREGS rights and entitlements, tailored to Bihar’s specifi c 
context and program guidelines. We return to this in chapter 7. 
In total, 3,000 households and approximately 5,000 individuals 
were interviewed in each of the two rounds. The panel comprises 
2,728 households and 3,749 individuals. Table 2.1 summarizes the 
sample size in the two rounds. In the analysis that follows, the panel 
is used only when it is needed. In each case, the most observations 
possible are used, with the appropriate sample always determined
by the question asked. 
The overall attrition rate for households of 8 percent between the 
two rounds was not concentrated in any particular stratum. There
were relatively few refusals; two-thirds of the attrition occurred
because a household was away temporarily when the survey team 
visited the village during the second round. There is no signifi cant 
attrition effect for household-level BREGS participation or when 
estimating the impacts of the pilot information campaign (see the
annex to this chapter).
Table 2.1 Sample Sizes in Bihar Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme Survey
R1 R2 Panel (R1, R2)
Households 3,000 3,000 2,728
Individuals 5,172 5,012 3,749
Males 2,399 2,230 1,586
Females 2,773 2,782 2,163
Note: R1 and R2 refer to rounds 1 and 2, respectively, of the Bihar Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (BREGS) survey.
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The questionnaire asked both surveyed households and individu-
als whether they engaged in casual work on “public works” (which 
could include BREGS, road-building programs, or other government
public works schemes) and then whether this was BREGS work. 
In round 1 (R1), 14.4 percent of households and 12.6 percent of 
individuals who said they were employed in public works stated 
that they did not participate in BREGS. The equivalent percentages
for round 2 (R2) were 16 percent and 11.8 percent of households 
and individuals, respectively. Some proportion of this work possibly 
really was BREGS although participants were not aware of it; how-
ever, we cannot be sure. For this reason, we will sometimes refer to 
public works and sometimes to BREGS in accordance with the terms
used in the specifi c question being examined.
To estimate poverty measures for Bihar, we use the median per 
capita consumption level in R1 to delineate the poverty line and 
then update it using the consumer price index for agricultural labor-
ers to get the R2 poverty line. This method yields poverty lines of 
6,988 rupees (Rs) per person per year in R1 and Rs 7,836 in R2. The 
R1 poverty rate in Bihar is then 50 percent (by construction) and in 
R2, it is estimated to be 41.8 percent.
Performance in Meeting Demand for Work
As in the all-India results reported in the previous chapter, the 
 participation rate, demand rate, and rationing rate are estimated 
for rural households in Bihar using the BREGS survey. Although 
we use the same concepts and defi nitions, three differences should 
be noted between estimates based on the National Sample Survey 
(NSS) and the BREGS survey. First, we expect to fi nd differences 
in the estimates as the result of differences in how this information 
is captured through the two surveys. The NSS 66th round (Sched-
ule 10.0) used in the cross-state analysis asks a single question on 
whether the household got work on the Mahatma Gandhi National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) in the past 
year; this question is used to classify households into participants, 
excess demanders (those who wanted work but did not get it), and 
the rest. In contrast, the BREGS survey has two sources of infor-
mation on participation: fi rst, the household questionnaire has a 
module on BREGS participation (including the total number of days 
worked in the past year) for each household member; and second, 
the individual questionnaires have a detailed module on each episode
of BREGS (and other public works) work for the two household 
members interviewed, one male and one female. These individuals 
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were also asked whether they had wanted to work on BREGS in 
the past year but did not get work. We believe that a specialized
survey with detailed questions on MGNREGS is more likely to 
capture this information than a single question in a general survey. 
This is particularly likely to be the case if awareness is low and the
main household respondent is not entirely aware of the activities 
of other members. Second, the specialized individual questionnaires 
in the BREGS survey make it possible for us to estimate demand, 
participation, and rationing separately for men and women in each
survey round. Third, using the BREGS survey, we can extend the 
demand analysis to also assess which participating households may
be rationed with respect to days of work by asking if they received 
fewer days of employment than they desired. (Annex table 2A.3 pro-
vides a summary of the participation and excess demander variable 
defi nitions and their source at the individual and household levels in 
the BREGS survey.)
Table 2.2 reports the demand rate, participation rate, and ration-
ing rate for households, and separately for men and women. Similar 
to results reported for Bihar in the previous chapter, the BREGS
survey also indicates the presence of massive demand for BREGS 
employment in rural Bihar among both men and women; indeed, 
estimated demand for the scheme is higher when we use data from 
the BREGS survey, which, as noted, collected much more detailed 
information on program participation and demand than did the 
NSS questionnaire. In both rounds of the survey, nearly two-thirds 
Table 2.2 Summary of Participation, Demand, and
Rationing
Households Men Women
Round 
1
Round 
2
Round 
1
Round 
2
Round 
1
Round 
2
Participation
rate (percent) 22.4 17.6 23.6 16.8 5.7 6.8
Demand rate
(percent) 65.5 64.4 68.1 64.1 38.3 44.1
Rationing rate
(percent) 65.8 72.8 65.3 73.8 85.1 84.6
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(BREGS) survey. 
Note: The participation rate is defi ned as the percentage of rural households that
obtained work on the scheme. The demand rate is the percentage of rural households 
that were participants or excess demanders. The rationing rate is defi ned as the per-
centage of those who wanted work but did not get it.
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of households stated that they would like to work on the scheme. 
Not surprisingly, demand was much higher among men than among 
women at 68 percent versus 38 percent in R1, and 64 percent versus 
44 percent in R2. However, when seen in light of extremely low 
overall labor force participation rates for women in Bihar, female 
demand for BREGS employment is notable.6
The data indicate that BREGS meets only a fraction of the demand.
In R1, only 22 percent of rural households secured any work on the 
scheme (table 2.2). Of those demanding work, only one-third got 
work—a rationing rate of 66 percent. The participation rate fell 
and the degree of unmet demand increased between the two surveys, 
with nearly three-quarters (73 percent) of the households rationed 
away from work in R2.
Women are less likely to demand work, and the rationing process
is less favorable to them. In both rounds of the survey, fewer than 
7 percent of women interviewed in the sampled households worked 
on the scheme. The vast majority (85 percent) of women who would 
like to get work on the scheme were rationed. 
When we observe overall participation rates for different times, 
such as in table 2.2, we do not know whether the same people or dif-
ferent people are participating at each date. By exploiting the panel 
design of the survey, we can learn more about exits and entries, that 
is, the dynamics of participation. 
We fi nd high levels of churning, with households entering and 
exiting the program from year to year. Table 2.3 reports move-
ment of households between the three categories—participants, 
excess demanders, and the rest—between the two survey rounds. 
Fewer than half (45 percent) of the R1 BREGS participants were 
Table 2.3 Joint Distribution of Program Participation across
the Two Survey Rounds
number of households
Round 2
BREGS
participants
Excess
demanders
The
rest Total
Round 1
BREGS participants 279 291 50 619
Excess demanders 162 685 333 1,179
The rest 40 310 580 929
Total 480 1,285 963 2,728
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(BREGS) survey. 
Note: These are the weighted number of observations (calculated using household 
weights) in each cell in the subsample of panel households. 
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also  participants in R2. Some 42 percent of participants in R2 were 
new entrants to the scheme. Only 10 percent of households were 
BREGS participants in both rounds of the survey. The degree of 
churning helps explain the similarity between participants and 
excess demanders that will be seen in chapter 3.
High levels of churning can be consistent with BREGS serving 
an insurance function, such that households seek employment on 
the scheme to cope with shocks and exit to the private labor market 
at other times. However, that interpretation is not consistent with 
the evidence already presented on the extent of rationing. Effective
insurance requires that people can get the work when they want it.7
It appears more plausible that withdrawals from the program are 
involuntary. Four of every fi ve participants who exited the program 
expressed a desire to stay in it. About 72 percent of those in R1 who 
said they wanted work on BREGS but did not get it also expressed
demand for work in R2. Only 19 percent of them actually got work 
in R2. Nearly a quarter of households wanted work but did not get
it in both years. This is highly suggestive of unmet demand for work, 
in that the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act’s (the Act’s) 
stipulated guarantee of employment to anyone who wants it was not 
being fulfi lled in Bihar.
Rationing can also take the form of fewer days of work than 
desired. Many households that participated may have been rationed 
in that they would have liked more days of work and still had fewer 
than the 100 days stipulated by the Act. This picture is confi rmed in 
a comparison of the days of employment provided to days demanded 
under the scheme (table 2.4).
In 2008/09 (the year preceding R1), the scheme provided 24 days 
of employment to participating households, on average. However, 
91 percent of these households reported that they would have liked 
additional days of work but were unable to get them. Satisfaction 
levels improved in R2—average employment rose to 37 days per 
participating household, but 82 percent of households continued 
to believe that they were rationed. If we truncate each individual’s 
employment (participating days plus number of additional days 
desired) to 100 days, the average total extra days of desired employ-
ment across all participants in R2 was 44 days. Excess demanders
(those not presently employed by the scheme) also reported high 
demand, at 79 days per household.
Household perceptions about why they did not get as much 
employment as they wanted on the scheme suggest possible reasons 
for rationing (table 2.5). Among participants, the overwhelming
reason seems to be the lack of available BREGS work. This lack of 
work could refl ect supply-side constraints (discussed in  chapter 8) 
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Table 2.5 Household Perceptions about Why They Were
Rationed
percentage of respondents
Why did you not get (more) work on
BREGS in the past year?
Participants
Excess
demanders
Female Male Female Male
Work is not available at worksite 70.2 77.4 26.1 24.4
I was not present when th e work was
available 2.4 2.9 6.5 7.6
Did not get work even after demanding 9.4 4.4 11.1 12.0
Do not have any facility for child care 4.2 0.0 n.a. n.a.
Work not allotted to women 0.1 0.0 7.7 0.0
Do not have any personal contacts 2.0 0.7 4.0 3.9
Because of the 100-day limit of 
MGNREGS 0.5 2.5 n.a. n.a.
Unable to work or disabled n.a. n.a. 3.2 4.5
Do not have job card n.a. n.a. 34.1 40.9
Other 11.2 12.1 7.3 6.8
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(BREGS) survey. 
Note: Table reports percentage of households that report stated option as the main 
reason for why they did not get work (for excess demanders) or more days than they 
actually worked (for participants). Results reported for round 2 of the BREGS survey 
(the question was not asked in round 1). MGNREGS = Mahatma Gandhi National
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme; n.a. = not applicable, as option not provided 
to respondent.
Table 2.4 Days of Employment Provided and Demanded in
the Past Year
Round 1 Round 2
Number of BREGS days worked
 Per household 23.5 36.8
 Per female 4.7 8.1
 Per male 18.4 27.4
Percentage of households that worked 100 days 2.1 9.0
Number of additional BREGS days wanted
 Per household — 71.5
 Per participating household 44.4 43.6
 Per excess demander — 79.2
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(BREGS) survey. 
Note: Average days are reported for the group of households that were BREGS 
participants or excess demanders; households not interested in working on the pro-
gram are not included. The number of days worked plus additional days desired is 
truncated at 100. Information on days desired by nonparticipating households was 
not collected in round 1 of the BREGS survey. — = not available.
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that limit the ability of local administrators to open suffi cient 
BREGS worksites in a timely manner. Among excess demanders, 
the lack of a job card was cited as the primary reason for lack of 
work. This reason is probably valid given that most participants 
did possess job cards (78 percent in R1 and 87 percent in R2),
while a very large fraction of nonparticipants (79 percent in R1 and 
68 percent in R2) did not. However, a small fraction of households 
without job cards were also able to get employment on the scheme 
(8 percent in R1 and 4 percent in R2), suggesting that other factors 
were also at play.
For instance, it is clear from the survey data and fi eld reports that
very few people were aware of how to apply for work, the fi rst step 
toward registering demand. As documented later, the work applica-
tion process was not yet in place. The vast majority of those who 
have worked report that work was “given to them” by the local 
authorities. Others who are interested in working wait passively for 
work to come their way. Despite growing public awareness (docu-
mented in chapter 7), few people understand that getting a job card 
is only the fi rst step in obtaining employment on the scheme, which 
must then be followed by an application for work. In that sense, the 
fundamental principle of employment on demand has yet to sink in.
Of course, demanding work does not automatically translate into 
getting it—more than 10 percent of excess demanders state that they 
asked for work but were turned away. Households also perceived 
the need to have the right personal contacts and networks to be 
granted employment, a theme examined in more detail in the next
chapter on who gets work and who is rationed out. 
The extent of the rationing raises fundamental doubts about the 
scheme’s effectiveness in reducing poverty, both now and in the 
future. We will return to these concerns throughout this volume. 
But fi rst it is of interest to look more closely at how the available 
work is rationed, which we take up in the next chapter. 
Annex 2A
The survey data for this study come mainly from two rounds of a 
panel survey administered to households, individuals (in the selected
households), villages, Gram Panchayats, and blocks, with a gap of 
one year between survey rounds. The survey covered 150 villages 
across Bihar. In total, 3,000 households and approximately 5,000 
individuals were interviewed in each of the two rounds. This annex 
describes the BREGS sampling design and provides defi nitions of 
key variables used in the analysis. 
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Sampling Design
The survey covered 150 villages spread across all 38 districts of 
Bihar. A two-stage sampling design was followed. In the fi rst stage, 
150 villages were selected; in the second stage 20 households from 
each of these villages were selected.
The BREGS sample recognized six explicit strata, defi ned by 
 combinations of three household groups and two village groups. 
The three household strata (ST) were defi ned as follows:
 ST1: Households in which at least one member engaged in 
 public works employment in the past year.
 ST2: Households in which at least one member engaged in other 
(non–public works) casual work (but no one engaged in public 
works employment in the past year).
ST3: All other households.
Because of the program’s wide variation in coverage and overall 
low coverage, two village strata (VS) were defi ned on the basis of pro-
gram coverage (based on administrative data for 2008/09), as follows:
VS1: Villages in districts with high BREGS coverage (10 districts). 
VS2: Villages in the remaining districts (28 districts).
The 2001 census frame of villages was used as the sampling 
frame. Urban areas as defi ned in the 2001 census were explicitly 
excluded from the study. The selection criteria for selection in R1 
were as follows:
a. First stage, village selection. Half the sample villages (75 vil-
lages) were drawn from the high coverage stratum (VS1), and 
the remaining 75 villages from the remaining set of districts 
(VS2). Villages were selected within each stratum (as defi ned 
above) with probability proportional to village size. 
b. Second stage, household selection. In villages of 150 house-
holds or fewer, a complete listing of all households was imple-
mented and some basic information collected. Households 
were grouped into the three strata described above. Larger 
villages were divided into segments of roughly 75 households 
each, from which two segments were selected randomly to 
be completely listed. Twenty households were selected from
all the households in the list using the following rule (where 
applicable or available): seven households from ST1, seven
households from ST2, and six households from ST3. In vil-
lages in which there were insuffi cient households in a stratum, 
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households were taken from other strata, with probability 
 proportional to size of the strata in the village.
c. Individual selection. From within each household,
two  individuals—one adult male and one adult female 
(ages 18–60)—were selected to respond to the individual-level 
questionnaire. Priority was given to individual members who 
had engaged in public works, if any:
i. For households from ST2 or ST3 (no public works partici-
pants), the household questionnaire was administered to the 
(ideally male) main respondent, and the relevant individual 
questionnaire to the same person. An adult respondent of 
opposite gender for the other individual questionnaire was 
selected by simple random sampling from the household roster.
ii. For households from ST1 (at least one public works par-
ticipant), the household questionnaire was administered to 
the (ideally male) main respondent, and the individual ques-
tionnaire to the same person if he or she had participated in 
public works. If the main respondent had not participated
in public works, the individual questionnaire was adminis-
tered to a household member who had. Similarly, for the 
opposite gender, the individual questionnaire was adminis-
tered to the person who had participated in public works. 
If no one of a particular gender had participated in public 
works, the individual questionnaire was administered to a 
person selected randomly from the household roster.
Note that because the BREGS program participants were purpo-
sively sampled within households in ST1, in the study we do not
report any estimates that are representative of the male or female 
adult population in Bihar. In all cases, estimates are representative
of rural households.
Table 2A.1 presents the distribution of households and individu-
als across strata.
R2 aimed to interview the same households and individuals as 
in R1. Village listing sheets were not updated in R2. In R2, the rules 
for substitution of households, and substitution or addition of indi-
viduals, were defi ned as follows:
a. Household substitution. If a household was not found (for
example, because it had migrated out, or was temporarily 
unavailable when the survey team was in the village), the 
household was replaced by an adjacent household in the same 
stratum from the R1 list. A sample size of 3,000 households 
was retained in R2. For replacement households, the same 
rules of individual selection were followed as in R1.
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b. Individual substitution. An attempt was made to interview the 
same individuals as in R1. If a person was not found or was 
not available, another adult (ages 18–60) of the same gender 
in the household was interviewed.
c. Individual addition. For households from which only one indi-
vidual was interviewed in R1 (for example, because no one 
from the other gender was resident in the household or avail-
able during the survey period), and a person of the missing 
gender was available during R2, that person was interviewed.
Note that additions and substitutions were done from the 
updated household roster (that is, they need not be limited to 
those listed in the R1 household roster).
Sample Size and Attrition
In both survey rounds, 3,000 households and approximately 5,000 
individuals were interviewed (see table 2A.2). In R2, 272 of the 3,000 
households (8 percent) were new households. Of the 5,012 individu-
als interviewed in R2, 4,555 were from panel households and 3,749 
had been interviewed in R1. The panel comprises 2,728 households 
and 3,749 individuals. 
The overall attrition rate for households was low at 8 percent. 
Household attrition was not concentrated in any particular stra-
tum, and most of the replacements were taken from the same stra-
tum except for 13 households (spread across 11 villages) for which 
replacement households were from different strata. There were 
relatively few refusals; two-thirds of the attrition was because the 
household was away temporarily when the survey team visited the 
village. However, the reasons for attrition do differ across strata. 
Table 2A.1 Distribution of Households and Individuals
across Strata (Round 1)
Stratum
Number of 
households
Percentage of 
households a
Number of 
individuals
Percentage of 
individuals a
ST1 922 27.1 1,650 29.2
ST2 1,137 40.4 1,929 39.6
ST3 941 32.5 1,593 31.2
Total 3,000 100.0 5,172 100.0
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(BREGS) survey. 
Note: ST1 = worked on public works in 2008; ST2 = worked at other casual labor 
in 2008; ST3 = worked on neither public works nor casual labor in 2008. 
a. With sample weights.
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Refusals were more likely in the third strata (ST3), while temporary 
or permanent migration was more likely in other strata, especially 
ST2 (casual labor other than public works).
The characteristics of those lost through attrition versus others
suggest that households lost through attrition tend to have fewer 
adult males, to have younger household heads, and to be poorer. 
Households with the fi rst two characteristics would be expected to 
be less likely to work on BREGS, while poorer households may be 
more likely to work on BREGS. However, probit regressions for 
household-level BREGS participation indicate no signifi cant attri-
tion effect. There also does not seem to be an attrition bias when 
estimating impacts of the movie (see chapter 7): (1) the attrition 
rate did not vary between treatment and control groups, and (2) the 
characteristics of those who were lost through attrition were similar 
between treatment and control groups.
Calculation of Weights
The raising factors (sampling weights) needed to extrapolate 
the results from the sample to rural Bihar are the inverses of their
selection probabilities. Survey round–specifi c household and vil-
lage weights were calculated using the 2001 census sampling frame 
and the R1 listing to refl ect the probability of selection. There were 
some differences in household and individual weights between the 
two rounds resulting from the replacement of R1 households in R2 
with households from different strata (13 cases spread across 11 vil-
lages). R1 weights were used for the analysis of the panel of house-
holds. Round-specifi c weights were used for the analysis of the two 
cross-sections.
Table 2A.2 Sample Size (Rounds 1 and 2)
Cross-sections
Panel
(Round 1, Round 2)Round 1 Round 2
Households 3,000 3,000 2,728
Individuals 5,172 5,012 3,749
Males 2,399 2,230 1,586
Females 2,773 2,782 2,163
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme (BREGS) survey.
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Notes
 1. However, because the interviews were spread over three months, 
there is some overlap in the recall periods between the two survey years.
 2. Flood Management Information System, Water Resources Depart-
ment, government of Bihar, available at http://fmis.bih.nic.in/history.html.
 3. The panchayat rozgar sewak is hired on contract by the state govern-
ment for implementing the scheme at the GP level.
 4. Background notes were prepared by Development Alternatives (2009), 
Indian Grameen Services (2009), and Sunai Consultancy Pvt. Ltd. (2009). 
 5. A background note was prepared by MART (2010).
 6. According to NSS 2009/10 data, only 10.6 percent of women ages 
15–59 years were participating in the labor force in Bihar (including 
employed women and those seeking employment). Bihar’s female labor 
force participation rate is the lowest across all major states and well below
the nationwide average of 39.8 percent.
 7. In R2, only 13 percent of men and 9 percent of women felt that 
BREGS work was available when they needed it in the past year.
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3
Who Gets Work?
Who Is Left Out?
The previous chapters show evidence of substantial unmet demand 
for work on the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS). The extent of unmet demand is 
clear from survey responses in the National Sample Survey (for India 
as a whole, and especially in the poorer states) and in the specially 
designed survey for Bihar, the Bihar Rural Employment  Guarantee 
Scheme (BREGS) survey. This unmet demand raises questions about 
how well the self-targeting feature of MGNREGS is working in prac-
tice. To understand whether the self-targeting mechanism is working 
despite signifi cant rationing, this chapter examines who gets work 
and who gets left out. In the process, we will also learn more about 
how well the extra income gains from the scheme are “targeted” to 
poor families.
Table 3.1 summarizes the main characteristics of BREGS 
 participating households in round 1 (R1) of the survey, and com-
pares them to the characteristics of excess demanders, as well as to 
those of the “rest” who did not express interest in working on the 
scheme.
Participants generally belong to more-disadvantaged groups. For 
instance, only 31 percent of participant households own some land, 
compared with 64 percent of the “rest.” They are much less likely to 
have a pucca roof1 (21 percent versus 44 percent); to have a head of 
household who has completed class 8 of schooling or more (8  percent 
versus 36 percent); to rely on own-agriculture as their main income 
source (7 percent versus 33 percent); and much more likely to be 
dependent on casual labor, whether agriculture (33  percent ver-
sus 7 percent) or nonagriculture (51 percent versus 12 percent). 
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In other respects as well, such as consumption levels, it is clear that 
participants are poorer than the rest.
Participation of disadvantaged social groups is high in comparison 
with that of other groups, a fi nding also corroborated by other fi eld 
studies. About 45 percent of participating households were Sched-
uled Caste or Scheduled Tribe (SC/ST) in R1, which is well above the 
SC/ST share in the population (29 percent). This high relative level 
of participation is particularly true of Mahadalits, who in R1 com-
prised 5  percent of households but more than twice that as a share 
(12  percent) of participant households.2 By round 2 (R2) of the survey, 
overall household participation rates fell, but SC/ST households were 
more likely to retain BREGS employment. Thus, in R2, more than 
50 percent of BREGS participants were drawn from SC/ST groups. 
These patterns suggest that assignment of work on the scheme is pro-
poor, despite very low levels of coverage and high unmet demand.
In many respects, as can be seen in table 3.1, excess demand-
ers are not very different from participants. For example, the two 
groups have similar propensities to migrate for employment, and 
their housing is of the same quality. Excess demanders are better off 
than participants along some dimensions (for example, land owner-
ship, monthly consumption per capita, lower dependence on casual 
labor), but in all characteristics are more similar to participants than 
they are to the rest. This is not surprising given the large degree 
of churning in the scheme reviewed in chapter 2, with households
transiting between participant and excess demander categories from 
one year to the next.
Targeting
To assess targeting performance, table 3.2 reports participation, 
demand, and rationing rates by rural quintiles, defi ned by per cap-
ita consumption, from each round of the BREGS survey. The pat-
terns for Bihar from the National Sample Survey data, described in 
 chapter 1, are confi rmed with the BREGS survey. 
As expected, demand for work on BREGS declines with con-
sumption; richer households are considerably less likely than the 
poorest 20 percent to want to do this work, although the gradient 
is fl at between the 20th and 80th percentiles of the distribution. 
Even among the richest quintile, more than 50 percent of households 
express interest in working on the scheme, possibly because of its 
potential insurance function.
Participation rates also decline with consumption but more rapidly 
than do demand rates, showing that rationing of work among those 
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who would like to work is pro-poor. The scheme is also  pro-poor in 
its distribution of total days of employment. This pro-poor perfor-
mance is achieved through both demand for work and the pro-poor 
rationing of work but not by the assignment of number of days of 
work actually received. The average days of work received by partici-
pants tends to increase with consumption, particularly in R2. 
Patterns of coverage, demand, and rationing by social group 
(castes and tribes), reported in table 3.3, confi rm the positive pro-
poor targeting results. Disadvantaged social groups are more likely 
to participate, and face less (though not insignifi cant) rationing. In 
R1, a little more than 30 percent of SC (excluding Mahadalits) and 
ST households participated in the program. Participation was lower 
for Other Backward Classes (OBCs) at 20 percent and lowest for all 
others, at 6 percent. Mahadalits were much more likely to partici-
pate, with one of every two households securing some employment
(on average, 25 days) on the scheme. In R2, the participation rates 
of Mahadalits fell, but likely because of the reclassifi cation of other 
SC castes as Mahadalits in between the two survey rounds.
The targeting differential,3 reported in table 3.4, provides a sum-
mary measure by which to compare targeting performance by con-
sumption groups versus social groups.4 It shows that the program
is considerably more successful at targeting disadvantaged social 
groups (compared with others) than it is at targeting based on con-
sumption poverty. The targeting differential for SCs, STs, OBCs, 
and Mahadalits together relative to “others” of 0.19 in R1 (0.16 
in R2) compares favorably with the targeting differential based on 
poverty status of 0.06 in the same round. As shown in the next sec-
tion, this good targeting performance likely relates to the fact that 
the rationing process in Bihar appears to rely heavily on indicators 
(or  proxies) of poverty. Poor households that do not have the typical 
profi le of the poor tend to be rationed out; conversely, groups that 
have been traditionally disadvantaged and have household charac-
teristics (such as social group, Below-Poverty-Line [BPL] card) that 
are considered to be reasonable proxies of poverty status tend to be 
favored in the targeting process.
When participation and rationing probabilities are consid-
ered over the entire distribution (rather than across quintiles), the 
 correlation with wealth is more complex than might at fi rst be 
assumed. Figure 3.1 plots participation and rationing against three 
different indicators of wealth—an index of asset ownership, con-
sumption per capita, and land area owned.5 Although rationing of 
work tends to increase with all three indicators of wealth, the poor-
est of the poor (roughly the bottom 15 percent measured on the asset 
index or consumption) are more, not less, likely to be rationed out 
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Table 3.4 Targeting Differentials by Poverty Status and
Social Group
Participation rates
Targeting differentialPoor Nonpoor
Round 1 0.257 0.201 0.056
Round 2 0.210 0.158 0.052
SCsa/STs/OBCs Others
Round 1 0.251 0.059 0.192
Round 2 0.199 0.041 0.158
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme survey.
Note: SCs/STs/OBCs = Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Other Backward 
Classes.
a. Includes Mahadalits. 
than households in the middle of the distribution. Adding controls 
for household characteristics and village fi xed effects6 fl attens the
gradient but the effect persists. These patterns are explored more 
closely in the next section.
Determinants of Participation and Rationing
The summary statistics in table 3.1 are instructive, but there is an 
interpretational issue because the identifi ed characteristics linked to 
participation are likely to be correlated with one another. For exam-
ple, BPL card holders are more likely to participate in the scheme,
as are the landless; but the landless are more likely to be BPL card 
holders. We need a multivariate regression model to separate out 
the partial effects.
Table 3.5 reports the marginal effects of various household and 
village characteristics on participation, demand, and rationing. To
ease interpretation of coeffi cients—so that higher values are posi-
tive and lower values negative for all three outcomes variables—we 
replace rationing by its complement, namely, the assignment of work
among those who wanted work. (Assignment is, in effect, 1 minus
rationing.) There are two regressions for each independent variable: 
the fi rst case incorporates explicit village characteristics available in 
the data, whereas the other includes a complete set of village dummy
variables to represent village fi xed effects.
To investigate potential heterogeneity by wealth level, we also 
estimate these regressions for different wealth groups (defi ned using 
the asset index), namely, the richest 50 percent and the poorest 
15 percent. The detailed results for R1 are given in table 3A.1 in the 
annex to this chapter. The following discussion notes cases in which 
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the effect of characteristics differ signifi cantly across wealth groups, 
in particular, for the poorest 15 percent because this is the group for 
whom targeting is perverse (as illustrated by fi gure 3.1). 
The regressions include a cubic function of the asset index as well
as a quadratic function of landholding.7 (Consumption was not used
given the potential endogeneity concerns.) The pattern of the wealth 
effects is similar between actual participation and demand. Higher 
wealth as measured by the asset index is associated with lower 
demand for this work, and lower actual participation. For landhold-
ing, participation falls as landholding increases for 99  percent of the 
data. (The turning point, at 5.7 acres of land, is at the 99th percentile
of the land distribution. This could be due to measurement errors.)
However, participation depends on many other factors, to which 
we now turn.
Household Characteristics
Given that physically demanding outdoor work is required on 
BREGS, one expects a family’s demographic characteristics to mat-
ter to household demand for work. The regression results show that, 
controlling for wealth and other factors, a higher share of adult 
males in the household increases the probability that a household 
will demand work, and get it. The effect is stronger (in both size 
and signifi cance) for demand for work than for actual participation 
or assignment of work. Households with a female head were less 
likely either to want to participate or to participate; they were also 
less likely to be assigned work when they did want it. This echoes
the fi ndings of a study in Andhra Pradesh (AP) that also fi nds a 
lower likelihood of participation for female-headed households (Liu 
and Deininger 2013). Some households headed by women may have 
a remitting male migrant member, others may lack labor, and yet 
others may be denied work even if they want it. There is no sign 
of a “life cycle” effect, as measured by age of the household head. 
However, households with more old people are less likely to want 
this work, but no less likely to get it.
Controlling for wealth (including land) and other factors, house-
holds with heads who have completed secondary and higher levels of 
schooling are less likely to participate or to want to do so compared
with those with less-educated heads. Note that illiterate heads are 
the excluded group. However, the negative effect of higher educa-
tion is stronger (in size and signifi cance) for actual participation than 
for demand and strongest for being assigned work. This outcome 
is consistent with a rationing mechanism that excludes educated 
households even when they may want work for some reason. 
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Figure 3.1 Participation and Rationing as a Function of 
Wealth
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Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(BREGS) survey.
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There is strong evidence that group identities or “poor 
 credentials” play an important role in explaining participation, and 
that these identity effects exist independently of non-land wealth 
or landholding. Mahadalits are signifi cantly more likely to partici-
pate than are other social groups but only among the richer half 
of households (see table 3A.1). However, this effect reverses when 
we look at demand for work, in that the poorest Mahadalit house-
holds are signifi cantly more likely to desire this work than are the 
richest. Being a Mahadalit from the wealthier half of the Mahadalit 
population is a strong correlate of participation but not of demand, 
 suggesting a role is played by group identities in the rationing pro-
cess: being a Mahadalit is treated as a proxy for poverty status 
when allocating work.
In contrast, SC households that were not classifi ed as Mahadalits 
at the time of the R1 survey were at a disadvantage. They were 
more likely to demand work than general category households, but 
no more likely to get it. There are weak effects of OBC status on 
overall participation rates in the sample. Both OBC and ST status
variables become very signifi cant negative determinants of partici-
pation among the poorest 15 percent (see table 3A.1 in the annex 
to this chapter). However, this negative effect arises because OBC 
and ST households were no more likely to want work than general 
category households.
Being a Hindu (as opposed to a Muslim) household increases 
both demand and participation.8 However, the household religion 
effect is much smaller and becomes statistically insignifi cant when 
we focus on the impact of religion on household participation within 
villages by adding village fi xed effects. Thus, the religion effect seems
to be stemming from village attributes correlated with the religious 
composition of the village, rather than from whether the village is 
majority Hindu or Muslim.
There are strong signs that households with local political 
 connections—as indicated by reported connections to village leaders 
(for example, the Mukhiya or Sarpanch) or administrative offi cials 
(for example, the block development offi cer [BDO])9—are more 
likely to get BREGS work, even though their demand for work is 
not any higher. The pattern is reversed, however, for self-reported 
connections to the ward member, which increases demand but not 
participation. We can only speculate on why. Ward members may 
be important sources of village information about the scheme, while 
the assignment of work lies under the control of the Mukhiya and 
others (such as the panchayat rozgar sewak [PRS]). 
However, focusing on the poorest 15 percent, we fi nd notable 
differences in the effects of political connections on participation. 
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Knowing the Mukhiya discriminates well among the rich, but mat-
ters little among the poor. Connections to administrative offi cials 
(such as the BREGS program offi cer or the BDO) have a signifi cant
effect for the poorest 50 percent but again, matter little to the poor-
est 15 percent. This result may be a refl ection of the “quality” of the
political connections of the poor. However, political participation 
(as indicated by voting in local elections) is a more signifi cant covari-
ate with a larger effect for the poorest 15 percent than for any other 
group (see table 3A.1).
Having a BPL ration card is strongly correlated with securing 
employment on the scheme.10 BPL households are twice as likely to 
be BREGS participants as other households—a pattern that persists 
even after controlling for wealth, landholding, and other household
characteristics. However, disaggregating by wealth, this result holds
only among richer households. Among the richest 50 percent, BPL 
card holders do not demand more work than other households, 
but are signifi cantly more likely to get it (table 3A.1). In contrast, 
having a BPL card signifi cantly increases demand for work by the 
poorest 15 percent, but has no effect on these households being 
assigned work. 
The BPL effect could be picking up some dimension of poverty 
omitted from the regressions. However, problems of inclusion and 
exclusion errors in the allocation of BPL cards are well known, and 
Bihar is no exception. In the sample, BPL card distribution among 
households is only mildly progressive. Whereas 68 percent of house-
holds in the bottom per capita consumption quintile have a BPL 
card, almost half (49 percent) of those in the top quintile also  possess 
one. Using the median consumption per capita level as the poverty 
line, we fi nd that 61 percent of Bihar’s poor households are in pos-
session of BPL cards versus 52 percent of nonpoor households. These 
patterns may also possibly indicate that the BPL effect in the upper 
end of the distribution is picking up not poverty, but privilege—the
same factors that determine why a household (among the relatively
better off) receives a BPL card may also result in its being assigned
work under BREGS.
It also may be that in a context of supply constraints, a BPL card 
is used by scheme functionaries as a mechanism for allocating what-
ever work becomes available. Holding a BPL card is not an eligibility 
criterion stipulated by the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act (the Act). However, knowledge of this fact is low: 62 percent 
of interviewed women (47 percent of men) reported that they did
not know that BREGS employment is also available to households 
that lack a BPL card. That said, when asked why they thought they
did not get work despite wanting it, only a miniscule percentage
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(fewer than 0.5 percent) mentioned not having a BPL card as the 
main determinant. The lack of available work (23 percent in R1 for 
both men and women) or of a job card (33 percent for women and 
42  percent for men) were perceived to be more pertinent. However, 
BPL status was seen to play a role in acquiring a job card in the fi rst
place. In R1, 11.2 percent of households without a job card and 
who made no effort to get one said one reason for not even apply-
ing was not being BPL. Some 3.9 percent of households without job 
cards and that did make an effort to get one said that they were not 
granted one because they were not BPL. Of course, as one might 
expect, almost all Mukhiyas and PRSs report in both rounds that 
non-BPL households can also get work as per the scheme’s guide-
lines. (See chapter 7 for further discussion of household awareness
of BREGS rules and procedures.)
We fi nd little to suggest that the scheme is providing insurance 
benefi ts not otherwise captured by the other explanatory variables. 
Households reporting shocks did not have either higher demand for 
work or higher participation (although a mildly signifi cant effect of 
job loss appears when one allows for village fi xed effects). 
Labor market history clearly matters. If the household includes 
either men or women who have previously engaged in casual labor 
it is more likely that they will both demand and get this work. Hav-
ing a household member who had a regular salaried job in the past 
year makes it less likely that the household will want to work on 
public works; there is a considerably weaker effect on actually doing 
this work.
Panchayat and Village Characteristics
GP and village-level characteristics are also driving participation 
levels.11 The Mukhiya is important to the scheme’s functioning. 
 Villages in which the Mukhiya has held a GP post in the past have 
higher levels of participation and assignment of work, though, not 
surprisingly, this village attribute has no effect on the demand for 
work. Villages in which the Mukhiya resides are more likely to have 
work, as are villages in which the Mukhiya is a contractor.
Better village infrastructure in the form of a pucca road has oppo-
site effects on demand and participation, increasing participation 
while lowering demand for work. Other accessibility indicators also 
suggest that more-remote villages (farther from a bus stop, farther
from the GP headquarters) have higher demand for work, and less 
participation. Having a post offi ce in the village increases demand 
for this type of work but has no signifi cant effect on actually getting 
the work. 
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Higher wealth inequality within the village is associated with 
signifi cantly lower demand for work, and, less strongly, lower 
participation.12 This effect is particularly strong for the poorest. 
Possibly the same factors that create high inequality in a village 
lessen the knowledge of one’s rights under the Act as well as a poor 
household’s ability to demand those rights.13 (Chapter 7 points 
to some evidence consistent with this view.) Power relations in 
high-inequality villages may mean that the scheme gets very little
attention.
One of the most notable differences in the participation model 
for the poorest 15 percent versus the rest of the population is in 
the coeffi cient of having “good relations among different groups 
within the village.” This village attribute emerges as a signifi cant 
positive correlate of participation, consistent with the hypothesis 
that the job-rationing process favors the poor in more cohesive, 
cooperative village environments.
However, there is clearly some unexplained variance in village 
characteristics: the pseudo R2 is typically about 0.04 higher in
the model with a complete set of village fi xed effects, which can 
be  interpreted as indicating that about 4 percent of the variance 
is attributable to omitted village characteristics. Undoubtedly some 
village-specifi c factors, such as the extent to which local offi cials 
share the aims of the scheme or their capacity to deliver, are hard to 
capture empirically.
Several other GP-level characteristics (other than the characteris-
tics of the Mukhiya) can also be expected to matter to participation. 
The survey included a module on GP characteristics. However, a 
sizable share of these data were incomplete, resulting in a marked 
reduction in sample size—600 households from the full sample 
used for modeling participation were lost—when these variables
are included as predictors of participation. Annex table 3A.2 shows 
regression results with GP characteristics included, but they should 
be treated as highly tentative given the potential sample selection 
bias. (The regressions also included all the variables listed in annex 
table 3A.1, but we do not report them in their entirety because there 
were few differences of any note.)
The level of safety (as measured by responses to a question about 
whether it was safe to move around after dark) in the GP attracts 
a signifi cant and positive coeffi cient in the participation regres-
sion, particularly for the poorest. Certain characteristics of the
PRS, the main program functionary at the local level, also emerge. 
Having a lower caste PRS makes participation less likely for the 
poor, as does the PRS living outside the GP. Another seemingly 
puzzling fi nding is that having a PRS responsible for more than 
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one GP (implying a higher workload) is associated with higher 
participation rates. However, qualitative research suggests it is the 
Mukhiya rather than the PRS who infl uences participation. The
former is the local elected leader, whereas the latter may often be 
an outsider to the GP.
An important supply-side variable is whether the GP has a shelf 
of projects ready to start up for BREGS work. This is a stronger 
predictor of participation among the poor. In the absence of an 
approved shelf of works, GPs may be constrained in providing work 
in response to demand (see chapter 8).
Determinants of Individual Participation, Demand, and 
Rationing 
So far we have only looked at which households participated or 
wanted to do so. Focusing on the individual level, as in results 
reported in annex table 3A.3, highlights the particular constraints 
to participation faced by women in the scheme.
The most notable observation is the signifi cant gender effect 
on participation, favoring men. Men also had a higher demand 
for work. But it is telling that they were more likely to get work, 
given that they wanted it, and that this holds controlling for other 
individual, household, and village characteristics. There is marked 
unmet demand for work by women that exists independently of 
other characteristics, which corroborates much anecdotal evi-
dence.
Other points of note are that demand for work is higher among 
household heads. Women with stronger self-effi cacy, as measured 
by the Pearlin scale, are also more likely to express demand for this 
type of work, but they are no more likely to get work.14 A man’s 
Pearlin scale does not make a difference to his demand for work or 
participation in BREGS.
Days of Employment
Rationing can take two forms. Households can either be rationed 
by not getting any employment on the scheme, or they may receive
fewer days of employment than they desire. Chapter 2 documents 
that both forms of rationing are prevalent. The preceding analysis has 
explored who gains entry into the scheme. This section explores the 
correlates of the number of days of employment received, to  better
understand this dimension of rationing. Table 3.6 reports regres-
sions of the number of days of employment at the individual level. 
The sample consists of participants 18–65 years old, and results are 
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reported separately for men and women, using R1 data. Focusing 
on individuals (rather than the total household days of employment) 
allows us to explore the potential role of gender, and of other indi-
vidual characteristics, in determining days of employment.
Household composition and gender effects are strong corre-
lates of the intensity of participation, as measured by the number 
of days worked. Households with a male head get 7 more days 
on average than households with female heads, and the spouse 
(almost always a woman) of the household head gets 10 fewer 
days of employment than the head. Both these effects are consis-
tent with the fact that women tend to have fewer days of employ-
ment than men. This effect is further reinforced by the fact that 
households with a greater share of adult women get fewer days, 
and (focusing on the regression for women) that women get fewer 
days of employment if the share of adult males in their  household 
increases, or if men in their households tend to do casual labor. 
Similar to the patterns seen in table 3.5, we fi nd that even after 
controlling for other household and village characteristics, richer 
households (based on the asset index or land ownership) get 
more days of employment, if they participate. Connections (to 
the Mukhiya or Sarpanch) matter, positively, to participation and 
to the intensity of participation. Caste and education attributes, 
or having a BPL card, are not strong or consistent correlates of 
days of employment, unlike their strong association with house-
hold participation. Household shocks are uncorrelated with days 
received. Finally, note that the predictive power of the regression 
(R2) doubles when village fi xed effects are added, suggesting that 
village-level effects are very important in explaining the intensity 
of employment.
In summary, we fi nd clear signs that the scheme is reaching the 
poor, despite the rationing of work. The rationing process appears 
to rely heavily on indicators of poverty, meaning that poor house-
holds that do not have the typical profi le of the poor tend to be 
rationed out. We also fi nd signs that the poorest of the poor are 
underrepresented, as are households led by women or with a high 
share of female members. The rationing process is likely to under-
mine BREGS’ insurance benefi ts. Consistent with that expectation,
we fi nd that neither participation nor the number of days of employ-
ment provided is responding to shocks. 
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Notes
 1. Pucca refers to a solid, permanent, or proper structure and is often
contrasted to kutcha, meaning crude or temporary. A pucca roof is made of 
materials such as timber, slate, corrugated iron, or the like. The alternative, 
a kutcha roof, is made of materials such as bamboo or thatch.
 2. As mentioned in chapter 1, four broad categories are typically used 
to classify households into social groups—Scheduled Castes (SCs), Sched-
uled Tribes (STs), Other Backward Classes (OBCs), and others. In Bihar, 
Mahadalits, comprising the poorest and most disadvantaged among SCs, 
have been notifi ed as a separate subcategory by the state government.
 3. See chapter 1 for an explanation of the targeting differential.
 4. As in chapter 1, for consumption groups, the targeting differential is 
defi ned as the difference between the BREGS participation rates of the poor
and the nonpoor. For social groups, we estimate it as the difference between 
the weighted average participation rate of SCs, STs, OBCs, and Mahadalits, 
and the participation rates for “others.”  Tables 1.4 and 1.5 report the all-
India results.
 5. The asset index is the fi rst principal component of an index that 
combines data on household ownership of durables and dwelling character-
istics as a proxy for household wealth (following Filmer and Pritchett
[2001]). As in the corresponding fi gure in chapter 1 (fi gure 1.5 for all-India 
results), the x-axis is the percentile of the wealth distribution.
 6. The controls are entered linearly, giving a “partial linear regression” 
in which the wealth effect is nonparametric.
 7. These parametric functional forms appeared to offer a reasonably 
good approximation over the bulk of the data to the nonparametric func-
tional forms shown in fi gure 3.1, though naturally they still have less fl exi-
bility in representing the data.
 8. Fewer than 1 percent of households were neither Hindu nor Muslim.
 9. The Mukhiya, in Bihar, is the elected leader of the GP and is respon-
sible for implementation of development programs at the panchayat level. 
The Sarpanch is the elected leader of the panchayat judicial body. The BDO
is a civil servant responsible for the administration of a block. GPs are 
typically divided into a number of wards, each of which is represented by
the elected ward member in the Gram Panchayat body.
 10. BPL cards, used to target a number of social assistance schemes, are 
meant for poor households that are identifi ed based on a periodic BPL Cen-
sus. Note that we refer to the combined set of BPL, Antyodaya, and 
Annapoorna cardholders as BPL households (see note to table 3.1).
 11. The explanatory power of the regression models increases with the 
inclusion of village fi xed effects or village characteristics compared with 
specifi cations with household characteristics only.
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 12. We measure inequality of wealth within a village using the mean 
log deviation from the village household mean of the asset index. This is 
a standard inequality measure, known to have a number of desirable 
 properties.
 13. Galasso and Ravallion (2005) report such an effect of land inequal-
ity on the performance of an antipoverty program in Bangladesh.
 14. The Pearlin Mastery scale is a measure of the extent to which indi-
viduals perceive themselves to be in control of factors that affect their lives
(Pearlin and Schooler 1978; Pearlin and others 1981).
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Wages
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (the Act) stipulates 
a minimum wage rate for the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS). In 2009, an all-
India uniform wage of 100 rupees (Rs) per day was notifi ed for the 
scheme, but adjusted subsequently for state-specifi c infl ation. Five 
main reasons indicate why the actual net income gain received by 
workers may end up being less than these stipulated wages for the 
scheme:
• Workers may be unable to meet the productivity norms required 
for earning the minimum wage if the norms are very stringent or 
if the scheme attracts workers with lower-than-average physical 
ability.
• There may be delays in payment (random or purposeful).
• Corruption may be present, whereby local leaders or offi cials 
take a cut, possibly as a “fee” for their services, such as providing 
wages in advance or collecting wages against “ghost workers.” Or 
there may be collusion between offi cials and village residents such 
that wages are collected and shared against work not done. 
• There may be exploitation stemming from the monopsony 
power of the village leader acting as a contractor.
• There may be forgone income, that is, some opportunity cost to 
the worker from some forgone economic activity. 
This chapter examines wages paid by the Bihar Rural Employ-
ment Guarantee Scheme (BREGS): specifically their levels and 
trends, in relation to the stipulated wage rate for the scheme, the 
wages paid in the casual labor market, and the total wage bill as 
reported in the administrative data. The next chapter focuses on 
forgone income.
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Payment of Wages 
According to the scheme’s guidelines, wages are to be paid either on 
a time- or piece-rate basis. The time rates are based on the scheme’s 
notifi ed state daily minimum wages, and the implementing agencies
are supposed to ensure that productivity norms are met. An indi-
vidual worker who does not attain the productivity norms should 
be paid less than the scheme wage. During the survey period, Bihar’s 
notifi ed MGNREGS wage started at Rs 89 per day, rising to Rs 102 
on June 16, 2009, and to Rs 114 on May 18, 2010. The piece-rate
wages are based on the rural district-level Schedule of Rates (SoR), 
which specifi es the wages to be paid based on the type of work done. 
The productivity norms in the SoRs are supposed to be such that an 
able-bodied worker is capable of earning the scheme-notifi ed wages. 
Several states have modifi ed the SoRs specifi cally for the MGN-
REGS following detailed time and motion studies. We found that, 
although different SoRs exist for different parts of Bihar, scheme 
functionaries typically apply a single set of productivity norms. The 
qualitative research also suggested differences between workers and 
scheme functionaries in their understanding of the SoRs.
In Bihar, qualitative research and the BREGS survey suggest that 
the time-rate system is common (see also Pankaj 2008). As noted, 
in this case, too, scheme functionaries are required to ensure that 
productivity norms are being met by measuring the work done at 
the worksite. Yet, nearly half of the men and women workers inter-
viewed reported seeing no one measuring work at the most recent 
worksite at which they worked. When measurement was under-
taken, among those aware of the process, the majority (83 percent of 
the male and 75 percent of the female workers interviewed) reported
equal payments to all workers at the site. These equal payments indi-
cate that wages were estimated on the basis of the work done at the 
entire worksite rather than that done by individual groups based on 
measurement against productivity norms. It is of interest that when 
we asked Mukhiyas why workers reported not being paid the stipu-
lated BREGS wage, they typically responded that workers had not 
performed to the SoR standards and hence were not owed the stipu-
lated wage. They also noted that workers did not understand this. 
Since April 2008, in an effort to promote fi nancial inclusion of the
poor and to improve transparency in wage payments, all wages are 
supposed to be paid through benefi ciary bank or post offi ce accounts 
rather than as direct cash payouts.1 Practice, based on responses
to our survey, is unclear. Panchayat rozgar sewaks (PRSs) report 
that the majority of wage payments are made through benefi ciary 
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bank or post offi ce accounts. In contrast, workers report that wage 
 payments are often made in cash at the worksite. For 2009/10, the 
time period covered by round 2 of the BREGS survey (R2), more 
than half of the workers interviewed—52 percent of women and 
56  percent of men—reported receiving wages in cash from the 
Mukhiya, the contractor, the mate, or another offi cial at the most
recent worksite at which they worked. In round 1 of the BREGS 
survey (R1), the shares were 78 percent and 64 percent for female
and male workers, respectively. Thus, there is evidence of a decline 
over time, particularly for women, but the share of total workers 
getting cash at worksites remains high. This may refl ect, in some 
cases, partial initial cash payments to workers by the Mukhiya while 
funds are being transferred to worker accounts. 
Mukhiyas or their spouses or close family members often act as 
money lenders as well as contractors, making advance payments
to workers.2 The reasons given for them doing so include delays in 
work measurement, delays in obtaining post offi ce or bank accounts, 
and delays in the fl ow of funds to the workers’ post offi ce or bank
accounts.3 In principle, the scheme should move toward fi nancial 
inclusion and full reliance on accounts with fi nancial institutions 
rather than cash. But practice is still a long way from that ideal. 
Weaknesses in the fl ow of funds or administration of accounts, lead-
ing to delays in payment, create scope for the Mukhiya or other
intermediaries to profit by being able to provide advance cash
 payments to needy workers.4 Fieldwork for this study indicated that 
some local offi cials also take a cut from the wages due the worker,
possibly in the process of making advance payments.
There are many qualitative reports from the fi eld of partial pay-
ments and long delays in receiving wages owed. Our survey corrobo-
rates these fi ndings. We asked sample households whether BREGS
participants had received wages owed in full. Some 72 percent of 
our households’ female participants in R1 and 67 percent in R2 had 
been paid in full by the time of the survey, while this was the case 
for 66 percent and 72 percent of participating men. Women who
had not been fully paid were still owed 58 percent and 75 percent
of wages, on average, in R1 and R2, respectively. Unpaid men were 
still waiting for 64 percent and 57 percent of their earned wages. The 
amount owed is likely to decline with increases in time since partici-
pation. The data confi rm that the share of wages received is higher 
for participants for whom more time has elapsed since they partici-
pated in BREGS. This can be seen in fi gure 4.1, which plots the share 
of total wages owed that were actually received by months since the 
work was completed for the sample of participants who have not 
received their full wages. The mean share of wages paid rises with 
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time up to six months, then stabilizes (R1) or falls (R2). However, 
even at its peak, the share of wages received among those receiving
less than they felt they were due was no more than 50 percent.
Advocates have hoped that the scheme would reduce the exploi-
tation of rural workers in local labor markets that stems from the 
labor market power of large farmers and contractors. This might 
have been wishful thinking given that the local leaders in charge of 
implementing the scheme often overlap with the set of people who 
have been employers in the past. For example, the Mukhiya, acting 
as a contractor directly or via a close ally, can maintain similarly 
exploitative relations in implementing the scheme. The scheme offi -
cially bans contractors, but we found that they are common, with 
half or more of the responding workers reporting that contractors 
were present at worksites (chapter 8). 
The next section discusses how the actual wages reported by 
workers in the survey compare with the stipulated wages for BREGS.
Wages Received by Households 
The BREGS survey includes two sources of information on wages 
received. The household questionnaire (Block 23) asks about wage 
earnings and days worked as casual labor in the week preceding the 
survey for each adult household member.5 It differentiates between
public works and other (agricultural or nonagricultural) casual wage 
Figure 4.1 Delays in Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme Wage Payments
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(BREGS) survey.
Note: Based on Block 1 from the individual questionnaire. Sample restricted to 
participants who have not been fully paid BREGS wages owed to them.
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work, but does not differentiate between BREGS and other  public
works employment. Wage earnings include cash payments and the 
value of in-kind payments. In addition, for each work episode, 
the questionnaire records information separately on wages that were 
owed and wages that had already been received at the time of the 
interview. We expect recall to be excellent, but the data have the dis-
advantage of covering employment for one week and thus provide 
relatively few observations.6 Because the survey was fi elded during 
May, June, and July, wage information from this block pertains only 
to these months.
The second source of information about wages is from the 
individual-level questionnaire (Block 1) which asked (up to) one 
male and one female adult in each household about their involve-
ment in public works, including type (whether BREGS or other), 
days worked, wages owed, and wages received, separately for each 
 episode of  public works employment during the past year. These 
data have already been referred to above with respect to delays
in wages paid. In addition to providing details specifi cally about 
BREGS, this source has the advantage of giving us far more observa-
tions. The drawback is that there may be mismeasurement caused by 
the long recall period and by the fact that this does not give wages 
for non–public works (non-PW) work.7 Given that each source has 
different pros and cons, we make use of both. 
Wages in the Last Week
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics on casual labor wages 
reported for the week preceding the survey. In R1, median pub-
lic works wages were nearly 30 percent higher than the prevailing 
casual wage. Wages were higher for men than for women in both 
segments of the labor market, but for women, PW paid much bet-
ter than the private sector. Between 2009 and 2010, average PW 
wages maintained value in real terms (increasing by 14.6 percent 
in nominal terms, compared with a 12 percent rate of infl ation),8
but the gap between public works and labor market wages nar-
rowed because mean casual wages rose by 21 percent, and median 
casual wages rose by 43 percent. Women, however, still earned sig-
nifi cantly higher wages under BREGS in R2 than in the casual labor 
market (t = 3.91 in R1 and t = 4.85 in R2). 
Figure 4.2 and table 4.2 provide a closer look at PW and market 
wages for casual labor in relation to the stipulated BREGS wage, and 
their evolution. First, it can be seen that wages owed, as reported 
by participants on the scheme, are lower than the stipulated BREGS 
wage rate (top panels of fi gure 4.2). Summary statistics and statistical 
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tests reported in table 4.2 show that, on average, workers received
Rs 10 less per day than the stipulated wage for much of the recall 
period. Note that this gap is not due to payment delays, because the 
wages summarized are total wages owed to the individual, not the 
amount actually received by the time of the survey interview.
Second, the evidence about whether BREGS has been placing 
pressure on the private labor market for unskilled labor is not clear. 
On the one hand, comparing the average wage gaps in R1 and R2 
shows that market wages started catching up with PW wages in 
R2, consistent with labor market tightening, possibly because of 
the scheme. On the other hand, non-PW wages do not respond in 
a predictable pattern to changes in the BREGS stipulated wage. In 
R1, other (non-PW) wages did not rise after the BREGS wage was 
increased; and in R2, non-PW wages actually fell even as the BREGS 
wage was raised during the reporting period. (Note that these are 
nominal wage rates, so the trend increase in wages in part refl ects 
infl ation.) 
Wage trends do show that the gap between non-PW and PW
wages narrowed, though more for men than for women, even 
though women began in R1 with a larger gap between the two sets 
of wages. 
Table 4.1 Daily Wage Rate for the Week before Interview
rupees
Mean
Standard 
deviation Median
Number of 
observations
Round 1
All Public works 82.7 27.4 89.0 54
Other casual labor 72.2 31.2 70.0 1,031
Men Public works 85.8 25.2 89.0 41
Other casual labor 79.1 29.2 80.0 815
Women Public works 73.0 32.6 80.0 13
Other casual labor 46.0 23.6 45.0 216
Round 2
All Public works 94.8 22.3 100.0 118
Other casual labor 87.2 42.0 100.0 796
Men Public works 99.4 18.2 100.0 75
Other casual labor 97.9 39.3 100.0 574
Women Public works 86.8 26.6 100.0 43
Other casual labor 59.4 35.2 50.0 222
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme survey.
Note: Based on Block 23. We treat wages of more than Rs 200 or less than Rs
10 per day as missing values. Wage data are in nominal terms, and reported as 
unweighted means and medians from the sample. 
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Figure 4.2 Wages over Time
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The view that the scheme has tightened up the labor market and 
increased wage rates is also hard to reconcile with the evidence of 
considerable rationing of BREGS work (chapter 2). However, recall 
that there is far more rationing in some states than in others. The 
scheme may be having larger impacts on private sector wages in 
states with less rationing. 
Wages in the Past Year from the Public Works Module
Turning to the second source of data on wages on BREGS from the 
survey, fi gure 4.3 plots the mean wage rate by month for both men 
and women based on Block 1. The fi gure also gives total days of 
work, and it identifi es the survey periods. 
There is a marked seasonality in days of employment, although
perhaps exaggerated by recall problems. As before, we see a per-
sistent absolute gap between the stipulated wage rate for BREGS 
and the wage actually reported by respondents. The absolute gap is 
roughly unchanged over time. There is some sign of convergence in 
male and female wages, but this outcome is possibly deceptive, given 
that there were very few observations in the early months, when the 
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(BREGS) survey.
Note: The fi gure reports data on wages owed, based on Block 23 for casual labor 
done in the week preceding the survey. Wages are nominal.
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female wage was lower. The longer recall periods required by this 
source of wage data also raise doubts about the reliability of the 
early data points.
Wages from the National Sample Survey 2009/10
A third source of wage data for Bihar is the National Sample 
Survey (NSS) for 2009/10. Table 4.3 gives estimates of the mean 
and median wage rate by subrounds, essentially spanning the 
period between R1 and R2 of the BREGS survey. Here too we see 
an increase in agricultural wages, notably between subrounds 2 
and 3, corresponding to the last quarter of 2009 and fi rst quarter 
of 2010, respectively. BREGS activity typically picks up in the 
fi rst quarter of every year, so this agricultural wage increase does 
 coincide with BREGS activity. However, also note that there was 
an even steeper increase in manual nonagricultural wages during 
the year.
Figure 4.3 Evolution of Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme Wages and Days Worked over the Entire Survey
Period
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(BREGS) survey.
Note: Based on Block 1 of the BREGS survey, individual questionnaire with recall 
over past year. Reported wage data are household-weighted wages owed to the 
worker.
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Comparing PW and Non-PW Wages for BREGS
Participants, Excess Demanders, and the Rest
Figure 4.4 gives the density functions for daily casual work wage 
rates for R1 and R2 (in the week preceding the survey) for  public 
works (PW) and three comparators: (1) the non-PW wages for 
BREGS participants; (2) the non-PW wages for the excess demand-
ers; and (3) the non-PW wages of the others (the “rest”). The wage 
rates were calculated by taking total wage earnings by type of work 
in the week before the interview and dividing by the total number 
of days of such work reported. 
Two points are worthy of note. First, as already discussed, PW 
wages are higher than other casual wages earned by BREGS partici-
pants, for both men and women. We can reject the null hypothesis of 
equality between the PW wage and the non-PW wage  distributions 
for both men and women in R1 (probability less than 0.0005 in 
both cases). This situation is true for other comparator groups as 
well: the people who said they wanted work on BREGS but did not 
get it (the excess demanders) were typically earning less than those 
working on PW. 
Second, the difference between PW wages and casual wages
earned by other (nonparticipant) workers does not appear to be due 
to different abilities of the workers who are participating in PW. 
Table 4.3 Daily Wages for Farm and Nonfarm Casual
Labor in Bihar from the 2009/10 National Sample Survey,
by Subround
rupees
Subround
Agricultural work
Manual 
nonagriculturalAll operations Cultivation
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
1. July–Sept 2009 74.8 77.5 72.4 73.3 86.9 80.0
2. Oct–Dec 2009 72.8 80.0 67.6 70.0 103.4 95.0
3. Jan–Mar 2010 84.6 80.0 80.2 80.0 97.1 90.0
4. Apr–June 2010 86.0 81.4 78.9 80.0 120.7 100.0
Total 79.0 80.0 74.4 76.7 100.2 90.0
Percentage
change between
subrounds 1
and 4 15 5 9 9 39 25
Source: Calculations from National Sample Survey 66th round.
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Figure 4.4 Density of Daily Casual Wages, by Bihar Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme Participation Status
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Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(BREGS) survey.
Note: Based on Block 23 and questions about casual work done in the last week.
Wage data are unweighted. 
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It could be possible that piece work schedules such as used by BREGS 
reward physically stronger workers. However, this explanation does 
not seem to hold, given that we also see that BREGS participants 
were earning signifi cantly less in non-PW work than in PW. In fact, 
there is no statistically signifi cant difference between the wage dis-
tributions of the three comparators for either women or men.9 And 
there is essentially no difference between the wage distribution for 
the “excess demanders” and the non-PW wage distribution of those 
who also do PW. Those who get the jobs on PW are essentially
drawn from the same wage distribution as those who do not get 
that work, but want it. This is again suggestive of unmet demand 
for work stemming from some form of rationing in the assignment
of jobs on PW.
Impact of BREGS on Wages 
If BREGS provided an unconditional guarantee of work to anyone 
who wanted it at a wage equal to or above the wage for alternative
work, the BREGS wage rate would become binding on the casual 
(farm and nonfarm) labor market. Nobody would be willing to 
work at less than the BREGS wage rate. Lags may be present in the 
adjustment process, but we would expect to see casual wages catch-
ing up to BREGS wages.10
There are intuitive reasons to doubt whether BREGS would 
be putting upward pressure on wages in the casual labor market. 
The guarantee is only conditional, up to 100 days, and in practice
the work is confi ned largely to the lean season, when there is less 
likelihood of a spillover effect on agricultural wages.11 But, probably 
more important, chapter 1 has shown for all of India and chapter 2
for Bihar that there is substantial unmet demand for work on the 
scheme even among those with fewer than 100 days of work. With 
so much rationing, the scheme driving up other wages in Bihar does 
not seem plausible. The option value of BREGS in wage bargaining 
in the casual labor market depends critically on employers believ-
ing that the scheme is available. The bargaining value might not 
require a strict guarantee of employment under BREGS; the scheme 
might still help workers bargain up their non-BREGS wages as long 
as there is a reasonably good chance of obtaining BREGS work. 
 However, it is hard to believe that this would be the case with the 
degree of rationing in BREGS jobs observed in the survey data. We 
cannot rule out the possibility that the scheme is causing a tightening 
of the agricultural labor market, but the extent of the unmet demand 
for BREGS work does introduce skepticism.
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Could the tightening of the casual agricultural labor market have 
come instead from the expansion of nonfarm work opportunities 
other than BREGS? Table 4.4 reports the count of  person days in all 
types of non-PW operations from the Bihar sample of the 2009/10 
NSS (as used in table 4.3). We see substitution between casual labor 
(on someone else’s farm) and own-farm work between subrounds 
2 and 3, whereas the total amount of agricultural work remained 
roughly constant. What increased between these two subrounds was 
the amount of manual nonfarm work. This fact is at least suggestive
of the possibility that the increasing availability of this work was 
driving up the agricultural wage rate in this period, not BREGS. 
Respondent perceptions that improvements in both wages and 
employment opportunities are unconnected to BREGS (see chap-
ter 6) are also consistent with this reading of the evidence. Workers 
can be expected to know whether BREGS is enhancing their bar-
gaining power in the labor market, but they do not think so overall. 
Also, recall that for women the gap between public works and non– 
public works wages was much less affected than that for men over 
the period. The fact that men are generally more likely than women 
to be engaged in casual off-farm work gives added weight to this 
interpretation.
Note that there may be larger impacts on wages in states where 
there is less rationing (chapter 1). Indeed, Imbert and Papp (2012) 
present evidence that in states with more effective implementation, 
the scheme has had a greater impact on casual wages. 
A Fuzzy Wage Floor?
If the scheme guaranteed employment at the stipulated wage rate, it 
would provide a binding wage fl oor across all casual work,  including 
in the private sector. However, given the extensive rationing we have 
documented, we would not expect to fi nd this wage fl oor. But how 
close does the scheme come in practice to providing a wage fl oor 
even for PW labor?
To answer this question we need to examine the distribution of 
the wage rates received relative to the stipulated BREGS wages. To 
see how the wages reported in the survey compare with the stipu-
lated wages for MGNREGS in Bihar, the survey wage rate (for the 
week before the interview) is divided by the stipulated wage rate in 
Bihar for that week. In R1 the unweighted mean of this ratio is 0.88 
(standard deviation = 0.16), and in R2 the mean is 0.86 (standard 
deviation = 0.21). The corresponding medians are 0.91 and 0.88.
It is evident from the medians that about half the workers 
on PW earned less than 90 percent of the stipulated wage rate.
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Figure 4.5 Wages Relative to the Bihar Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme Stipulated Wage Rate
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Figure 4.5 shows the full distributions of this ratio; in each case, 
both the densities and the cumulative distribution are provided, to 
show more clearly how many workers were earning less than the 
stipulated wage rate. For R1 we see that about the same percentage
of PW workers were earning less than the stipulated wage rate as 
were non-PW workers. For R2, we fi nd a slightly higher proportion
of workers on PW earn less than the stipulated wage rate than do 
workers on non-PW work. However, this comparison is deceptive,
given the greater compression of PW wages. This illusion becomes
clear if we calculate the proportion of workers earning less than 
75 percent of the stipulated wage rate. For example, in R1, only 
14 percent of PW workers earned less than 75 percent of the stipu-
lated wage rate, as compared with 46 percent of non-PW workers. In 
R2, the corresponding proportions were 21 percent and 45  percent.
(Continued on the following page)
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It appears that BREGS is able to provide a “fuzzy wage fl oor” to 
participants that is not available for other (non-PW) casual work.
Figure 4.6 examines whether there is a difference in the wage 
fl oor for men versus women. We use data from Block 1 in the 
individual questionnaire, which is based on one-year recall and 
therefore has more observations for a gender-wise disaggregation. 
In means and medians, the ratio of the BREGS wage rate to the 
stipulated wage rate for both men and women was similar in both 
rounds.12 However, the gap widens at lower proportions of the
stipulated wage rate (as is evident from the cumulative distributions 
in fi gure 4.6). 
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(BREGS) survey.
Note: Based on Block 23 and questions about casual work done in the last week.
Wage data are unweighted.
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The proportion of women earning considerably less than the
 stipulated wage rate is markedly higher than for men in both rounds. 
In R1, 19 percent of women were earning less than 75 percent of the 
stipulated wage rate, as compared with 13 percent of men. The gap 
narrowed slightly in R2, with 15 percent of women earning less than 
75 percent of the stipulated wage rate, versus 11 percent of men. It 
is clear that BREGS is even less effective in providing a wage fl oor 
for women than for men.
Determinants of Wages 
Wages are stipulated by the scheme, though compliance is clearly
another matter. A piece rate schedule identifi es wages for specifi c 
tasks, such that a person working with “normal” effort will attain the
stipulated minimum wage rate under the scheme. By contrast, wages 
for other casual labor (primarily in agriculture) are  determined by 
Figure 4.6 Actual BREGS Wages Relative to the BREGS
Stipulated Wage Rate, by Gender
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market conditions and local idiosyncratic institutional factors, such 
as longer-term agreements between specifi c employers and employ-
ees (possibly tied to other transactions, such as in credit markets). 
It should be noted that village labor markets for casual labor oper-
ate differently from the standard competitive labor market, and are 
arguably much more complex, involving interlinkage and sometimes
complex reciprocal arrangements, including for risk sharing. Local 
employers can often exercise a degree of monopsony power. In this 
setting, it is likely that household characteristics as well as worker 
characteristics will matter to wages. 
It is of interest to see how the determinants of wages differ between 
BREGS and the casual labor market. Annex table 4A.1 reports 
results from regressions of wages on a set of individual, household, 
and village characteristics. Some practical data issues must be noted. 
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(BREGS) survey.
Note: Based on Block 1, individual questionnaire with recall over the past year. 
Concerns BREGS only.
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In  particular, we obtained casual (non-PW) wages from the previously 
mentioned one-week recall segment of the questionnaire (Block 23). 
As noted, this source provided an adequate number of observations 
for non-PW wages but not PW wages. For PW wages, we relied on the 
special segment of the questionnaire that used one year recall (Block 
1), and is likely to be subject to greater measurement error.
What is most striking in this comparison is how dissimilar the 
 factors determining wages are between the PW scheme and the 
casual labor market. The PW wage regressions have higher explana-
tory power than the casual labor regressions for women but not for 
men. The PW wage regression with village fi xed effects explains 
a remarkable 90 percent of the variance in wages, though almost 
20 percentage points of this is due to the strong village effects that 
are not being captured by the included village variables. 
Strikingly, the strong gender effect on casual wages in agriculture
and other non-PW activities—whereby the coeffi cient on being male 
implies a difference in log wage rates of about 0.3 (0.4 with complete
village effects)—vanishes in the PW wage regressions; controlling for
other worker characteristics, there is no evidence of women earning 
less than men in public works. There is still a gender gap, but it is on 
account of the differences in worker characteristics. Although there are 
signs of wage discrimination against women in the casual labor market, 
we fi nd no evidence of such discrimination in setting PW wages. This
is clearly a positive achievement of BREGS. In fact, lower rationing 
in BREGS may also reduce discrimination in the casual labor market.
Comparing Survey Aggregates with Administrative Data
The analysis presented thus far shows that wages received by BREGS 
workers are less than what they should be paid if they are meeting
productivity norms. The wage gap is evidently not caused by any 
differences in BREGS workers (for example, less physically able) to 
the extent that lower wages than received by other workers would 
be warranted. Although we are unable to comment on whether the 
Schedule of Rates in Bihar is too exacting for a normal worker to 
achieve the stipulated wage (in piece-rate work), the majority of 
payments are made on a time basis or on group (rather than indi-
vidual) productivity. On the positive side, we fi nd that, controlling
for worker characteristics, there is no evidence of wage discrimina-
tion against women on BREGS. 
Another reason that wages may be lower than stipulated wages is 
corruption, or “leakage.” As noted earlier, leakage can take various 
forms, including workers receiving less than their due for work done, or 
ghost workers (who are on the books but not employed) drawing wages.
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Because the survey is representative of rural Bihar, we can scale 
up the survey-based estimates (using the appropriate weights) to 
obtain an estimate of the gross wages and employment received by 
households. The total estimated wage bill can then be compared 
with the wages recorded as being paid in the administrative data. 
This process has been used in the literature as a method of assess-
ing leakages in MGNREGS (Bhalla 2011; Himanshu 2010; Imbert
and Papp 2011). The shortfall in estimated total employment rela-
tive to days of employment recorded in the administrative data is, 
however, a crude estimate of the number of days accruing to ghost
 workers. This interpretation depends, of course, on the accuracy of 
the  survey-based estimates and of the administrative data. Although 
the sampling error will be negligible with our sample size (and rela-
tively simple two-stage design), we cannot rule out nonsampling 
errors in the survey or errors in the administrative data.
Table 4.5 provides the results of this comparison, including employ-
ment as well as wages. The survey aggregates account for 80 percent of 
the employment claimed in the administrative data for 2008/09, rising 
to 86 percent in 2009/10. The survey aggregates account for a slightly
lower share of the administrative data on wages paid—75 percent in 
the fi rst year and 80 percent in the second. These proportions compare 
favorably with the estimated leakage from another large antipoverty 
program, the Public Distribution System (PDS), that distributes subsi-
dized food to poor households. One study matches administrative data
on the off-take of grain by state governments from the Food Corpora-
tion of India (FCI) with NSS data on household purchases from PDS 
shops for 2007–08. Khera (2011b) estimates that in Bihar, as much 
as 90 percent of the grain off-take from the FCI does not reach house-
holds. The corresponding all-India fi gure is 43.9 percent. 
These estimates are in reasonably close accord with Himanshu’s 
(2010) estimates for India as a whole, which are based on compar-
ing administrative records with the NSS data for 2007/08. How-
ever, Imbert and Papp (2011) obtained larger discrepancies between 
NSS aggregates and administrative data on MGNREGS. For Bihar, 
Imbert and Papp can only account for about 30 percent of the admin-
istrative amount of employment using the scaled-up estimate based 
on the 2007/08 NSS. We would conjecture that our survey instru-
ment is doing a better job than the NSS in picking up spells of work 
on BREGS. In addition, the BREGS survey includes various ques-
tions asked both at the household and individual levels that probe 
respondents about participation from different angles and with vari-
ous recall periods. Such a specialized survey is likely to capture actual 
levels of participation and remuneration in the scheme much more 
accurately than surveys with single questions about MGNREGS.
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Notes
1. Exceptions are allowed in certain isolated areas that have no  banking 
facilities.
2. As in other states, one-third of elected positions are reserved for 
women in Bihar. Thus, elected Mukhiyas are sometimes female. However, 
once the election is over, a male surrogate, frequently a husband or father,
often takes on the job. When we refer to the Mukhiya we mean either the
elected or surrogate one.
3. Also see the discussion in Khera (2011a).
4. This is not confi ned to Bihar; Vanaik (2009) reports the same  practice 
in Rajasthan—thought to be among the best performing states in imple-
menting MGNREGS.
5. Block 23 is a modifi ed version of the standard weekly block module 
in the National Sample Survey Employment-Unemployment (Schedule 10.0)
surveys.
6. Because of the scant number of observations, we do not weight the 
wage data from Block 23.
7. To reduce sensitivity to measurement errors, we treat recorded wages 
of more than Rs 200 per day or less than Rs 10 from both sources as miss-
ing values.
8. The infl ation rate is based on the consumer price index for agricul-
tural laborers in the state.
9. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test does not reject the null hypothesis 
that the distributions are identical in the three binary comparisons between
the three comparison wage distributions for either men or women.
10. This is not, of course, a bad thing, because it could make the employ-
ment guarantee a very effective policy for fi ghting poverty by bringing all 
wages up to the minimum wage. Doing so, however, does not mean that it 
will be more effective than other policy options. For further discussion, see
Murgai and Ravallion (2005a, 2005b).
11. Zimmerman (2012) fi nds evidence of wage gains for women when 
MGNREGS work is provided in the main agricultural season, but not for men.
12. The mean ratio was 90 percent for men in both rounds; for women 
the means were 87 percent and 89 percent in R1 and R2, respectively. Medi-
ans were similar, with half the workers (of both genders) earning less than 
91 percent of the stipulated wage rate in R1 and 96 percent in R2.
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Forgone Employment and
Income
Some loss of income from other sources is bound to occur for at 
least some of those who take up public works (PW) employment. 
Given that the wage rate is higher than that for other work, some 
people will naturally be attracted to the Bihar Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (BREGS) for the wage gain. Others will no 
doubt be unable to fi nd other work, and for them the wage gain is 
also the net income gain from BREGS. The literature on the impacts 
on poverty of public works schemes has emphasized the impor-
tance of assessing the forgone income (see, among others, Ravallion 
1999; Murgai and Ravallion 2005; Jha, Gaiha, and Pandey 2012). 
However, advocates of such schemes have typically ignored this
issue, implicitly assuming that there is no displacement of other 
employment opportunities.1
The BREGS survey asked counterfactual questions of actual 
participants to obtain their assessments of how many days they 
would have otherwise worked and what they think they would have 
earned if they had not been doing the BREGS work during that 
period. All survey participants were asked for their expectations of 
employment and income from that employment if they did not have 
the BREGS job at the time. 
This method is unusual in the literature on the impact evalua-
tion of antipoverty programs.2 Standard methods rely heavily on
comparing means between those in a “treatment group” and in a
“comparison group” of nonparticipants deemed to reveal the coun-
terfactual. Various observational and experimental methods are 
used to derive the comparison group under maintained identifying 
assumptions. A number of evaluations of the Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) in 
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various states adopt this approach (for example, Ravi and Engler 
2013; Liu and Deininger 2013; Imbert and Papp 2012; and Berg 
and others 2012).
As described in the overview, we adopt a different approach. 
Our method relies instead on asking participants themselves what 
they think they would have done in the absence of the program. If 
they said that they would have worked, we asked them how many 
days and at what wage. This approach is similar to widely used 
expectations surveys, in which respondents are asked for their point 
expectation for some event or number at some point in the future, 
which cannot be directly observed at present. Here we are also ask-
ing about an unobserved state—the outcome in the absence of the 
intervention. The difference is that we are asking about a concurrent 
counterfactual state rather than a future state. 
This aspect of our methodology comes with both a benefi t and a 
cost. The benefi t is that we obtain individual-specifi c data on impacts. 
By contrast, standard impact-evaluation methods only deliver mean 
impacts, or at best conditional mean impacts. This benefi t of our 
methodology facilitates quite fi ne distributional analysis, as required 
for assessing impacts on poverty. The cost is that counterfactual sub-
jective questions are not always easy for respondents, although we 
found that, with appropriate training for interviewers, high response
rates could be obtained. The overall nonresponse rates to our ques-
tions on forgone income were 8 percent in the fi rst round of the 
survey (R1), falling to 2 percent in the second round (R2).3 There
may also be some double-counting of forgone work opportunities if 
different respondents have in mind the same forgone job.
One of the options for respondents was “housework or own-
enterprise” (typically the own-farm). For this category (grouped 
into one option), forgone income was assumed to be zero, on the 
plausible assumption that such work can be readily reallocated in
time to ensure little or no forgone income. Questions about forgone 
work and incomes were asked for each episode of BREGS work, for 
each individual. The gender-specifi c median was then used as the
household value. Missing values for forgone income were replaced
with the median for the household’s stratum or the village median 
if it was still missing.
Forgone Opportunities
The nature of forgone opportunities varies considerably across work-
ers and between men and women. Table 5.1 summarizes the types 
of activities that BREGS participants identifi ed as being  displaced by
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their BREGS work; we give results for both survey rounds and both 
genders. For men, about 14 percent in R2 (fewer in R1) said they 
would have migrated if not for BREGS; the same was true of only 
1 percent of women in R2. With regard to activity, casual work in 
agriculture was identifi ed as the forgone work opportunity for about 
22 percent of men and 25 percent of women in R1. Casual nonfarm 
work was more important for men than for women. Not surpris-
ingly, work on own land or in the house was the most common 
answer given by women.
Forgone Income
In estimating income from these forgone opportunities, one con-
cern emerged about the responses to the questions about reported 
income during the period of BREGS work. About 10 percent of 
respondents reported forgone earnings greater than their reported 
earnings from public works. This is implausible, and most likely 
refl ects a misunderstanding of the question, which is clearly not an 
Table 5.1 Forgone Work Opportunities Identifi ed by Bihar
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme Participants
Alternative to BREGS Work
Round 1 Round 2
Men
(percent)
Women
(percent)
Men
(percent)
Women
(percent)
Migrated for work 10.7 2.9 14.0 1.0
Worked at paid work, 
by type
Casual work (agricultural) 22.4 24.8 19.4 23.6
Casual work
(nonagricultural) 23.8 5.7 25.7 5.0
Other 1.0 0.8 2.1 0.0
Searched for work or
remained unemployed 44.0 35.7 37.6 13.2
Worked on own land or 
house 8.8 33.1 14.9 58.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(BREGS) survey.
Note: The questions were asked of BREGS participants by work episode. The 
means are formed over all work episodes such that an individual who worked more 
than once is also counted more than once. Would-be migrants are included in totals 
according to the type of activity they would have done. Data are household weighted. 
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easy one because it requires a counterfactual response. We trun-
cated the data such that whenever the reported forgone income 
exceeded the earnings from PW, the forgone income was set equal 
to the PW earnings.
However, the survey design also allows for a test of the reliabil-
ity of reported forgone incomes for the main relevant activity, that 
is, casual work. We compare the reported month-specifi c forgone 
wage for casual work with the mean wage rate actually received by 
casual workers (in the week before the survey) for that same month. 
Sample sizes mean that the test is only feasible for May and June of 
2009 and 2010.
Table 5.2 gives the results. We fi nd a fairly close correspondence
between the means, and more so in R2 than R1, suggesting that 
there may have been some learning. (Recall also that the response 
rate was higher in R2.) The variance is greater for actual than for 
counterfactual wages. These results give us greater confi dence that 
the counterfactual questions were understood and that the answers 
are sensible.
Forgone Employment and Income
as a Result of BREGS
On average, workers had to give up work days equivalent to 
40–45 percent of the total BREGS employment received. Although 
BREGS provided the sampled households with 18,900 person days 
of employment in R1, we calculate that 7,700 days of other employ-
ment were given up to take on this BREGS work. In R2, 20,400 per-
son days of employment were provided, but 9,300 days had to be 
given up. Forgone employment is higher for men than for women. 
In R1 the share of gross employment that was accounted for by 
forgone work was 0.42 for men, versus 0.36 for women. In R2, the 
corresponding ratios were 0.51 and 0.31.
Averages mask three distinct types of BREGS participants in rela-
tionship to forgone employment and income. The density functions 
of the ratio of self-assessed forgone days to PW days, in the left-hand 
panel of fi gure 5.1, have three distinct modes. One is around zero,
which is the overall mode. These participants would not have had 
any days of work had they not worked on BREGS. A second mode
is around 0.6, and the third and smallest mode is about 0.9. The 
latter benefi ciaries would have worked almost as many days in non-
BREGS work, possibly for a much lower wage.
Forgone income tends to be slightly lower than forgone 
employment, refl ecting the lower wages from casual work on the 
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labor market as compared with working on BREGS. The mean 
ratio of forgone income to PW wages is 0.35 (standard devia-
tion = 0.344; observations = 930) in R1, rising to 0.39 (standard 
deviation = 0.392; observations = 774) in R2.4 The correspond-
ing medians are 0.30 and 0.31. Density functions of the ratio of 
forgone income to PW wages (right-hand panel in fi gure 5.1) also 
have three distinct modes. As with days, one is around zero and 
is the overall mode. This represents the BREGS participants who 
stated that they would not have been earning income had they not 
worked on PW. A second mode is around 0.5, where participants 
would have earned about half of the earnings on PW, and the third 
and smallest mode is around 0.9. The latter benefi ciaries would 
have earned an amount close to the amount earned on BREGS 
but possibly would have had to migrate and bear costs to do so. 
There may also be unobserved nonpecuniary benefi ts to PW that 
make them more desirable than alternative equally remunerated 
casual work. 
In summary, these observations suggest that forgone income is 
signifi cant, though it varies considerably between workers. There 
are three distinct groups of participants—those for whom there is 
Figure 5.1 Distribution of the Ratio of Self-Assessed
Forgone Days to Public Works Days and Ratio of Forgone
Wages to Public Works Wages
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(BREGS) survey.
Note: Distributions are estimated for all public works at the household level.
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no likely income loss from joining the program, those for whom 
there is only a small net income gain from joining the program, and 
an intermediate group for whom about half of the BREGS wage 
represents a net income gain.
Impacts on Migration
Table 5.1 shows that BREGS has some impact on reducing migra-
tion. In R2, 14 percent of male BREGS workers stated that in the 
absence of that work, they would have migrated elsewhere. Com-
bined across men and women, 13 percent of BREGS households said 
they would have migrated. These responses are a clear sign of some 
impact, but how big is the impact? How does it compare with the 
total amount of migration in Bihar? 
In R1, 22 percent of households had at least one member who 
migrated for work in the year preceding the survey. Factoring in the 
extra migration implied by the fact that some households that did
not have any migrants would have otherwise migrated in the absence
of the program, we estimate that the proportion of households with 
migrants would have risen to 23.3 percent (see table 5.3). In R2, 
the proportion of households with a migrant would have risen from 
23.7 percent to 24.9 percent.
We estimate that a total of 1.6 million days of migration did not 
occur because of BREGS, rising to 2.3 million days in R2. Thus, with-
out BREGS, total migration days would have risen by 0.5 percent in 
Table 5.3 Migration Impact of Bihar Rural Employment
Guarantee Scheme
Round 1 Round 2
Households with at least one member who
migrated in the past year (percent) 22.2 23.7
Households that did not migrate in the past year, 
but had at least one member who would have
migrated in the absence of BREGS work (percent) 1.1 1.2
Total number of days of migration among all 
household members (millions) 312.7 382.0
Total number of additional days of migration that
would have occurred in the absence of BREGS
work (millions) 1.6 2.3
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(BREGS) survey.
Note: Household weighted. Based on BREGS participant responses to question
about whether they would have migrated if not for BREGS work. 
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R1 and 0.6 percent in R2. These estimates suggest that although the 
program is reducing migration, it is not having an impact on a large
enough scale to signifi cantly stem the fl ow of migrants who travel to
look for work outside Bihar.
Notes
 1. For example, in a compilation of popular writings in broad support 
of the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme in
Khera (2011), there is only one passing reference in a footnote to the pos-
sibility of forgone income.
 2. For a survey of the methods found in practice, see Ravallion (2008). 
 3. Exploiting our survey design, we can also confi rm the reliability of 
reported forgone incomes for the main relevant activity, that is, casual work. 
This is discussed later in this chapter.
 4. The corresponding means without truncation are 0.63 (standard 
deviation = 2.31) and 0.63 (standard deviation = 2.73). However, these means 
are distorted by some very large outliers (reaching a forgone income of 
68 times actual wage receipts from PW) that are clearly measurement errors. 
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6
Impacts on Poverty
We can now bring together the main elements from the preced-
ing chapters to derive our estimate of the impact of Bihar Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (BREGS) earnings on the incidence
of rural poverty in Bihar. We focus mainly on quantifying the income 
gains to households through their participation as workers. When
comparing the actual impact with simulated impacts under different
scenarios, it is evident that there is a large “lost impact” on poverty 
from BREGS. We investigate the extent of this lost impact that is 
due to the unmet demand for work and due to the gap between 
the actual wages received and the stipulated wages. We also make 
some observations from the survey on respondents’ perceptions of 
the scheme that are relevant to its poverty impacts.
Impacts on Poverty of the Extra Earnings from BREGS 
In estimating the impacts on poverty, we use the household-specifi c 
estimates of forgone income for men and women. The post–public 
works (PW) distribution of consumption is that actually observed in 
the data. The pre-PW distribution is derived from this by subtracting 
the net gains from PW, as given by gross wages less the estimated
forgone income.
As mentioned in Chapter 2, in estimating poverty measures for 
Bihar, we use the median per capita consumption level from round 1 
of the survey (R1) as the poverty line and update it over time using 
the consumer price index for agricultural laborers to get the round 2 
(R2) line. This gives poverty lines of 6,988 rupees (Rs) per person 
per year in R1 and Rs 7,836 in R2. However, recognizing that any
poverty line is bound to be somewhat arbitrary, we also provide 
estimates of the poverty impacts over a wide range of potential lines. 
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We estimate that the poverty rates (proportion of the population 
of Bihar living below the poverty line) among BREGS participants
would have been 62.2 percent in R1 and 52.6 percent in R2 without 
the program. By contrast, what we observe in the data (including, 
of course, net earnings from the scheme) are corresponding poverty 
rates of 56.8 percent and 50.2 percent. Thus, we estimate that the 
extra earnings from the scheme reduced poverty among participants 
by 5.4 percentage points in R1 and 2.4 percentage points in R2. 
There is no reason to consider just one poverty line. The upper 
panel of fi gure 6.1 gives the observed (post-BREGS) cumulative dis-
tribution function and the estimated counterfactual distribution of 
consumption in R1 for PW participants only. The difference between
the distribution functions is plotted in the lower panel. Thus, the 
lower panel plots the impact on the poverty rate at a given poverty 
line. We call this the “poverty impact graph.” The peak reduction 
in the poverty rate is (coincidentally) near the R1 median.1 At about
two-thirds of the median, poverty falls by about 1 percentage point, 
and at one-third above the median, it falls by more than 3 percentage
points. (Naturally, impacts go to zero at the extremes.)
Of course, the average impact is lower for the population of rural 
Bihar as a whole. We fi nd that without the program, the poverty 
rate would have been 51.4 percent and 42.3 percent for R1 and R2, 
 respectively. The estimated postprogram poverty rates are 50.0  percent 
(by construction) and 41.8 percent, respectively. Therefore, we con-
clude that the scheme reduced the poverty rate in rural Bihar as a 
whole by 1.4 percentage points in R1 and 0.5  percentage points in R2. 
Figure 6.2 reproduces the poverty impact graph from the lower 
panel of fi gure 6.1 but compares it with the corresponding graph for 
the sample as a whole for R1 (top panel) and R2 (bottom panel). In 
the full sample, the impact on poverty in R1 peaks near the median, 
but falls off quickly on either side. In R2, the impacts on poverty 
peak just above the median. 
As noted in the previous chapter, it is possible that we have over-
estimated forgone incomes, to the extent that there are overlaps in the 
self-reported opportunities forgone. The unemployment rate provides 
a clue. The Labour Bureau’s estimate of the unemployment rate for 
rural Bihar in 2009/10 was 18 percent, comprising 16  percent for 
men and 32 percent for women (Ministry of Labour and Employment 
2010). While the true rate is likely to be higher in the lean season and 
in the absence of BREGS, a reasonably conservative upper bound is 
50 percent. Therefore, as a sensitivity test, we reestimate the poverty 
impacts after halving reported forgone incomes on the grounds that, 
if the true unemployment rate were as high as 50 percent, there would 
only be half the number of job options available to BREGS workers as 
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Figure 6.1 Impacts on Participants’ Poverty in Round 1
cumulative distributions of consumption with and without 
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Figure 6.2 Poverty Impact Graph for Public Works
Participants and the Whole Population
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predicted by adding up their idiosyncratic reports on  forgone work. 
Poverty impacts, illustrated in fi gure 6.3, are greater (as one would 
expect), but the difference is not large. In R1, the impact among 
PW participants at the median rises by less than 1 percentage point. 
The extra impact at the median is even lower in R2, but larger 
impacts—an extra 1–2 percentage points—are found within the 
region of one-third below the median to one-third above.2
Naturally, eliminating all forgone income yields even higher  poverty 
impacts. This sensitivity test (see fi gure 6.4) indicates that BREGS 
reduced the poverty rate for R1 PW participants from 63.1  percent to 
56.8 percent; instead of an impact of 5.4  percentage points with full 
forgone income, we estimate an impact of 6.3  percentage points. For 
the rural population as a whole, the R1 poverty rate fell by 1.7 percent-
age points instead of 1.4 percentage points with full forgone income. 
In R2, without any forgone income the poverty rate for PW partici-
pants would have fallen by 6.2 percentage points (from 56.4 percent 
to 50.2 percent) whereas it would have fallen by 1.4 percentage points 
in the rural population as a whole, from 43.2 percent to 41.8 percent. 
So even if we have substantially overestimated forgone incomes 
using the individual survey responses, the poverty impacts for the 
rural population as a whole are not considerably greater.
Comparisons with Other Simulated Impacts
We started this book by noting the potential for the scheme to 
 substantially reduce poverty—by 14 percentage points in 2009. More 
precisely, recall that we calculate that the poverty rate in the absence 
of the extra earnings from BREGS would have been 51.4  percent. 
Giving all households that want work on the scheme 100 days at the 
stipulated wage rate would have brought the poverty rate down to 
37.6 percent—a drop of 13.8 percentage points. This stylized version 
of the scheme would have had an even larger impact in R2. We esti-
mate that the poverty rate (again using the 2009 median as the poverty 
line adjusted for infl ation) in R2 would have fallen from 42.3 percent 
without the scheme to 27.3  percent—a 15  percentage point decline.
This calculation is, of course, stylized. It assumes that every house-
hold that said it wanted work on the scheme (those who actually 
worked on the scheme plus the excess demanders) got the full 100 
days of work allowed under the legislation, no participant had to give 
up any other source of income to take on this work, and every partici-
pant was paid the stipulated wage rates. It also assumes that other 
wages are unaffected. As noted in the introduction, the 100-day limit 
on employment means that the complete general equilibrium effects of 
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Figure 6.3 Poverty Impact Graph with 50 Percent Lower
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Figure 6.4 Poverty Impact Graph without Forgone Income
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the employment guarantee will not be realized, and it is diffi cult to say 
just how strong these effects would be even if there were no rationing 
up to the 100 day limit. Nonetheless, it would be safe to assume that 
without any rationing of work up to the 100 day limit, there would 
be spillover effects on other unskilled wage rates, which would favor 
the poor. A reduction of 14 percent could well be an underestimate.
Figure 6.5 illustrates the impacts under this stylized scenario 
across the full range of potential poverty lines, for R1 and R2, respec-
tively. (Naturally, impacts are even larger among the PW partici-
pants, but we focus on the impacts in the population as a whole.) 
The 14  percentage point drop turns out to be near the maximum 
impact in R1, though slightly below the maximum in R2. Impacts 
drop off at lower or higher poverty lines. 
Thus, it is evident that there is a large “lost impact” on poverty of 
BREGS. Instead of a reduction in the poverty rate of 14 percentage 
points or more, we estimate that the impact is roughly 1  percentage 
point. As seen from the results of this study so far, none of the 
conditions assumed by the idealized version of BREGS holds in 
practice. Not all households want the 100 days (see table 2.4). But 
more important, there is a large unmet demand for work; even the 
“conditional guarantee” (subject to the 100 day limit) is not work-
ing. There is also nonnegligible forgone income. And there are gaps 
between the wages received and those stipulated by the scheme. 
How much of the lost impact is due to the unmet demand for 
work? That is, how much greater could the impact on poverty have 
been if there was no unmet demand up to the 100 day limit? The 
seemingly low impact on poverty refl ects, in part, the high propor-
tion of potential workers who wanted work on the scheme but did 
not get it, though many of them did not require the full 100 days. 
Two key assumptions are made in simulating the potential impact 
of BREGS if the expressed demand were satisfi ed. First, we assume 
that the changes in earnings from public works implied by the ideal-
ized version of BREGS are passed on fully to current consumption 
(that is, the earnings are not saved or invested). Second, we ignore 
consumption gains from the extra assets created as well as general 
equilibrium effects (noting that the 100 day limit makes it unclear 
how great a spillover effect can be expected).
The days of work for households currently participating in the 
scheme are scaled up to equal the days they said they would have 
liked in the survey, up to a maximum of 100 days. We value the 
extra days at the average, household-specifi c, PW wage rate net of 
forgone income. Households that wanted work but did not get it 
are given the median of the simulated net earnings on PW for the 
actual participants. No changes are made for those not interested in 
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Figure 6.5 Impacts on Poverty under Idealized Bihar Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme
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participating. (We can only make this calculation for R2, in which 
we asked for the number of extra days desired.) 
We estimate that satisfying the expressed demand for work 
on the scheme would have decreased the poverty rate in R2 from 
42.3  percent to 33.7 percent. Satisfying the unmet demand for work
would have increased the scheme’s impact on poverty from about 
1 percentage point to more than 8 percentage points. 
How much of the lost impact is due to the gap between the actual 
wages received and the stipulated wages (as discussed in chapter 4)? 
To address this question, we simply reestimate the impacts by rais-
ing the wage rates actually received to the level of the stipulated 
wage rate for that date up to the 100 day limit, and keep all else 
constant. Closing this gap would have resulted in a poverty rate of 
49.1 percent in R1 and 40.3 percent in R2, as compared with the 
preintervention rates of 51.4 percent and 42.3 percent, respectively. 
Thus, the wage gap accounts for about 2 percentage points of the 
lost impact—much less than that attributable to the unmet demand. 
Thus we see that more than two-thirds—about 10 percentage 
points—of the 15 percentage points of lost impact in R2 is attribut-
able to the ways in which the scheme is not fulfi lling the provisions 
of the Act. The rest is due to forgone income, which is hard to avoid. 
A second simulation allocates the same total public resources 
that were spent on BREGS in a different way. In calculating the cost 
of the scheme, we include both wage and nonwage costs from the 
administrative data. The precise budgets we use are Rs 858.42  per 
rural household in R1 and Rs 1,194.92 per rural household in R2.3
The simplest alternative is to then give every household (regardless of 
whether poor) these amounts—a uniform transfer—so that the total 
across households equals the sum of money actually spent on BREGS. 
This plan requires no targeting. We estimate that this would reduce 
the poverty rate from 51.4 percent to 49.5 percent in R1, whereas in 
R2 it would reduce the poverty rate from 42.3  percent to 39.1 per-
cent. Both resulting poverty rates are lower than those under BREGS.
This simulation assumes that there is no leakage of money from 
the budget for the transfers, which is unrealistic. If we make a seem-
ingly generous allowance for leakage in these transfers, such that 
10 percent is lost, then the poverty rates fall to 49.7 percent and 
39.6 percent in R1 and R2, respectively—still an improvement in 
comparison with the BREGS impact.4
A third simulation of interest is to once again take the same budget 
but distribute it equally to all households holding a Below-Poverty-
Line (BPL) card. This approach assumes that the government knows 
who has a BPL card (which is plausible given that they are issued by 
the government), but that it does not know who is really poor and 
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how poor they are. Our calculations indicate that this alternative 
would reduce the poverty rate from 51.4 percent to 49.8 percent in 
R1, and in R2 it would reduce the poverty rate from 42.3 percent to 
40.0 percent. In both cases, the poverty rates are lower than under 
BREGS. Poverty rates are also lower than for the uniform transfer, 
indicating that BPL cards are more likely to be given to those who are 
deemed to be poor in our data set. If we make a 10 percent allowance 
for leakage in the transfers, the poverty rates fall to 49.9 percent and 
40.2 percent in R1 and R2, respectively.5
It is notable that the impact on poverty using an allocation of 
transfers based on BPL cards is only slightly greater than that calcu-
lated for a uniform, untargeted allocation of the same total expen-
diture. This outcome indicates that the assignment of BPL cards is 
only slightly more pro-poor than if they were handed out with an 
equal chance of anyone getting the card.  
Table 6.1 summarizes the various budget-neutral simulations 
reported above. The calculations suggest that in 2009 the extra earn-
ings from BREGS had slightly less impact on poverty through the 
income gains to workers than would have occurred through either a
uniform transfer of the same gross expenditure (to everyone, whether 
poor or not) or a uniform transfer to those holding a BPL card (with
only a slightly larger impact in the latter case). When one allows for
10 percent leakage from the transfers, there is hardly any difference in
the poverty impacts in 2009—BREGS, uniform transfers of the same 
budget, or transfers of the same budget to BPL card holders would 
all have achieved a 50 percent poverty rate, as compared with an 
estimated preintervention rate of 51.4 percent. However, the picture
looks less favorable for BREGS in 2010. For that year, we fi nd that 
the scheme would not have done as well as either of these alternatives,
Table 6.1 Summary of Estimated Poverty Impacts Holding
Total Public Spending Constant
percentage of population below the poverty line
Round 1 Round 2
Preintervention (Estimated by deducting net
earnings gains from BREGS) 51.4 42.3
Postintervention BREGS (observed data) 50.0 41.8
Basic-income scheme 49.5 39.1
Basic-income scheme with
10 percent leakage 49.7 39.6
Transfers based on BPL
 ration cards 49.8 40.0
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which would have reduced the poverty rate by an additional 1.5–
2.0 percent points, even with a seemingly generous allowance for 
leakage. The scheme is clearly not justifi ed, relative to feasible options, 
by its ability to transfer cash to poor people through the self-targeting
mechanism. Only with suffi cient asset creation benefi ting poor people 
will the balance tilt in favor of this workfare scheme.
Perceptions of BREGS 
We can complement this assessment of poverty impacts with per-
ceptions about the scheme and general conditions in the village and 
their changes during the intervening year. The mean weighted shares 
of positive answers to perception questions included in the survey 
are presented by gender in table 6.2.6
The answers suggest that households are reasonably positive 
about their village circumstances, for which they have seen improve-
ments during the survey period. More than half of all men and 
women in R1 and nearly two-thirds in R2 felt that infrastructure in 
their village had improved during the past year. A signifi cant share
(41 percent and 35 percent, respectively, of men and women in R1 
and 46 percent and 42 percent in R2) felt that employment oppor-
tunities increased during the past year. More than three-quarters of 
both men and women reported that wages had gone up. Many fewer 
(34 percent and 23 percent in R1 and 26 percent and 17 percent in 
R2) felt that there had been a reduction in short-term, work-related
migration from the village.
Optimism on the same issues with respect to BREGS was more 
muted, and in marked contrast, perceptions were that the impact of 
BREGS weakened between the two survey rounds.7 Only 30 percent
and 28 percent of men and women, respectively, felt that BREGS
had increased access to employment in R1, falling to 23 percent and 
16 percent in R2. Fewer still felt that BREGS had led to a decline 
in work migration: approximately a fi fth of men in both rounds 
and 23 percent and 13 percent of women for R1 and R2, respec-
tively. Respondents perceived that BREGS employment was heav-
ily rationed and not available to them. In R1, only 17 percent of 
men felt that they could get BREGS work when they asked for it
during the previous year and even fewer (12 percent) did so in R2. 
Women are even more pessimistic: the share who felt that they could 
get work on a worksite, already a low 18 percent in R1, halved to
9  percent a year later. In both rounds, slightly more than half of male 
and female respondents trusted that BREGS would still be a source 
of employment in a year’s time.
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Perceptions then are consistent with the findings on wages 
reported in chapter 4, in which we hypothesized that the observed 
rise in non-PW wages was attributable to the recent growth in casual 
off-farm employment rather than to BREGS. This seems to accord 
well with villagers’ own perceptions. 
When it comes to perceptions about the way in which women 
are treated on worksites, both men and women are quite positive. 
Three-quarters of women and just slightly fewer men agreed that 
women actively participate in BREGS; whereas the same propor-
tions (though reversed by gender) felt that women are not penalized 
in getting work if they bring children to the worksite. Close to all 
(95–98 percent) perceived that women are treated well at worksites 
and close to 90 percent of women and 80 percent of men said that 
women are paid the same wage. 
Notes
 1. As a consequence of the smoothing used in creating fi gure 6.1, the 
average impact at the median is slightly lower than the precise estimate at
that point reported above.
 2. We then fi nd that the poverty rate for R1 (again using the R1 median) 
among PW participants fell from 62.8 percent to 56.8 percent as the result 
of BREGS—a drop of 6.0 percentage points, as compared with 5.4 percent-
age points with full forgone income, as indicated by the respondents. For 
the rural population as a whole, the R1 poverty rate fell from 51.6 percent 
to 50.0 percent—a 1.6 percentage point decline, as compared with 1.4 per-
centage points with full forgone income. In R2, the poverty rate for PW 
participants fell from 54.0 percent to 50.2 percent—a 3.8 percentage point 
drop, as compared with 2.4 percentage points with the full forgone income 
from the survey responses—while it fell from 42.6 percent to 41.8 percent 
in the population as a whole, representing a 0.8 percentage point decline, 
as  compared with 0.7 percentage point with the full forgone income.
 3. The administrative data indicate total expenditures of Rs 13,058 
million in fiscal year 2008/09 and Rs 18,177 million for fiscal year 
2009/10. These amounts were divided by our count of 152 million house-
holds in rural Bihar, as implied by the survey weights. Census projections 
for these years gave slightly higher counts, but it is better to use our survey-
based numbers for internal consistency.
 4. The results are not very different if we use the estimated leakage in 
BREGS (assuming the discrepancy between survey responses and adminis-
trative data is due to leakage to unintended benefi ciaries; see table 4.5). 
Poverty rates fall to 49.6 percent and 39.2 percent in R1 and R2, respec-
tively, for the uniform transfer.
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 5. Again, applying estimated leakage in BREGS (see chapter 5) yields 
very similar results. Poverty rates fall to 50.1 percent and 40.3 percent in 
R1 and R2, respectively, with a Below Poverty Line–targeted uniform 
transfer.
 6. This uses the entire sample of individuals interviewed in each round. 
We also calculated the summary statistics for the sample of interviewed 
individuals from households in which both a man and a woman were inter-
viewed in either round. The results were very similar, so we only report the 
results for the full sample.
 7. It is interesting to note that this optimism holds in the sample of 
nonparticipants, though less so than in the full sample (that is, including 
participants). See annex table 6A.1.
Reference
Ministry of Labour and Employment. 2010. Report on Employment and 
Unemployment Survey (2009–10). Chandigarh: Government of India.
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Reforming the Bihar Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme:
Citizen Awareness
The rights-based, demand-driven nature of the Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS) and 
its decentralized, participatory approach are two core aspects of 
the scheme that set it apart from previous public works schemes 
in India. These aspects of the scheme introduce new challenges in 
delivery, including developing mechanisms to register demand for 
work. This chapter uses the quantitative and qualitative work done 
for this study to assess how the demand-side processes are working, 
how aware people are of those processes and their rights under the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (the Act, or NREGA), 
why some people are more knowledgeable about the scheme than
others, and how policy makers can improve knowledge. 
Registration and Expressing Demand for Work
To participate, the Act requires that households must fi rst register 
and get a job card (see the overview). In round 2 (R2) of the Bihar
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (BREGS) survey, 42 percent
of rural households had been issued job cards, up from 34 percent
in round 1 (R1) of the survey (see table 7.1).1 Households without 
job cards are less likely to get work on the scheme. In both sur-
vey rounds, 40 percent of male and about a third of female excess 
demanders reported the lack of a job card as the reason for not 
getting work. At the same time, there are a few households (but a
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declining share) that say they do not have a job card but also report 
getting work on the scheme. We fi nd that 7.8 percent of households
without a job card in R1 got work on the scheme, falling to 3.8 per-
cent in R2. However (as noted in box 7.1), we cannot rule out the 
possibility that some of those interviewed were unaware that they 
had a job card. 
In both years, one in fi ve households reported not receiving a job 
card even after applying for it. Lack of local contacts and discrimi-
nation by functionaries were perceived to be key reasons in both 
years, with the proportion reporting the latter reason increasing 
to  47 percent from 29 percent between the two years. Qualitative 
research indicates that caste and electoral politics may have a role 
to play in this process (Sunai 2009). Reports for Bihar and other 
Table 7.1 Not All Households That Want a Job Card
Have One
Round 1
(percent)
Round 2
(percent)
Households with job cards 34.2 42.2
Among households without job cards:
Households that are in the process of obtaining 
a job card 26.0 5.0
Households that want, applied for, but have not 
gotten the card 33.4 39.6
 Reason: no acquaintance with offi cials 59.2 37.9
 Reason: perceive discrimination by offi cials 29.3 46.7
 Reason: without BPL card 3.9 4.0
 Reason: with disabled members 2.3 1.6
 Reason: cannot afford 2.5 6.0
Households that want but have not applied 11.9 19.3
 Reason: unaware of application process 49.0 73.1
 Reason: perceive application process too lengthy 10.8 7.2
 Reason: perceive unlikely to obtain 20.2 8.1
 Reason: deterred by lack of BPL card 11.2 1.2
 Reason: deterred by disability 6.4 5.9
Households that do not want 28.7 35.9
 Reason: do not need work 30.1 20.5
 Reason: deterred by disability 6.2 15.2
 Reason: deterred by other program featuresa 63.7 64.3
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(BREGS) survey. 
Note: Households with missing values are excluded from the sample. BPL = Below
Poverty Line.
a. These households were not interested in the type of work, or felt the stipulated 
wage was too low or the number of days available too few. 
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Box 7.1 Are the Transparency Safeguards Adhered To in
Practice?
The job card is an important transparency safeguard; it is supposed
to serve as a complete record of adult household members (with pho-
tographs) and of all scheme-related activity by the household mem-
bers. In practice, qualitative research for this report and other fi eld 
studies suggest that this function is not yet being served. Poor knowl-
edge of processes as well as high levels of illiteracy among Bihar Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme (BREGS) workers exacerbates the 
problem.
An encouraging fi nding is that the majority (two-thirds) of job 
card holders in Bihar have the card in their own possession. This is
the fi rst step in ensuring transparency. However, this still leaves nearly 
a third of job card holders reporting that their card is held by the 
Mukhiya or other panchayat members and offi cials (panchayat rozgar
sewak, postmaster, and the like). But one-third may be a lower bound; 
qualitative research suggests that households may be unaware that 
job cards have been issued in their name and are in the possession of 
a middleman or functionary. Administrative data indicate that 61 per-
cent (74 percent) of rural households were issued job cards in 2008/09
(2009/10), whereas only 34 percent (42 percent) of households in the
BREGS survey reported possession of a job card in approximately the
same period. The same research also indicates that passbooks for 
workers’ bank and post offi ce accounts are often held by scheme func-
tionaries or the Mukhiya, leaving room for manipulation and misuse.
We also fi nd that job cards are poorly maintained. The majority of 
households report that their job cards list at least one adult member, 
but about 29 percent in round 1 of the survey said their cards do not 
have the photographs of all listed members. Though job cards and 
photographs are supposed to be issued free of charge, in both rounds,
only about a quarter of job card holders obtained theirs without pay-
ment. The rest paid between 40 and 50 rupees, on average. Qualita-
tive research suggests that scheme functionaries often charge for the
photographs. In addition, records of work applications, days worked,
and wages paid are often not made in the job cards. For instance, 
when asked about payments received at the last worksite at which 
they worked, 24 percent of men and 38 percent of women workers 
did not even know if this information was recorded in the job card.
Only 29 percent of men and 25 percent of women workers reported
that payments received were recorded in their job cards.
Source: Authors’ calculations from the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme (BREGS) survey; Indian Grameen Services 2010; Development Alter-
natives 2009; and Sunai 2009.
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northern states have also emphasized the specifi c barriers faced by 
women, for example, in getting their names on job cards (Khera and 
Nayak 2009). Among those who wanted a job card but had not yet
applied for one, the main deterrents were a lack of knowledge about 
the application process, the perception that it was lengthy, and they 
thought that they would not get a job card even if they were to apply
for it (see table 7.1). 
We fi nd that the knowledge of rights, and equally important,
information about the processes by which to access these rights, 
remains low, and more so among women (more on this below). In 
particular, the notion of “demanding” and applying for work is still 
in its infancy.2 We fi nd that only a quarter of male (and only 16 per-
cent of female) workers in the sample had actually demanded work 
at the last worksite at which they worked in R1 (see table 7.2). The 
rest had simply come to the worksite when it opened, or obtained 
work through village leaders (including the Mukhiya), scheme func-
tionaries, or even contractors. An encouraging trend is the increase
in the proportion demanding work in the second survey round, par-
ticularly among female workers. 
Women said that they were often turned away from worksites if 
they came for work without a husband or male relative. It is unclear 
how widespread this practice is. But the R1 survey indicates that 
23 percent of women workers who applied for work at the last 
BREGS worksite at which they worked did so with their husbands 
Table 7.2 Notion of “Demanding” Work Is Weak but
Improving
Round 1 Round 2
Way in Which Work Was Obtained Men Women Men Women
Asked for work 25.2 16.3 40.5 33.8
Came to worksite 11.8 10.6 11.8 17.1
Called for work by contractor 9.2 14.0 13.2 13.5
Called for work by panchayat rozgar
sewak 9.4 14.8 7.0 4.7
Called for work by Mukhiya or Gram
Panchayat member 41.1 36.0 26.3 19.6
Other 3.1 7.3 0.2 11.1
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(BREGS) survey.
Note: Based on responses by workers in the surveyed households to the question of 
how work was obtained at the BREGS worksite at which they last worked. Observa-
tions with missing values (workers that did not respond to the question) are excluded 
from the sample. 
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and 52 percent applied as part of a group. It was more common for 
men (60 percent in R1, but falling to 35 percent in R2) to apply indi-
vidually for work. Applications as part of a group were even more 
common in R2 (70 percent for women and 58 percent for men). 
Qualitative research also corroborates that many villagers believe 
that work will be provided when it is available (that is, not necessar-
ily on demand). In some cases, the Mukhiya, the panchayat rozgar 
sewak (PRS), or other scheme functionaries inform potential work-
ers that work will be available when a worksite is opened. The per-
ception of Mukhiyas and PRSs is that many people do not formally 
demand work because they are used to a contractor-based system 
wherein work is allocated rather than demanded (Sunai 2009). 
There is little awareness that the right to employment is a uni-
versal right for rural households and not limited to specifi c groups. 
As a consequence, potential applicants can be excluded based on 
certain characteristics (for example, widowhood, gender, old age, 
and disability) or a lack of documentation (for instance, a Below-
Poverty-Line [BPL] ration card). We fi nd that although 11 percent 
of households perceived the lack of a BPL card to be a deterrent 
to applying for a job card in 2008/09, fewer than 2 percent con-
tinued to think so in 2009/10.3 Another small share of households 
(6  percent in both rounds) cited disability as the reason for lack
of interest in the scheme or for not applying for or getting a job 
card. Although public works schemes are typically designed for able- 
bodied individuals, some states have made greater efforts to extend 
the scheme to persons with disabilities.4 We fi nd little sign that this
has happened in Bihar, however. 
There is also some anecdotal evidence that women are discour-
aged from participating because of a perception that they are less 
productive. Information campaigns need to stress that all adults are 
eligible for the scheme and that potential workers need to demand 
work, individually or collectively, to get it. And it is crucial that such 
campaigns be designed keeping in mind the high levels of illiteracy 
in rural Bihar. There is also a need to specifi cally mobilize weaker
groups to encourage their participation in the scheme.
What Do Rural Households Know about BREGS?
The surveyed individuals were asked whether they knew about the 
existence of BREGS, and if so, they were given 12 questions aimed 
at testing their knowledge of the scheme’s functioning, as well as 
about their rights under the Act. Table 7.3 provides the mean of 
correct responses for each of the questions by gender and survey 
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round. We provide the weighted summary statistics for two samples: 
all interviewed individuals in panel A of table 7.3 and all those from 
households in which both a man and a woman were interviewed in 
panel B. (The questionnaire fi rst asked individuals whether they had
heard about BREGS. If they answered no, the rest of the awareness
questions were skipped for those individuals. Note that the means 
presented in table 7.3 simply treat these as missing observations 
rather than including them as zeroes.)
We fi nd knowledge of the details of the scheme to be very low 
and lower for women than for men.5 Most men and three-quarters
of women had heard about the program by R1, but many were 
unaware of their precise rights and entitlements under BREGS. 
The level of understanding of how to go about obtaining work 
is clearly low. For example, 37 percent of men and 11 percent of 
women knew that households can work up to 100 days per year; 
57 percent and 51 percent (respectively) knew that both men and 
women can work; 53 percent and 38 percent that a household 
need not have a BPL ration card to be eligible; 6 percent and 
2 percent that work should be provided within 15 days of having 
demanded it; 44 percent and 21 percent knew what wage should 
be paid, and 12 percent and 8 percent that it should be paid within 
two weeks; and only 24 percent and 11 percent that contractors 
are not allowed on the scheme. The R1 questionnaire did not 
contain a question about whether the individual knows work must 
be demanded. However, in R2, 74 percent of men and 52 percent 
of women answered the question correctly. The only awareness 
question for which there was no gap between men and women 
concerned the provision for child care, which 19 percent of all 
individuals knew about. 
As an overall measure of knowledge about the scheme’s employ-
ment aspects, we use the number of correct answers to the eight 
employment-related questions. We call this the “employment 
knowledge score,” or “Score 1” for short. This gives averages of 
2.6 for men and 1.5 for women out of a maximum of 8. A second 
measure was created for awareness of the facilities and amenities 
that BREGS mandates must be provided at worksites (child care, 
drinking water, shade, and fi rst aid kits). Respondents were asked 
to identify what facilities were supposed to be provided. The mean 
number of correct answers was 1.4 and 1.0 out of a maximum of 4 
for men and women, respectively. We refer to this as the “facilities
knowledge score” (“Score 2”). 
As can be seen in table 7.3, knowledge of entitlements and BREGS 
procedures improved with time. The average employment knowl-
edge score increased to 3.1 for men and 2.1 for women between 
184 RIGHT TO WORK?
rounds 1 and 2, while the facilities knowledge score rose to 1.6 and 
1.1, respectively. But these are clearly not large increases.
Table 7.4, column 1, shows the marginal effects of various 
 individual, household, and village attributes on whether an  individual 
has heard about BREGS. This regression uses all individual observa-
tions for R1.
Higher educational attainment at the secondary level and above 
has a signifi cantly positive effect on awareness of the scheme, as 
does male gender. We also collected data to calibrate an individual- 
specifi c version of the Pearlin Mastery scale, which is a measure of 
the extent to which individuals perceive themselves in control of 
factors that affect their lives. We fi nd that the Pearlin scale has a sig-
nifi cant positive effect for women but not for men.6 Being  married, 
or widowed or divorced, as opposed to unmarried, signifi cantly 
reduces the probability of having heard about BREGS.
Household-level characteristics that are correlated with higher 
participation in the scheme (see chapter 3) also have a signifi cant 
positive impact on knowledge. These characteristics include having 
male and female household members who have engaged in casual 
work, being from the Mahadalit caste or of the Hindu religion, being 
related to the ward member or other panchayat member, and having 
voted in the panchayat election. In contrast, higher wealth as mea-
sured by the assets index (as used in chapter 3) and land holdings 
tend to reduce the likelihood of having heard about BREGS. The 
scheme is clearly less relevant to wealthier groups. The fact that they 
know less about the scheme suggests that this type of knowledge is 
not public knowledge.
Conditional on individual and household characteristics, the 
attributes of a respondent’s village of residence have considerable 
explanatory power. We fi nd that knowledge is lower in villages that
are more unequal (based on distribution of assets). Living in an elec-
trifi ed village that is within fi ve kilometers of the Gram Panchayat 
or block headquarters also appears to negatively affect knowledge 
of BREGS. Larger shares of Scheduled Caste households and ones 
with kutcha houses also have a strong positive effect, as does having
a panchayat bhawan, a post offi ce, and access to nonagricultural 
enterprises within fi ve kilometers of the village. The characteristics 
of the Mukhiya also emerge as important. A male Mukhiya has a 
positive effect on knowledge; a Mukhiya employed in agricultural 
pursuits has a signifi cant negative effect on whether villagers have 
heard of BREGS.
The regression also tests for whether active associations in the 
 village has an effect. We separately control for the presence of 
 women’s self-help groups (SHGs), and civil society organizations 
185
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(CSOs) that specifi cally focus on the Act, an NREGA Village 
Vigilance Committee (NVVC), and others (comprising farmers, 
laborers, trade, caste groups, and agricultural or milk  cooperative 
societies). Some 45 percent of villages in the sample have at least 
one women’s SHG, only 22 percent have active BREGS-related 
CSOs, and 77 percent an NVVC. The other groups are generally 
individually much less common, although 84 percent of villages 
have at least one that is active. People in villages with a women’s 
SHG and “other” groups are less likely to have heard about the 
scheme, perhaps because the presence of these groups reduces 
their need for BREGS. Those in villages with an NVVC are more 
likely to have heard of BREGS. Having a BREGS-related CSO 
appears to have no bearing on whether people have heard about 
the scheme.
The columns from 2 onward in table 7.4 present the probit 
estimates for whether individuals answered each of the specifi c 
knowledge questions correctly in R1. (We dropped the questions 
with which respondents were least familiar to save space.) As noted 
above, if an individual stated that he or she had not heard of BREGS, 
none of the knowledge questions were asked, and a zero was entered 
for each of the subsequent knowledge questions. This raises the pos-
sibility of selection bias with respect to the sample of individuals 
who had heard of BREGS and answered the questions. However, 
the tests did not suggest that this was likely to be a problem.7 We 
therefore conclude that the people who said that they did not know 
about BREGS are not systematically different from those who said 
they did. We exclude them and run the probits only for those who 
answered the specifi c knowledge questions. 
Many of the attributes that determined whether individuals 
had heard of BREGS (male gender, higher levels of education, the 
gender-specifi c Pearlin scales, being Hindu, political  connections—
knowing the Mukhiya, Sarpanch, ward member, or panch, and 
 having voted—as well as attributes of the Mukhiya and of the 
village) also infl uenced knowledge of the various aspects of the 
scheme.
As with the “heard of BREGS” question, the level of asset inequal-
ity in the village has a strong negative effect on the level of aware-
ness in almost all cases. Having suffered a household-level shock 
from a natural disaster tends to raise knowledge. Natural disas-
ters at the village level also result in more people knowing about 
BREGS. However, the direction of the effect on knowledge about 
the scheme’s details depends on the shock. Floods tend to signifi -
cantly reduce knowledge whereas droughts have the opposite effect.
This outcome may refl ect the reality that BREGS worksites tend 
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to be impossible to set up in times of fl ooding and that the scheme
closes down during the rainy season, leading to fewer opportunities 
to learn about the scheme.
It is interesting that the only cases in which there is no signifi cant 
male knowledge advantage concerns the questions about whether 
women are equally welcome to participate and whether child care 
is provided. The only case in which BPL household status has a 
statistically signifi cant (and positive) effect is for the question con-
cerning whether eligibility requires that one be a BPL household. 
These fi ndings suggest that people retain information about issues 
that specifi cally concern them and matter to them.
Living in a village that reports good relations between different 
village groups signifi cantly raises the probability of correct answers 
on a number of knowledge questions; being from a village with 
active CSOs positively affects knowledge about the wage rate but 
negatively affects that concerning the scheme’s mandated worksite 
facilities. However, the presence of a women’s SHG consistently sig-
nifi cantly reduces awareness. If these groups are dispensing micro-
credit to women, they might have a reduced need to know about the
scheme. Alternatively, the fi nding may refl ect that women’s groups
locate where there is the most pressing need for them, that is, where 
knowledge is lower.
Intrahousehold Gender Differences in Knowledge
It is apparent from the above discussion that men and women have 
different perceptions about their circumstances, as well as dispa-
rate levels of awareness about BREGS, and do not necessarily share 
information within the household. When we limit the sample to 
households in which members of both genders were interviewed, we 
fi nd the gender gap in knowledge declines, but the differences are 
negligible. Table 7.3, panel B presents the means of correct answers
for the different knowledge questions for men and women separately
in this sample. A comparison with the means in panel A shows that 
with some exceptions, awareness is somewhat higher for both gen-
ders and the percentage difference between them slightly reduced. 
The mean knowledge gap calculated over the 12 questions decreases
to 0.123 from 0.132. A regression on this reduced sample reveals 
that the coeffi cient on male gender remains positive and signifi cant 
for all knowledge questions and is actually larger conditional on 
individual, household, and village characteristics.8 Thus, the con-
ditional mean difference in knowledge favors men even more than 
does the unconditional mean.
REFORMING BREGS: CITIZEN AWARENESS 193
We also estimated separate male and female knowledge regres-
sions for individuals in households in which a member of the oppo-
site sex was also interviewed. The regressions controlled for the male 
or female individual’s own characteristics as well as those of the 
other surveyed individual’s characteristics, and household and vil-
lage attributes as before.
We found some interesting differences between the male and 
female estimates. More education and higher Pearlin scores have 
similar effects on knowledge. More education from secondary
schooling on increases the probability that women have heard of 
the scheme but does not do so for men. When signifi cant, the effects
of education are always positive for women; in contrast, more edu-
cation for men is a mixed blessing from the point of view of getting 
the BREGS knowledge questions right. For example, progressively 
more education relative to being illiterate is signifi cantly associated
with progressively higher probabilities by men of erroneously believ-
ing that women are not allowed to work on BREGS. Yet, educa-
tion levels higher than middle school for the interviewed woman in 
the same household helps him answer this same question correctly.
More years of schooling of the interviewed woman tends to be asso-
ciated with greater knowledge on the man’s part. The opposite is
true with respect to women’s knowledge. Their fellow male house-
hold member’s education tends to negatively affect their knowledge 
when it matters at all.
Similarly, a higher score on the Pearlin scale signifi cantly infl u-
ences women’s knowledge of their rights but has far less effect on 
men’s awareness. Indeed, men’s higher Pearlin score leads them to 
erroneously think that the household needs to have a BPL card to 
participate in BREGS. Furthermore, a higher Pearlin score for the
interviewed female has a positive effect on the male interviewee’s 
knowledge but not vice versa. A positive effect of the household’s
share of children under age six on knowledge of the mandated 
requirement that water be provided at work sites is signifi cant only 
for women.
Being close to the Mukhiya is equally important for men and 
women in determining knowledge. For men, there are also signifi -
cant positive effects of being close to the ward member and from 
voting in the elections. Neither effect is apparent for women. The 
household’s having faced a shock related to a natural disaster sig-
nifi cantly heightens men’s knowledge of multiple aspects of BREGS 
but not women’s. On the whole, village characteristics appear to 
infl uence knowledge similarly for men and women, conditional on 
household and individual characteristics. 
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To summarize the above discussion of the determinants of 
 knowledge, we fi nd certain factors to be consistently important. At 
the individual and household levels, one can think of these as fall-
ing roughly into two categories of attributes—those that enhance a 
person’s knowledge and understanding, and those that render the 
information more relevant and meaningful to those individuals. In 
the fi rst category, higher levels of education and higher scores on 
the Pearlin scale are dependably signifi cant attributes that help indi-
viduals process and retain information. Political connections create
opportunities to access the work that an individual may not have 
otherwise and in that sense will also help people take on information 
that may concern them. Being from the Mahadalit caste (typically 
the most disadvantaged), or being from a household whose members 
have engaged in casual work in the past, has a low level of wealth, 
and has suffered a shock, fall in the second category of attributes 
that make knowledge about BREGS vital to one’s household’s well-
being. Male gender, given men’s responsibility as main breadwin-
ners, can also be seen to fi t this category. In addition, a number of 
village-level characteristics that may largely refl ect supply-side issues 
also emerge as very important. High asset inequality is negatively
associated with knowledge; having a panchayat bhawan and cer-
tain characteristics of the Mukhiya, such as if he lives in the village, 
increase knowledge whereas others, such as the Mukhiya being a 
farmer or landowner, tend to reduce it. 
A Pilot Information Campaign
In the present setting, it may be that people are too unaware of their 
rights or of how to demand their rights for the program to func-
tion as intended. However, full information may not be suffi cient 
for the scheme to improve. First, being aware of one’s rights is not 
the same as being empowered to demand those rights. The BREGS 
target groups tend to be illiterate or barely educated, to come from 
the castes most discriminated against, and to lack political clout. It 
may take more than awareness for them to be able to make demands 
from those to whom they are subordinates in every way. There is 
also the preliminary issue of whether new contradictory  information 
can even be processed and accepted in the face of evidence to the 
contrary from one’s leaders, patrons, and other fi gures of author-
ity in one’s community. As we have seen, a household’s political 
connections and vote history, and local offi cials’ characteristics, 
have signifi cant effects, both positive and negative, on knowledge. 
Second, knowing the rules and how to obtain work may not be 
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suffi cient in the presence of very real supply-side issues that may 
play a substantial role in limiting participation (as further discussed 
in chapter 8).
A key question is whether demand- or supply-side constraints 
are the more important handicap to higher participation and a bet-
ter working scheme, and whether improving one without changing 
the other can still enhance the scheme’s functioning. Knowledge of 
public program eligibility and take-up procedures is a necessary con-
dition for people to demand their rights, but is it suffi cient? Would 
raising awareness on its own embolden people to demand employ-
ment and put suffi cient pressure on local governments and offi cials 
to overcome supply-side limitations?
To shed light on these key questions, we piloted a demand-side 
intervention aimed at increasing individual knowledge. Alternative 
modes of information campaign were initially explored through sev-
eral open-ended focus group discussions with BREGS participants 
and nonparticipants, and men and women separately, in Nalanda 
and Patna districts. In Nalanda, information about the scheme was 
read out by facilitators; in Patna, the team showed short video clips 
on the scheme produced by the Ministry of Rural Development and 
provided additional information through facilitation and discus-
sion. The fi lm format attracted considerable interest in the focus
groups. Feedback gathered in the fi eld after the discussions sug-
gested that a facilitator was needed for viewers to retain the infor-
mation provided through such video clips and to provide the most 
recent information. The demand-side pilot was thus designed as a 
fi lm on the program to be shown to households, in the presence of 
a facilitator. 
Based on these preliminary fi ndings from the fi eldwork, and 
with the cooperation of the Rural Development Department of the 
government of Bihar, we produced a fi lm to convey explicit infor-
mation about rights and entitlements under BREGS. The fi lm was 
tailored to Bihar’s specifi c context and program guidelines. Bihari
actors acted out an entertaining and emotionally engaging story-
based plot whose purpose was to provide repeated information on 
how the scheme works, who can participate, and how to go about 
participating. The fi lm was produced by a local nongovernmental 
organization, Praxis (Institute for Participatory Practices).
The film was disseminated between mid-February and mid-
March 2010 in a randomly selected subsample of 40 out of the 
150 villages that were surveyed in R1. Compliance at the village 
level was complete. Because the 150 villages were drawn randomly 
from all villages in rural Bihar, we can infer mean impacts of a 
 village receiving a screening of the fi lm for rural Bihar. However, it is 
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important to recognize that this evaluation design (in common with 
other randomized control trials) only identifi es mean impact. We 
cannot conclude that exposure to the fi lm would have that impact
in all villages. In practice, there will be heterogeneity in the impacts. 
We return to this issue. 
As a check on the randomization (if something went wrong that 
we do not know about), we tested for differences in the sample means 
of the 75 village variables used in the analysis (including  village 
means of household variables). The difference in sample means was 
only statistically signifi cant at the 5 percent level for three of the 75
variables. (Some signifi cant differences are to be expected by chance 
even when fully randomized.) The treatment and control samples 
are clearly well balanced.
In each village, the fi lm was shown in two separate locations at
different times. At each location, the fi lm was screened twice, fol-
lowed by a question and answer session and distribution of hand-
outs. Concerted efforts were made to announce and advertize the 
upcoming screenings widely in advance. Local offi cials such as the 
Mukhiya and Sarpanch, opposition leaders, and local BREGS offi -
cials were specifi cally invited to attend. The fi lm was typically shown
in a common area, such as an open ground, school building, or 
community hall. In 93 percent of the showings, the facilitators noted 
that the majority of people watched both screenings of the fi lm. On
average, about 365 people (38 percent women) attended at least one 
of the two back-to-back screenings at a given location. In a third of 
the villages, the Mukhiya attended the show as did the mate; the
PRS attended in half the treatment villages, and the local opposi-
tion leader did so in close to 60 percent. People in the majority of 
shows (89 percent) reported that the information was somewhat 
new, and the movie generated a lot of discussion in 29 percent of 
the showings. 
Impacts of the Information Intervention
The intervention aimed to raise awareness and through that to also 
favorably affect the scheme’s outcomes. We begin with the single-
difference estimates of the impact of showing the movie in a house-
hold’s village on knowledge and other outcomes. Table 7.5 gives the 
movie’s estimated impacts on knowledge about BREGS, for men and 
women separately, as well as for the full sample. These are regres-
sion coeffi cients of knowledge scores on the village assignment of the 
movie.9 The dependent variable is a dummy variable taking the value 
1 if a respondent was aware of BREGS or got the right answer to the 
relevant question, and 0 otherwise. Thus, the regression coeffi cient 
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is the difference in the mean knowledge score between those who 
lived in a village that was assigned the movie and those who lived in 
a village that was not. The constant gives the knowledge estimate for 
the control group. Given that the village assignment was random by 
design, and there was complete compliance (meaning the movie was 
shown as planned in all selected treatment villages), the estimated 
difference in means is unbiased.
The movie had a signifi cant effect on knowledge of the existence 
of BREGS for the sample as a whole, although the effect was small 
(a 3 percentage point gain) and only signifi cant at the 5 percent level. 
However, it should be recalled that knowledge of the existence of 
BREGS was high to begin with. Also note that a larger and more 
signifi cant effect on knowledge is found among women, who (as 
noted above) were less aware initially.
There was a signifi cant impact on knowledge about how many 
days of work are available, with a 12 percentage point increase in
the proportion who got this right being attributed to the movie 
 (signifi cant at the 1 percent level). The impact was slightly higher 
for men than for women.
For men, but much less or not at all for women, the movie had a 
large effect on knowledge of the fact that work has to be provided 
within 15 days, that wages are to be paid within two weeks, and that 
contractors are not permitted under the legislation; these impacts are 
all signifi cant at the 1 percent level for men. 
Awareness of the provision for an unemployment allowance if 
work could not be provided also rose substantially as a result of 
the movie, with a larger effect for men (12 percentage points) than
for women (8 percentage points). Similar effects were evident for 
knowledge of the wage rate, with a large and signifi cant effect of the 
movie, though again, stronger for men than for women.
The fact that child care is to be provided was little known in 
the control group, but rose appreciably for those living in villages 
where the movie was shown, rising from 13 percent to 20 percent.
The impact was similar for men and women. Among women, but 
not men, there was a puzzling negative effect on knowledge that 
the scheme requires that drinking water and shade be provided at 
worksites.
There was a sizable and signifi cant effect of the movie, among 
men, but not women, on knowing that work has to be demanded. 
Some 72 percent of men knew this in the control villages, rising to 
80 percent with the movie. It is striking that there was no impact 
on women’s awareness that work had to be demanded, given that 
barely half of them knew this in the control villages. It may be that 
because women typically go to BREGS worksites with male family 
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members or as part of groups, this is information they do not feel 
they need to retain. 
Following the same estimation method as used for table 7.5, 
table 7.6 presents estimates of the movie’s impacts on a number of 
other outcome indicators. Rows 1 through 22 report on differences
in perceptions about a number of factors, while the last four rows
give impacts on actual aspects of how the scheme functioned after 
the movie: demand, participation, days of work, and wages.
The perceptions that BREGS projects have increased employment
and led to a decline in migration rose appreciably and signifi cantly 
as a result of the movie for both genders. For example, the feeling 
that one can get work if one asks doubled from the 9 percent for the 
control group. Similarly, the perceptions that one can get work on 
BREGS when one demands it, and of improvements in BREGS work 
opportunities for the household, were appreciably and signifi cantly 
raised by the movie. The fi rst increased from 43 percent for men in
the control villages to close to 60 percent for those living in villages 
where the movie was shown, and from 35 percent to 51 percent for 
women. There was a doubling in the perception among both men 
and women that BREGS work opportunities have increased between
the two rounds of the survey. 
In general, perceptions of improvements in village infrastructure,
greater work opportunities, and lower migration in the village (not 
linking this to BREGS like the previous questions) were signifi cantly 
raised by the movie, although not always for both genders. When 
asked whether migration has decreased in their villages, 13 percent
more men and 9 percent more women agreed in the villages where
the movie was shown than in the control villages. Similarly, per-
ceptions that village infrastructure has improved were signifi cantly 
higher among women, though not for men, in the villages where the 
movie was shown. 
There is a small effect on men’s perceptions that women can 
choose BREGS projects, but no such effect for women. However, 
the movie has a strong signifi cant negative effect on the perception of 
men and women that the assets created have been useful to women, 
and for men only that women participate in BREGS work. No other 
perceptions concerning women were affected by the movie. 
There are no signifi cant effects on actual or desired participa-
tion, wage rates, or days worked (table 7.6). Although we fi nd sig-
nifi cant impacts of the movie on both knowledge and perceptions
of work opportunities (and infrastructure), we fi nd no impacts on 
actual work or wages. It may be that perceptions are informed by
factors that are not yet evident in the objective data, although the 
time period and timing of the intervention should have suffi ced to 
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204 RIGHT TO WORK?
capture any real effects. It appears more likely that the perceptions
were distorted by the movie. Having watched the movie, people 
came to think that the scheme was working better for the village as 
a whole than their own objective experiences would suggest. 
The results in tables 7.5 and 7.6 use R2 data. We can also exploit 
the panel data structure to test further for impacts of the movie on 
the various transitions discussed earlier. First, consider the group of 
“excess demanders” in R1. Did the movie encourage those exposed 
to it to take up work on the scheme in R2? The answer is a clear 
“no.” The regression coeffi cient of the probability of taking up work 
among the R1 excess demanders on the dummy variable for whether 
the movie was shown is 0.001 for men and −0.006 for women, and 
neither are signifi cantly different from zero at the 10 percent level.
Nor was there any impact on those who were neither actual 
participants nor excess demanders in R1. Among this group, the 
regression coeffi cient of the probability of either taking up work or 
becoming an excess demander on the dummy variable for whether 
the movie was shown was not signifi cantly different from zero at 
the 10 percent level.
We also calculated difference-in-difference (DD) impact estimates
of the movie on knowledge for all individuals, as well as for men 
and women separately. As we expect given the randomization, the 
movie’s estimated DD impacts are quite similar to those found for 
the single difference and reported above. However, small-sample 
properties mean that there may be some dissimilarities between the 
randomized in and out villages. Thus, the DD estimator provides 
extra cleaning for time-invariant selection bias that may be present
as the result of any small-sample bias. The DD impacts tended to 
be larger but less statistically signifi cant. For example, the movie’s 
effect on women having heard of BREGS is nearly double that esti-
mated with the single difference. The major disparity with the previ-
ous estimates concerns awareness of the mandated facilities. Using 
R2 data only, we fi nd signifi cant impacts on knowing about the 
child care provision as well as negative effects on being aware of 
the water and shade provisions. There is no sign of movie impacts 
on any of these variables when we use both survey rounds. We also 
test whether the movie had any effect on the number or the change 
in the number of worksites that opened in the GP. There is no effect
on either.
Table 7.7 turns to impacts of the movie on transitions from not 
knowing to knowing about BREGS. There may only be a small over-
all impact on the proportion of people who get the answer right, as 
we saw above using R2 data. Yet the small increase in awareness 
could coincide with a learning process together with a forgetting 
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process that may reduce the net impact. So it is of interest to isolate 
the learning process. To do so, we need to bring in the baseline 
and panel. Panel A of table 7.7 shows impacts for the subset of 
people who answered questions about BREGS correctly in R1 to see 
whether the movie reduced the incidence of forgetting, and hence 
infl uenced the share that are “still right.” Panel B then shows impact 
estimates for the subset of those who answered incorrectly in R1 and 
are “learning” about the scheme.10 Did the movie help them learn?
The movie had signifi cant, mostly positive, effects on retaining 
information about some of the scheme’s stipulated rules between 
the two survey rounds. For example, it signifi cantly helped both 
men and women remember that BREGS offers 100 days of employ-
ment per household and at what wage rate. It enabled men to recall 
that an unemployment allowance is mandated when work is not 
provided and that contractors are not allowed. It reinforced aware-
ness of the existence of the scheme for women who had heard about 
BREGS in R1. Women who knew in R1 that child care facilities
should be provided were signifi cantly reminded of this by the movie. 
However, being from a village that showed the movie appears to 
have had a negative effect on men’s and women’s recollection that 
worksites must provide drinking water.11
Panel B of table 7.7 turns to the movie’s impacts on learning 
about aspects of the scheme that people had been ignorant of in R1. 
The movie signifi cantly helped increase knowledge about a major-
ity of the 12 knowledge questions for both men and women. For 
example, 12 percent more individuals who are from movie villages 
than those from control villages learned about the allowed number 
of work days, 12 percent more women that participation does not 
require a BPL card, 13 percent more people about the wage rate, 8 
percent more people about the prescribed time for wage payments, 
and 15 percent more men that contractors are not permitted. For 
mandated facilities, the movie only infl uenced learning about child 
care.
The movie could have heterogeneous effects according to people’s 
characteristics—including both those attributes that help one retain 
and digest information and those attributes that make that infor-
mation more relevant to some individuals and less so to others. In 
particular, we postulate that education, self-mastery (as captured
by the Pearlin scores), caste identity, and being politically connected
matter to how much the movie affects knowledge.
Table 7.8 gives the results. We found some signs of heterogeneous
impacts. For instance, compared with those with primary educa-
tion, illiterate individuals were more likely to feel that their knowl-
edge of BREGS improved and that infrastructure has gotten better.
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The movie resulted in 5.1 more days of employment for them than 
for the more educated as well as 487 rupees (Rs) more in wages
(implying a daily wage rate of Rs 95, which is almost exactly the 
average BREGS wage in R2). Although this could be considered a 
nonnegligible gain, it is confi ned to current BREGS participants; the 
movie had no impact on participation by illiterate individuals. A 
relatively higher Pearlin scale results in higher impacts on a number 
of perceptions. For example, going from Pearlin 1 to 2 increases the 
employment knowledge score by 41 percent. Impacts on quite a few
perceptions also vary by caste. Typically, impacts of the movie are 
signifi cantly higher for Mahadalits, although in some cases, they are 
lower for them than for higher-level castes. There are also notable 
differences between those who do and do not have political connec-
tions. The movie’s impacts were signifi cantly different with respect
to the facilities knowledge score and a number of perceptions. In all
cases, the impacts are larger for the unconnected.
In summary, we find that the movie helped both men and 
women remember and retain information about the scheme’s rules 
and raised knowledge among those unaware of the rules in R1. It 
also had appreciable and signifi cant impacts on the perceptions of 
both men and women on the functioning of the scheme. This is 
particularly the case among individuals who are likely to fi nd this 
information relevant, such as illiterate individuals and Mahadalits
(typically the most disadvantaged groups). In addition, impacts are 
larger for more empowered and politically connected individuals. 
However, there are no signifi cant effects on actual employment or 
wages except among illiterate participating individuals, for whom 
the movie appears to have helped secure extra work on existing
BREGS projects.
214
A
nn
ex
 7
A
T
ab
le
 7
A
.1
 K
no
w
le
dg
e 
am
on
g 
Pa
rt
ic
ip
an
ts
, E
xc
es
s 
D
em
an
de
rs
, a
nd
 t
he
 R
es
t
R
ou
nd
 1
P
ar
ti
ci
pa
nt
s
E
xc
es
s 
de
m
an
de
rs
R
es
t
W
ho
le
M
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
W
ho
le
M
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
W
ho
le
M
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
V
ar
ia
bl
e
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
H
ea
rd
1.
00
0.
00
1.
00
0.
00
1.
00
0.
00
0.
98
0.
13
0.
99
0.
09
0.
97
0.
16
0.
67
0.
47
0.
87
0.
34
0.
58
0.
49
Sc
or
e 
1
2.
98
1.
61
3.
22
1.
56
2.
15
1.
50
1.
99
1.
86
2.
35
1.
97
1.
54
1.
60
1.
81
1.
70
2.
47
1.
86
1.
38
1.
43
D
ay
s
0.
42
0.
49
0.
48
0.
50
0.
20
0.
40
0.
22
0.
41
0.
30
0.
46
0.
12
0.
32
0.
20
0.
40
0.
37
0.
48
0.
09
0.
28
G
en
de
r
0.
63
0.
48
0.
64
0.
48
0.
59
0.
49
0.
52
0.
50
0.
55
0.
50
0.
49
0.
50
0.
53
0.
50
0.
54
0.
50
0.
52
0.
50
B
PL
0.
64
0.
48
0.
67
0.
47
0.
54
0.
50
0.
44
0.
50
0.
50
0.
50
0.
37
0.
48
0.
40
0.
49
0.
46
0.
50
0.
35
0.
48
W
or
k 
la
g
0.
05
0.
23
0.
06
0.
24
0.
04
0.
19
0.
04
0.
19
0.
06
0.
24
0.
01
0.
12
0.
04
0.
20
0.
08
0.
27
0.
02
0.
13
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
al
lo
w
an
ce
0.
24
0.
43
0.
28
0.
45
0.
11
0.
31
0.
20
0.
40
0.
26
0.
44
0.
13
0.
34
0.
20
0.
40
0.
35
0.
48
0.
10
0.
30
W
ag
e 
ra
te
0.
60
0.
49
0.
65
0.
48
0.
45
0.
50
0.
32
0.
47
0.
38
0.
48
0.
24
0.
43
0.
23
0.
42
0.
36
0.
48
0.
14
0.
35
W
ag
e 
la
g
0.
16
0.
37
0.
18
0.
39
0.
11
0.
31
0.
09
0.
29
0.
10
0.
30
0.
09
0.
28
0.
08
0.
27
0.
08
0.
28
0.
08
0.
26
C
on
tr
ac
to
r
0.
24
0.
43
0.
28
0.
45
0.
12
0.
33
0.
16
0.
37
0.
21
0.
41
0.
10
0.
30
0.
17
0.
38
0.
25
0.
43
0.
13
0.
33
Sc
or
e 
2
1.
80
1.
38
1.
88
1.
36
1.
52
1.
42
1.
12
1.
34
1.
26
1.
38
0.
96
1.
28
1.
02
1.
32
1.
18
1.
40
0.
91
1.
25
C
hi
ld
 c
ar
e
0.
22
0.
42
0.
22
0.
41
0.
24
0.
43
0.
19
0.
39
0.
18
0.
38
0.
19
0.
40
0.
18
0.
38
0.
19
0.
40
0.
17
0.
38
W
at
er
0.
76
0.
43
0.
79
0.
41
0.
67
0.
47
0.
47
0.
50
0.
54
0.
50
0.
40
0.
49
0.
44
0.
50
0.
50
0.
50
0.
40
0.
49
Sh
ad
e
0.
48
0.
50
0.
52
0.
50
0.
35
0.
48
0.
26
0.
44
0.
32
0.
47
0.
19
0.
39
0.
23
0.
42
0.
29
0.
45
0.
20
0.
40
Fi
rs
t 
ai
d
0.
35
0.
48
0.
37
0.
48
0.
27
0.
45
0.
20
0.
40
0.
23
0.
42
0.
17
0.
38
0.
18
0.
39
0.
21
0.
41
0.
16
0.
37
B
oa
rd
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
D
em
an
d
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
215
R
ou
nd
 2
P
ar
ti
ci
pa
nt
s
E
xc
es
s 
de
m
an
de
rs
R
es
t
W
ho
le
M
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
W
ho
le
M
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
W
ho
le
M
al
e
Fe
m
al
e
V
ar
ia
bl
e
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
SD
M
ea
n
S D
H
ea
rd
1.
00
0.
00
1.
00
0.
00
1.
00
0.
00
0.
99
0.
08
1.
00
0.
05
0.
99
0.
10
0.
84
0.
37
0.
94
0.
24
0.
79
0.
41
Sc
or
e 
1
3.
60
1.
56
3.
75
1.
58
3.
30
1.
48
2.
65
1.
77
3.
11
1.
84
2.
18
1.
57
2.
24
1.
70
2.
89
1.
86
1.
85
1.
46
D
ay
s
0.
38
0.
48
0.
43
0.
50
0.
26
0.
44
0.
26
0.
44
0.
38
0.
49
0.
15
0.
35
0.
20
0.
40
0.
36
0.
48
0.
11
0.
31
G
en
de
r
0.
68
0.
47
0.
72
0.
45
0.
60
0.
49
0.
67
0.
47
0.
69
0.
46
0.
65
0.
48
0.
61
0.
49
0.
65
0.
48
0.
60
0.
49
B
PL
0.
79
0.
41
0.
77
0.
42
0.
82
0.
39
0.
63
0.
48
0.
69
0.
46
0.
58
0.
49
0.
57
0.
50
0.
63
0.
48
0.
53
0.
50
W
or
k 
la
g
0.
18
0.
39
0.
20
0.
40
0.
15
0.
36
0.
12
0.
33
0.
14
0.
35
0.
11
0.
31
0.
06
0.
24
0.
10
0.
30
0.
04
0.
19
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
al
lo
w
an
ce
0.
46
0.
50
0.
48
0.
50
0.
40
0.
49
0.
34
0.
47
0.
42
0.
49
0.
26
0.
44
0.
24
0.
43
0.
36
0.
48
0.
16
0.
37
W
ag
e 
ra
te
0.
67
0.
47
0.
68
0.
47
0.
67
0.
47
0.
32
0.
47
0.
41
0.
49
0.
23
0.
42
0.
29
0.
46
0.
41
0.
49
0.
23
0.
42
W
ag
e 
la
g
0.
18
0.
39
0.
18
0.
38
0.
19
0.
39
0.
12
0.
32
0.
13
0.
34
0.
10
0.
30
0.
10
0.
30
0.
13
0.
34
0.
08
0.
28
C
on
tr
ac
to
r
0.
27
0.
44
0.
30
0.
46
0.
22
0.
42
0.
19
0.
39
0.
26
0.
44
0.
12
0.
33
0.
18
0.
39
0.
28
0.
45
0.
12
0.
33
Sc
or
e 
2
1.
91
1.
25
1.
96
1.
29
1.
80
1.
15
1.
38
1.
26
1.
54
1.
27
1.
21
1.
23
1.
10
1.
21
1.
36
1.
28
0.
94
1.
13
C
hi
ld
 c
ar
e
0.
28
0.
45
0.
27
0.
45
0.
28
0.
45
0.
14
0.
35
0.
16
0.
37
0.
12
0.
33
0.
12
0.
32
0.
16
0.
37
0.
09
0.
29
W
at
er
0.
80
0.
40
0.
79
0.
40
0.
80
0.
40
0.
62
0.
49
0.
67
0.
47
0.
56
0.
50
0.
51
0.
50
0.
59
0.
49
0.
46
0.
50
Sh
ad
e
0.
59
0.
49
0.
58
0.
49
0.
59
0.
49
0.
46
0.
50
0.
51
0.
50
0.
41
0.
49
0.
37
0.
48
0.
46
0.
50
0.
31
0.
46
Fi
rs
t 
ai
d
0.
25
0.
43
0.
31
0.
46
0.
13
0.
33
0.
16
0.
36
0.
19
0.
40
0.
12
0.
32
0.
11
0.
31
0.
15
0.
35
0.
08
0.
27
B
oa
rd
0.
09
0.
28
0.
11
0.
32
0.
04
0.
19
0.
02
0.
14
0.
03
0.
18
0.
00
0.
07
0.
03
0.
18
0.
06
0.
25
0.
02
0.
13
D
em
an
d
0.
82
0.
38
0.
83
0.
37
0.
80
0.
40
0.
74
0.
44
0.
79
0.
41
0.
68
0.
47
0.
46
0.
50
0.
62
0.
49
0.
38
0.
49
So
ur
ce
: E
st
im
at
es
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
B
ih
ar
 R
ur
al
 E
m
pl
oy
m
en
t 
G
ua
ra
nt
ee
 (
B
R
E
G
S)
 s
ur
ve
y.
N
ot
e:
 S
ee
 t
ex
t 
fo
r 
de
fi n
it
io
n 
of
 v
ar
ia
bl
es
. B
PL
 =
 B
el
ow
 P
ov
er
ty
 L
in
e;
 S
D
 =
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
de
vi
at
io
n;
 —
 =
 n
ot
 a
va
ila
bl
e.
216 RIGHT TO WORK?
Notes
 1. Note that the estimates of job card ownership from the 2009/10 
National Sample Survey (NSS) reported in chapter 1 are even lower (17 
percent of rural households). As noted previously, a specialized survey (the
BREGS has an entire module with questions on the job card) is more likely
to capture scheme-specifi c information than a general household survey. 
 2. Field studies suggest that this is true in most states across India (see, 
for example, Drèze and Khera 2011). These studies also typically fi nd that 
the unemployment allowance is rarely paid in lieu of providing work. In most 
cases, the allowance is paid following a social audit process in which the 
information is made public and pressure is brought to bear on local offi cials. 
 3. Some 4 percent of households in both rounds cited the lack of a BPL 
card as the reason for not obtaining a job card despite applying for it. 
 4. For example, Andhra Pradesh revised the scheme’s Schedule of Rates 
to enable disabled workers to earn the scheme wage following a detailed 
analysis of effort required. In 2008, Madhya Pradesh enabled the elderly 
and persons with disabilities to undertake lighter work, such as plantation
and provision of worksite facilities work (National Consortium of Civil 
Society Organizations 2009).
 5. Unsurprisingly, participants tend to be more aware of the program 
(see table 7A.1).
 6. The original scale consists of a seven-item scale developed by Pearlin 
and others (1981). Each item is a statement regarding the respondent’s per-
ception of self, and respondents are asked how strongly they agree or dis-
agree with each statement with four potential response categories. The 
original scale ranges from 4 to 16. We transformed the questions into yes/
no answers, which proved to be a better approach in this setting based on
our fi eld tests. Our scale is then created by adding up the answers, thus 
ranges from 0 to 7.
 7. We tested for selection bias with the standard Heckman method 
using a probit for each individual awareness question. We found the Mills 
Ratio to be insignifi cant in every case.
 8. We run this as a linear probability model so that we can compare the 
coeffi cient on gender across the two regressions (which cannot be done 
across probit estimates).
 9. The “svy” command in STATA, which takes into account survey 
design for estimation purposes, was used to ensure that the regression coef-
fi cient on the assignment dummy variable was equivalent to the difference 
in weighted means. This also takes clustering into account.
 10. These are selected subsamples, so caution should be taken in draw-
ing inferences for the population. Nonetheless, these tests are of obvious 
interest with regard to those subsamples.
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 11. Note that it does not make sense to examine impacts on the compos-
ite indices (Score 1 and Score 2) for this subsample or the next, so they are
left out of the table.
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Reforming the Bihar Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme:
Administrative Processes
The foregoing analysis tells us that the Bihar Rural Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (BREGS) is performing far short of its potential. 
Despite the high demand for work on the scheme, many people who 
want work do not get it. And many of those who do get work get 
fewer days than desired and end up with lower wages than stipulated 
for the scheme. In chapter 7 we also saw that some important demand-
side constraints, such as poor awareness and disempowerment on the 
part of potential benefi ciaries, limit the scheme’s performance. 
This chapter examines the scheme’s delivery mechanisms more 
closely to identify the points at which practice differs signifi cantly 
from intent and how performance might be improved. The supply-
side constraints identifi ed in this chapter are relevant to both the 
income gains to poor people from the extra employment on BREGS 
and the value to them of the assets created by the scheme. The cre-
ation of productive village assets that promote future livelihoods is 
a secondary objective of BREGS, and it is typically accorded lower 
priority than employment generation. However, as seen in chapter 6,
the cost-effectiveness of BREGS in reducing poverty through the 
income gains to workers alone is questionable. As shown in that 
chapter, a simple cash transfer program based on Below-Poverty-
Line (BPL) ration cards could do better, even allowing for adminis-
trative costs and poor targeting of BPL cards. So the value to poor 
people of the assets created should be an important concern in 
efforts to improve the scheme because it may tip the balance for or 
against this type of scheme.1
220 RIGHT TO WORK?
We fi nd bottlenecks in the planning and work sanctioning pro-
cesses that contribute to delays in opening worksites and frequent 
interruption of work. The resulting unpredictability of work provi-
sion is likely to make labor supply decisions more diffi cult, with 
households less likely to consider BREGS as a reliable source of 
employment in times of need. For instance, only about half—
59  percent of men and 51 percent of women in 2009/10 (round 2 of 
the BREGS survey, R2)—believed BREGS work would be available
in their village in the next year. More important, only 12 percent of 
men and 9 percent of women felt that BREGS work was available
when they needed it in the past year.
A Closer Look at the Scheme’s Administration 
Planning for Work
According to the scheme’s guidelines, the elected village council, led 
by the Mukhiya, is responsible for preparing annual plans for the 
projects to be undertaken under the scheme. This annual planning 
process is intended to generate an annual plan—a shelf of works and 
a labor budget (that is, an estimate of person days that the shelf of 
works can generate). These plans are meant to be validated through 
a village meeting (the Gram Sabha) before the necessary administra-
tive and technical approvals are requested.
In practice, the planning process is rarely community driven or 
participatory. Confi rming qualitative and anecdotal evidence, the 
survey reveals that project selection is rarely performed by the Gram 
Sabha. In fact, we fi nd that such village meetings are not widely 
held.2 We asked BREGS participant workers in the sample about 
the selection of projects at the most recent worksite at which they 
worked. Many—36 percent of men and 54 percent of women in 
2009/10—did not know how the projects were selected. Among
those who did know, the majority (60 percent of men and 71  percent 
of women) felt the projects were largely chosen by the Mukhiya 
(fi gure 8.1). Only a small proportion report selection of projects at 
the worksite having been made at a Gram Sabha. Qualitative stud-
ies in Bihar (and other states) also typically fi nd that Gram Sabhas 
are rarely held for the purpose of fi nalizing the shelf of works and
that the projects chosen tend to refl ect the interests of selected local 
groups rather than the Gram Panchayat (GP) as a whole.3
The nonparticipatory selection of projects raises the possibility 
of elite capture in work selection so that the assets created may be 
of use largely to specifi c groups and local power lobbies rather than
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benefi cial to the village as a whole.4 In the BREGS survey, we asked 
people about fi ve assets created under the scheme in their village. We
found that knowledge of these assets was poor, particularly among 
women, with slightly more than half the interviewed women being 
aware of any of these fi ve assets. Only 13 percent of men and 6  percent
of women knew about all fi ve of the assets about which they were
asked.5 However, the majority of those who knew about these assets 
perceived that they were likely to last at least until the next year and
were useful, primarily to those who lived close to them.6
In judging the choice of projects, it is necessary to consider 
local conditions. According to the national scheme guidelines, sev-
eral types of projects are permissible under the Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGS), 
ranging from rural connectivity to natural resource regeneration.7
However, as in many states, rural roads are the single most common
asset built in Bihar, accounting for nearly half the scheme’s total 
expenditures in the past three years (see table 8.1 for 2008/09). This 
emphasis on rural connectivity is also refl ected in the survey data. 
Panchayat rozgar sewaks (PRSs) in 98 percent of the surveyed GPs 
reported kutcha roads in their shelf of works in both rounds of 
the survey, while the proportion reporting pucca roads and bridges 
increased from 29 percent to 64 percent between the two years. 
However, the variation in the type of project undertaken across
Bihar’s four agro-climatic zones suggests that the planning process,
Figure 8.1 Selection of Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee
Scheme Works
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(BREGS) survey. 
Note: Based on responses of workers who report awareness of the project selec-
tion process at the BREGS worksite at which they last worked in round 2 of the 
BREGS survey. More than a third of men and more than half of women workers were 
unaware of how the specifi c project was selected.
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though not participatory, does take into account local conditions to
some extent (see table 8.1). As noted in the overview, nearly three-
quarters of Bihar is fl ood prone while 16 percent of its land area is 
permanently waterlogged.8 BREGS planning in many parts of Bihar,
particularly in the two northern agro-climatic zones, includes works 
related to fl ood control and protection. The share of expenditures 
on water conservation and microirrigation works is relatively high 
in many of the southern districts that are prone to drought.
Another consideration has to do with Bihar’s population density, 
which is among the highest in India. This attribute, combined with 
a shortage of common (public) land, makes it diffi cult to identify 
appropriate sites for building community assets. PRSs interviewed 
in the BREGS survey reported the lack of common land (on which 
to build village assets) or wasteland (as a source of soil needed for 
earth fi lling) as reasons for their inability to undertake certain types 
of projects in their GPs. As a result, it becomes necessary to promote
appropriate projects on individual lands as permissible under the 
scheme. Administrative data do not indicate the share of expendi-
ture on these projects. However, in the survey, PRSs in 80 percent of 
the surveyed GPs reported the inclusion of at least some works on 
the private land of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC/STs),
Indira Awaas Yojana9 benefi ciaries, and of small and medium-size
farmers (the last category was included in 2009) in the GP shelf of 
works.
When BREGS was fi rst introduced, the planning process initially 
developed in a way that was, for the most part, top down and supply
driven with a very limited role for communities, the village council, or 
the Mukhiya. In fact, the shelves of works left over from the previous 
public works scheme—Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana—were 
used in many districts. Although this approach is understandable 
in the early days of the scheme, addressing the  performance gaps 
in the planning stage as the scheme matures (see box 8.1) is criti-
cal. Participatory planning by the community can promote con-
vergence between schemes at the village level, so as to access all 
available resources, including those from BREGS, the Backward 
Regions Grant Fund, and the Village Disaster Management Plan, 
and develop an integrated village development plan.10 At present,
these are at best fragmented planning exercises lacking a coherent
vision and leading to duplication of effort. 
Finally, converging with other government schemes optimizes
 public resources and helps create durable assets. Local area devel-
opment programs, including watershed management, have the 
potential to develop village natural resources; they are expected to 
create, repair, and maintain local resources. Cooperation between 
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Box 8.1 Informed, Participatory Planning for the Bihar
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (BREGS)
As part of the qualitative work for this study, we attempted to under-
stand what is required to undertake informed, participatory planning
in the spirit of the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. Two 
teams carried out assessments of labor demand and a resource map-
ping exercise in two blocks in each of four districts (Gaya, Khaimur, 
Kishanganj, and Purnea) during February and August 2009. In two 
Gram Panchayats (GPs), the teams also plotted the relevant data on
a geographic information system (GIS) to facilitate planning.
These teams developed a list of projects based on resource map-
ping, labor demand assessment, and community participation. They
found that this “unoffi cial shelf of works” provided a much larger list
of projects than the offi cial shelf of works in the GPs studied. Detailed
resource planning (or land surveys as currently undertaken in Andhra
Pradesh) can provide communities with updated information on 
existing village assets and land ownership for siting projects. The 
unoffi cial shelf of works and labor budget developed in conformance
with the work demand assessment also corresponded better to the 
availability of workers for BREGS during the course of the year. In 
contrast, the corresponding offi cial documents planned for some 
work provision every month, without reference to worker preferences
or allowance for seasonality in agriculture.
The team’s qualitative work also highlighted two critical require-
ments for planning. First, the process requires reliable and updated 
information on village land use and ownership. The most recent maps
for the two GPs studied dated to the 1960s, resulting in the need for
intensive updating through discussions with village revenue offi cials,
local leaders, and community groups to obtain an accurate map of the
village.
Second, trained facilitators are needed to help communities plan. 
Though Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and communities have the 
advantage of local knowledge, they lack the necessary technical tools 
and capacity to translate this knowledge into concrete plans. 
Appropriate technical inputs on how to select, sequence, site, and 
design works are required. The estimation of costs and labor require-
ments for each project necessary to develop the overall labor budget 
for the GP also requires some engineering skills. Most states, including 
Bihar, face shortages in technical staff for the scheme. Andhra Pradesh 
and Madhya Pradesh have developed ways to deal with this issue. 
Both states have standardized the specifi c works that could be carried 
out under the permissible project types. This standardization has 
made the preparation of technical estimates for projects easier at the 
(Continued on the following page)
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BREGS and such local area development programs would promote 
the construction of relevant and durable assets. There are several
examples from other Indian states relating to using MGNREGS 
funds for creating village assets, but with technical expertise (and 
occasionally material inputs) provided by line departments such as 
Water Resources (for watershed and irrigation works), Forestry (for 
plantation-related works), and Agriculture (for works on individual 
lands). The 2012 MGNREGS guidelines promote this objective
by including watershed, agriculture, livestock, fi sheries, forestry, 
and sanitation-related works in the list of permissible MGNREGS
projects.
Estimating the Demand for Work
The shelf of works developed through the planning process is sup-
posed to be based on an estimate of labor demand. In practice, 
the labor budget is typically supply driven and determined by the 
village level. Madhya Pradesh provides handbooks for its technical 
staff to generate work estimates, and Andhra Pradesh has integrated 
the work estimation module in its computerized management infor-
mation system to allow for automated generation of work estimates.
With the appropriate technical expertise and community participa-
tion, the planning process can deliver a shelf of works and labor bud-
get that create assets relevant for the village and have the potential to
meet local demand for work. The use of technology, such as GIS for 
resource mapping, can further provide PRIs and communities with 
reliable information to plan effectively. GIS can also promote inte-
grated planning by facilitating the exchange of information across 
government schemes as well as facilitate asset monitoring over time.
Gujarat has used GIS to develop composite village maps with infor-
mation on natural resources and rural assets created by various 
departments. These maps are being used by Mahatma Gandhi 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme technical staff as a 
planning tool to position projects based on technical feasibility and 
to convince local leaders and communities of the rationale for site 
selection. GIS has also proved useful in eliminating duplication of 
projects and in facilitating asset maintenance and monitoring.
Sources: Development Alternatives 2009; Indian Grameen Services 2009;
MART 2010.
Box 8.1 (Continued)
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previous year’s performance, with some adjustment based on a 
rough estimate of likely demand in the current year (Ministry of 
Rural Development 2011).
Workers are likely to demand BREGS work primarily during 
the lean agricultural season. The BREGS survey data identify the 
peak months for BREGS work provision as January through June. 
Little BREGS work is made available during the rainy season (July–
September), when agricultural employment is also low for some of 
the time.11 The PRSs in the surveyed GPs reported that most of the 
projects permissible under BREGS, with the exception of planta-
tions, could not be undertaken for about four months of the year. 
This gap was usually during the rainy season or after fl oods (and 
subsequent waterlogging). In fact, at the time of the survey, BREGS 
guidelines waived the employment guarantee between mid-June 
and mid-October, and the state was not obliged to provide work or 
unemployment allowances during this period. 
The central ministry’s revisions to operational guidelines in 2012 
include undertaking a baseline survey of job card holders in every 
GP before preparing a labor budget (Ministry of Rural Development 
2013). Some states, such as Andhra Pradesh, already undertake 
detailed labor demand assessments at the start of the fi scal year to 
prepare a calendar of estimated demand for MGNREGS during 
the course of the year (see box 8.1). Bihar is attempting something 
similar through partnerships with nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs) and community-based organizations. The Nehru Yuva 
Kendra Sangathan (an organization of village-level youth clubs) was 
engaged in 2011 to carry out a survey to increase knowledge of the 
scheme as well as to explicitly record requests for job cards and 
demand for work. However, the presence of active youth clubs is 
patchy across the state, and their capacity to undertake this work is 
limited. Another promising channel is through the village organiza-
tions created under the National Rural Livelihood Mission. These 
groups have the potential to canvass preferences, at least among 
their self-help group member households, and to help create a cal-
endar for BREGS work demand. Incorporating this exercise into 
the planning process and informing workers of the proposed labor 
budget at an appropriate time (before household labor supply and 
migration decisions are made) would allow the supply side to be 
more responsive to demand. 
Supplying Work
Matching the expression of demand with the supply of worksites 
is key to fulfi lling the employment guarantee. We fi nd evidence of 
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delays in opening worksites, frequent closures of worksites, and 
interruption of work in both rounds of the survey. In 33 percent of 
the surveyed GPs, PRSs reported delays in starting work in round 1 
(R1); this fi gure rose to 43 percent in R2. Several factors could 
contribute to such delays, such as the absence of approved works 
that can be quickly initiated in response to demand, insuffi cient or 
untimely funding, and inadequate staff for initiating and managing 
worksites. We examine the fi rst reason here; the latter two factors 
are examined in the next section, which addresses systemic con-
straints to BREGS delivery. 
In the absence of a ready shelf of works with at least some approved
projects, GPs may be constrained in providing work in response to 
demand. We fi nd that 11 percent of GPs in R2 did not have a shelf of 
works (an increase from 6 percent in R1). As seen in chapter 3, the 
presence of a ready shelf of works in GPs was a strong predictor of 
participation among poor households. Qualitative research for this 
book reveals signifi cant delays in obtaining the necessary sanctions 
for the shelf of works proposed by GPs. For instance, in two GPs 
in Kishanganj district in 2008, it took three to fi ve months to get 
the necessary approvals from the block and district elected bodies 
(Development Alternatives 2009; Sunai 2009).
Even when an approved shelf of works exists in the GP, adminis-
trative and technical sanctions for a specifi c project must be obtained 
before a worksite can be opened. This requirement can introduce 
further delays in the process. For instance, it took 20–35 days to 
open road construction projects in the two GPs noted above. In 
one of them, the entire sanctioning process took so long that the 
rainy season began and work had to be delayed for another four 
months (Sunai 2009).12 In general, insuffi cient attention is paid to
the sequencing and timing of projects. For instance, projects like 
water harvesting and fl ood proofi ng require ample time for the nec-
essary preparatory work, group formation, and consensus building. 
Breaking ground on such projects just before the monsoons often 
results in unfi nished assets. 
In fact, interviews with block offi cials and PRSs in the surveyed 
GPs reveal that the problem of intermittent closure of worksites was 
common and became worse between the two survey rounds. The 
proportion of GPs reporting work interruptions in at least some of 
the worksites rose from 44 percent in R1 to 73 percent in R2. This 
impression is corroborated by the experience of BREGS workers: in 
both rounds, nearly half of the sample of men and women work-
ers reported interruptions to work at the worksite at which they 
last worked, often more than once.13 However, even when house-
hold members reported interruption of work at the last worksite, 
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80  percent of participating households in R1 felt that public works 
were an available coping mechanism for responding to shocks. By 
R2, this proportion had fallen to only 57 percent of households, 
possibly refl ecting the increase in the frequency of work interrup-
tion. In R1, the main reasons given for work stoppage were rains or 
fl ooding. Though these reasons remained important in R2, strikes 
by workers and work stoppage by offi cials had become much more 
widespread. The latter is likely linked to the availability of funds 
and is examined in the next section. Disputes with farmers were 
also cited in some of the GPs, perhaps pointing to confl icts over
common land.
Worksite Management
We also fi nd departures from the scheme guidelines in the manage-
ment of worksites and the provision of facilities to workers. For 
instance, contractors are not allowed under BREGS guidelines; 
instead, the PRS is expected to function as the agent who mobilizes
workers and manages the worksite, with the help of the mate.14 As 
seen in table 8.2, we fi nd that the ban on contractors is not being 
enforced—more than half of male and female workers reported the 
presence of contractors at the BREGS worksite at which they last 
worked in R1, and even more in R2. The majority of workers also 
Table 8.2 Participant Reports about the Worksite
Participants answering 
positively that the following 
are true
Round 1 Round 2
Men
(percent)
Women
(percent)
Men
(percent)
Women
(percent)
Contractor is on site 52.0 54.1 59.4 62.9
Mate is on site 90.4 79.1 87.8 85.7
Machines are used 39.0 49.0 7.6 7.3
Muster roll is on site 65.8 61.5 70.3 68.9
Attendance is taken on site 94.0 94.4 90.1 90.0
Used own tools 95.7 95.9 92.6 92.6
Site is within own village 67.3 68.1 71.7 74.3
Site is within 5 km 98.6 96.0 99.1 99.5
Money was paid to get work
or wages 16.6 19.4 21.5 10.8
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(BREGS) survey.
Note: Based on responses by workers at the BREGS worksite at which they last 
worked. km = kilometers.
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report a mate being present. It is not entirely clear whether work-
ers fully understand the difference between the two because both 
carry out similar functions with only the nature of their contract 
with the GP (the implementing agency) being different. There could 
thus be some double counting and over- or underestimation of the 
presence of mates or contractors based on the responses of workers 
in the surveys.
The rationale for banning contractor involvement in BREGS is 
to reduce corruption and exploitation. A survey of six North Indian
states fi nds that worksites where contractors are present are more 
likely to have fudged muster rolls,15 and experienced greater exploi-
tation and harassment of women (Drèze and Khera 2009). However,
contractors also bring project management expertise. PRSs and mates 
often lack the capacity to successfully mobilize workers on a fi xed
schedule to complete the work and build assets of reasonable qual-
ity. Because the mate is responsible for day-to-day management of 
the worksite, this is a critical gap and has implications for the quality 
of assets being created under the scheme. A concerted effort needs 
to be made to build the capacity of the PRS and the mate to enable 
them to undertake this task. This strengthening could potentially 
include redefi ning norms for mate selection, providing appropriate 
technical training and the necessary tools, and providing incentives
for performance. 
The use of machines at worksites is reported by workers, 
although the incidence of cases reported declined from 39 percent 
and 49  percent of men and women, respectively, at the last BREGS
worksite in R1 to 8 percent of men and 7 percent of women workers 
in R2 (table 8.2). It is not clear whether these are labor- displacing 
machines (which is the specifi c category of machines banned). Nearly 
everyone reports using their own tools for earthwork rather than 
being supplied with tools at the worksite. Fewer than two-thirds of 
male and female workers report that a muster roll was maintained
at the last worksite at which they worked, with an increasing trend 
over time. But almost all workers in both rounds reported attendance
(in some format) was taken on a daily basis. Worksites were located
in workers’ villages in more than two-thirds of all cases and practi-
cally always within 5 kilometers, as prescribed by the guidelines. 
Mandated worksite facilities are frequently not provided. The 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act entitles workers to basic 
facilities such as drinking water, shade, fi rst aid, and child care at
which women can leave their children when there are more than
fi ve children under age six at the worksite. In practice, these facili-
ties are often not present. The exception is the provision of drink-
ing water—in R2, nearly half of men and women workers reported 
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its availability at the BREGS worksites at which they last worked
(see fi gure 8.2), which was a somewhat lower share than in R1. 
Women workers reported an increase in the provision of most facili-
ties, including child care facilities, between the two rounds (from 
13 percent to 21 percent). The lack of such facilities can discourage 
women from participating in the scheme (Sunai 2009). 
Wage Payments
The scheme’s guidelines require that wages be paid within 15 days of 
the last day worked. However, the evidence points to delays in wage 
payments. These delays also discourage participation and reduce the 
overall impact on poverty.
The survey asked workers how long they had to wait to be paid 
wages after completing work at the last worksite at which they 
worked (table 8.3). In R1, 76 percent of men and 79 percent of 
women workers reported having been paid their expected wages 
in full at the BREGS worksite. Of course, it should be noted that 
the amount received may not be equal to the amount owed them 
had they been paid the stipulated BREGS wage (see chapter 4 for
a discussion of wage level shortfalls).16 In R2, the percentages were 
76 percent and 71 percent. Other workers had either received par-
tial payments and were still waiting for the rest, or had not been 
paid at all by the time of the survey. The latter was true for 13 
percent and 14 percent of men, and of 10 percent and 24 percent 
of women across R1 and R2, respectively. Among those who had 
Figure 8.2 Worksite Facilities in Round 2
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(BREGS) survey.
Note: Percentage of participants reporting that the worksite at which they last 
worked had the facilities. Based on round 2 responses by workers at the BREGS 
worksite at which they last worked.
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received the entire amount expected, about 11 percent of men and 
21 percent of women had waited for more than 15 days to be paid 
in full in R1. By R2, delays beyond 15 days had risen to 19 percent
among men and women, with 11 percent of men and 12 percent of 
women waiting more than one month. Thus, the evidence points to 
long delays as well as partial payments. At fi rst glance, the high pro-
portion of workers reporting either daily wages or some daily outlay 
with a lump sum paid subsequently is puzzling. Next we speculate 
on possible explanations for this occurrence.
There could be several reasons for delayed wage payments. On 
paper, the payment process is supposed to be as follows: wages 
due to BREGS workers are estimated on the basis of productivity 
norms set forth in the rural Schedule of Rates.17 Scheme function-
aries are required to ensure productivity norms are being met by 
measuring the work done at the worksite. On the basis of the mus-
ter roll and work measurement, a payment order is generated that 
directs banks and post offi ces to credit worker accounts with the 
specifi ed wage. Funds are then transferred from the implementing 
Table 8.3 Time Taken for Payment of Wages after Work 
Completion
Participants reporting the
following
Round 1 Round 2
Men
(percent)
Women
(percent)
Men
(percent)
Women
(percent)
Payment not yet received 13.2 10.2 14.1 24.3
Partial payment received 11.3 11.2 9.7 5.0
Full payment received 75.5 78.6 76.2 70.7
Of which, workers received 
payments in the following
period after completing work
 Daily 15.7 18.3 13.3 6.8
Some amount daily and a
lump sum later 20.9 33.9 7.4 4.5
 Between 1 and 15 days 52.2 26.5 59.9 70.1
 Between 16 and 30 days 7.4 13.2 8.5 6.4
 More than one month 3.8 8.2 10.9 12.2
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme
(BREGS) survey.
Note: Based on responses by workers at the BREGS worksite at which they last
worked. Note that the reference to full payment received refl ects merely that workers 
reported no outstanding payments, even though they may not have received the full 
stipulated scheme wage (see chapter 4).
232 RIGHT TO WORK?
agency’s bank account to workers’ bank or post offi ce accounts. 
This cycle is supposed to take no more than 15 days after work 
completion.
In practice, a number of bottlenecks in these processes in Bihar 
result in delayed payments. First, holdups often occur in the 
measurement of work (Development Alternatives 2009; Indian 
Grameen Services 2009; Sunai 2009). Second, the fl ow of funds 
to GPs is erratic and frequently delayed. In both rounds of the 
BREGS survey, PRSs in the surveyed GPs reported problems of 
insuffi cient funds and funds not being available in time. In more 
than half of the surveyed GPs (52 percent in R1 and 67 percent 
in R2), these problems were cited as contributing to delays in 
paying wages to workers. (This issue is explored in more detail 
in the next section, which focuses on systemic constraints such 
as weak fi nancial management capacity.) Third, the payment of 
wages through workers’ bank or post offi ce accounts rather than 
directly in cash adds to the processing time. Since April 2008, the 
scheme guidelines mandate a move toward fi nancial inclusion with 
full reliance on payments through personal accounts with fi nan-
cial institutions. But practice is still a long way from that ideal 
because of the sparse presence and inadequate capacity of fi nancial 
 institutions in rural areas.
In rural Bihar, bank coverage is patchy. In R2, nearly 60 percent
of the villages in the sample reported that the nearest bank was more 
than 5 kilometers distant. Post offi ces are more accessible: almost 
all sample villages reported one within 5 kilometers and nearly a 
quarter of the villages had a post offi ce within the village itself. But 
most village post offi ces are small, typically operated by a single 
postman, and lack the capacity to deal regularly with large volumes 
of transactions. Nor are they linked to the core banking system that 
facilitates interbank electronic funds transfers and through which 
payments can be directly transferred from the implementing agency’s 
BREGS bank account to workers’ bank accounts. In the case of post 
offi ce accounts, funds are transferred fi rst to the district post offi ce
before being redirected to the local village-level post offi ces where 
worker accounts are held. As a result, payments through post offi ces 
introduce further delays.18
In fact, we fi nd that more than half of all rural households in 
Bihar had neither bank nor post offi ce accounts in R2 (see table 8.4). 
Although the PRS is tasked with helping BREGS workers open bank 
or post offi ce accounts (at least one per household), about 53 percent
of participating households had neither in R1. By R2, this number 
had fallen to 30 percent. However, the absence of an account does 
not necessarily constrain households from getting work—fewer than 
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1 percent of men and women excess demanders (those who wanted 
work but did not get it) cited the lack of a bank or post offi ce account 
as the main reason for not getting work in each round. 
The large number of households remaining without bank or post 
offi ce accounts explains why workers continue to report wage pay-
ments made in cash. When asked about the worksite at which they 
last worked, more than two-thirds of workers, both men and women, 
reported cash payments in R2 (see table 8.5). For women, however, 
this represented an improvement from R1, when the majority of 
women workers (89 percent) reported payment in cash at their last 
worksite. Naturally, nearly all workers without an account reported
cash payments. But even among those belonging to households with 
Table 8.5 Percentage of Participants Reporting Wage
Payments through Various Sources at the Last Worksite
Payment source
Round 1 Round 2
Men Women Men Women
Post offi ce accounts 12.5 7.5 27.6 25.5
Bank accounts 10.5 3.5 5.8 5.5
Cash
 Mukhiya 27.7 40.0 25.4 29.6
 Mate 13.0 14.7 10.9 8.8
 Contractor 18.2 20.4 17.5 21.2
 Offi cials (PRS and others) 11.4 11.1 9.5 8.8
 Other 6.6 2.9 3.2 0.7
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(BREGS) survey.
Note: Based on responses by workers at the BREGS worksite at which they last 
worked.
Table 8.4 Percentage of Rural Households with Accounts at
Financial Institutions
Round 1 Round 2
All 
households
BREGS
households
All 
households
BREGS
households
Bank account 24.8 23.0 28.2 24.1
Post offi ce account 6.8 19.9 12.3 35.3
Both 2.2 4.0 5.1 10.6
Neither 66.2 53.1 54.4 30.0
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(BREGS) survey.
Note: Based on responses in the household questionnaire.
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at least one bank or post offi ce account, more than half the workers, 
both men and women, reported payments in cash.19
By contrast, the PRSs interviewed in the BREGS survey reported
that the majority of wage payments are made through worker 
accounts. In fact, as discussed in chapter 4, qualitative research for 
this report suggests that delays in fund transfers to worker bank 
accounts can sometimes lead to the Mukhiya or other functionar-
ies acting as intermediaries and making partial advance payments 
in cash. These cash advances are paid on a daily basis, in line with 
usual practice for agricultural casual work, but are typically less 
than the stipulated scheme wage. Wage payments in the workers’ 
accounts are then transferred to the intermediary when they are 
received. The difference between the daily wage paid in advance 
and that stipulated by the scheme and eventually received through 
the workers’ accounts is then pocketed by the intermediary.20 As
seen in chapter 7 (box 7.1), workers’ passbooks and job cards are
sometimes in the possession of the Mukhiya, the PRS, or some other 
offi cial or middleman, leaving room for manipulation and leakage. 
This is a potential explanation for why many workers report receiv-
ing daily wages as mentioned earlier and as shown in table 8.3.
Understanding the Supply-Side Constraints on Delivery 
Ensuring adherence to the scheme’s operational guidelines and trans-
parency safeguards requires appropriate institutional structures with 
skilled and motivated staff, adequate and timely funds, and robust 
systems for monitoring and grievance redress. The central govern-
ment provides 6 percent of MGNREGS expenditures to states to 
cover the nonwage, nonmaterial costs incurred in implementing the 
scheme. Yet in 2009/10, Bihar spent about 643 million rupees (Rs), 
amounting to only about 3.5 percent of total scheme expenditures.
This is not because Bihar does not need the extra money. More 
plausibly, the underspending of the central government’s allocation 
for these other costs refl ects the same administrative constraints that 
have created the rationing documented in previous chapters, as well 
as other defi ciencies in the scheme’s performance. This section exam-
ines those constraints. 
Staffi ng and Capacity
The BREGS guidelines call for a dedicated cadre of professional 
administrative and technical staff to implement the scheme. 
Signifi cant human resources are required at the village level to register
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households, record every work application, mobilize households to 
participate in the planning of works, obtain necessary approvals, 
and initiate work in response to demand, manage and oversee work-
sites, and ensure timely wage payments. The scheme also places a 
heavy emphasis on reporting.21 Whereas the district-level function-
aries (the district magistrate, the deputy district coordinator, block 
development offi cers, and the assistant engineers) are government 
offi cers, the rest of the BREGS staff (including junior engineers and 
PRSs) consists of contract workers.
When the scheme was fi rst introduced, many states experienced 
signifi cant delays in appointing contract staff, and Bihar was no 
exception (Comptroller and Auditor General 2008). In many dis-
tricts, the existing block development offi cers were required to per-
form the program offi cer (PO) function. The appointment of GP-level 
PRSs also took time. Extensive recruitment in 2007 and subsequently
has led to the fi lling of these district, block, and panchayat positions. 
Administrative data indicate that all districts now have a dedicated 
offi cer for BREGS, but that vacancies remained signifi cant at the 
block and GP levels, even in 2011—16 percent of the 534 blocks 
in the state did not have a PO; 9 percent of GPs in the state did not 
have a PRS; and 30 percent of GP clusters did not have a panchayat
technical assistant (there is supposed to be one for every four GPs).22
The issue of technical staff vacancies is refl ected in the responses
of block officials interviewed in the BREGS survey—although
almost all block offi cials report an average of about 14 PRSs per 
block (nearly one PRS per GP given that a block has about 15 GPs 
on average), the majority report only one or two junior engineers 
and panchayat technical assistants per block. The staffi ng levels 
improved between the two survey rounds, but adequate technical 
staff remains a concern. As many as 73 percent of POs and 80 per-
cent of junior engineers in R1 felt the available BREGS staff in the 
block was inadequate and contributed to delays in opening work-
sites, work measurement, and payment of wages. Even in R2, about 
66 percent of POs and 56 percent of junior engineers felt more staff 
was needed. At the GP level, however, only 9 percent of interviewed
PRSs viewed staffi ng as a constraint. 
In 2011, the government of Bihar established an autonomous 
society, the Bihar Rural Development Society, for BREGS implemen-
tation. The society seeks to attract experienced government offi cers 
and private sector professionals to implement the scheme. Current
BREGS staff at the district and lower levels will come under the 
purview of the Bihar Rural Development Society, opening greater 
avenues for these contract staff with respect to career development
and growth. 
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Building capacity among BREGS staff and Panchayati Raj
Institution (PRI) representatives is a key priority. Field studies high-
light low capacity among BREGS staff at the block and village  levels, 
particularly with respect to participatory planning, development of 
labor budgets, and demand registration. In addition, the scheme 
guidelines assign a central role to PRIs in BREGS implementation,
including planning, execution, and oversight (see box 8.2). BREGS 
alone required an average GP in Bihar to manage approximately 
Rs 2.2 million in 2009/10.23 However, their capacity to perform 
Box 8.2 The Role of the Mukhiya
The Mukhiya continues to play an integral role in the implementation
of the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (BREGS), acting
as the representative of both the workers on one side and the local 
government on the other. 
The panchayat rozgar sewak (PRS) and the Mukhiya bear joint 
responsibility for scheme implementation. The Mukhiya is responsi-
ble for preparing the village plans and can also sanction small works
costing up to Rs 5 lakhs.a Together, the Mukhiya and PRS are tasked 
with jointly operating BREGS bank accounts and managing pay-
ments. The PRS is responsible for registering demand, facilitating 
planning and work sanction, supervising worksites, and maintaining
records. However, in practice, the Mukhiya frequently carries out 
these functions; scheme performance often depends on the level of the
Mukhiya’s commitment. Because the Mukhiya is the local leader and 
the PRS is an outsider to the Gram Panchayat (GP), possibilities are
opened up for confl ict or collusion.
Information. Both qualitative studies and the BREGS survey indi-
cate that the Mukhiya and other GP members (such as ward mem-
bers) remain an important source of information about the availability
of BREGS works. In round 2 of the BREGS survey, about 45 percent 
of men and 29 percent of women workers listed Panchayati Raj 
Institution (PRI) representatives as the main source of information 
about the worksite at which they last worked. About 26 percent of 
male and 20 percent of female workers reported that they had been
called to the worksite by the Mukhiya or other PRI representative. 
Qualitative studies indicate that demand for work is often informally
made to the Mukhiya.
Participation. In a third of the GPs surveyed in the BREGS survey,
the GP’s offi cial work is carried out at the Mukhiya’s house. This 
could potentially constrain the ability of different groups to register
for job cards or apply for work, depending on caste and political 
(Continued on the following page)
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affi liation. In addition, the local political connections and character-
istics of the Mukhiya him- or herself can infl uence participation (see
chapter 3). Thus, households in villages in which the Mukhiya has 
held a GP post in the past, is a contractor, and lives in the village are 
more likely to get BREGS work.
Work execution. According to the scheme guidelines, the mate in
charge of worksite management is to be chosen by the Gram Sabha.
But more often than not, the mate is selected by the Mukhiya. The 
mates perform the project management function of contractors to a 
large extent in that they mobilize workers, record attendance, oversee
and manage the worksite, and record preliminary work measure-
ments. Qualitative research indicates that mates are not always held
accountable because of their connections to the Mukhiya.
Source: Authors’ observations and estimates from the Bihar Rural Employ-
ment Guarantee Scheme (BREGS) survey.
a. One lakh = Rs 100,000.
these functions is weak. Both the scheme staff and PRI represen-
tatives also often lack clarity on the modifi cations to the scheme 
guidelines that are periodically issued by the state.
Training and technical support to the scheme staff and PRI rep-
resentatives, particularly at the village level, is critically important. 
This support includes, for example, building capacity for better 
fi nancial management, participatory resource planning, and project 
management functions. But developing an ongoing system for the 
training of about 13,000 contract BREGS workers and PRI repre-
sentatives in 534 blocks and 8,463 GPs is not an easy task. In fact, 
fi ndings from the BREGS survey suggest a lower emphasis on train-
ing in R2 compared with R1. Both the POs and PRSs report, on 
average, a lower number of training sessions and fewer days spent 
in training in R2. 
Financial Management 
Because MGNREGS is a centrally sponsored scheme, the central
government funds the bulk of the states’ MGNREGS expenditures.
As noted previously, the central government also fi nances up to 6 per-
cent of the state government expenditures on MGNREGS, including 
salaries of contract workers, training, and information technology 
(IT) monitoring systems. As with other centrally sponsored schemes,
Box 8.2 (Continued)
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funds are transferred directly from the central ministry to districts.
For BREGS, unlike other centrally sponsored schemes, PRIs at the 
district, block, and GP levels are implementing agencies and play an 
important role in managing scheme funds. Given the multiple agen-
cies and government levels involved in  managing the fl ow of funds, it 
is critical for Bihar to have a well-functioning fi nancial management 
system to keep track of funds’ transfer and use. 
MGNREGS funds are released by the central Ministry of Rural 
Development on the basis of state proposals rather than predeter-
mined allocations. These annual state work plans and budget pro-
posals are supposed to be an aggregation of demand for funds from 
the districts (based on the estimated shelf of works and labor bud-
get). In practice, the initially released central funds are also linked 
to actual utilization in the previous fi scal year.
Funds are released directly to districts in two (or more) tranches. 
On paper, the initial tranche in the beginning of the fi scal year is based 
on the submitted district-level labor budget projections.24 Once the
central funds are released, the state allocation is also released. This 
initial allocation provides the necessary advance funds to initiate 
BREGS works. The second (and subsequent) tranches are released 
once the districts submit utilization certifi cates indicating that 60 per-
cent of the initial allocation has been exhausted. An audit report is 
also required if the certifi cates are submitted after September. Funds 
are to be transferred to the district within 15 days of submission of 
the utilization certifi cate, provided the certifi cates are found to be 
accurate. Districts are then required to transfer funds to the imple-
menting agency accounts at the district, block, and GP levels. 
In practice, both qualitative research and the BREGS survey fi nd 
evidence of signifi cant delays in the transfer of funds to GPs. As seen 
in table 8.6, substantial improvement occurred by R2, but 36 per-
cent of PRSs still reported inadequate funds. Even if suffi cient funds 
Table 8.6 Flow of Funds
Round 1
(percent)
Round 2
(percent)
PRSs reporting insuffi cient funds in past year 61.1 36.3
PRSs reporting funds not available on time in
past yeara — 64.1
Source: Estimates based on the Bihar Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme 
(BREGS) survey.
Note:  Based on panchayat rozgar sewak (PRS) responses in the Gram Panchayat
questionnaires. — = not available.
a. This question was not asked in R1.
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were available on average, they were not necessarily available on 
time, as reported by PRSs in 64 percent of the surveyed GPs in R2. 
In the majority of GPs in which these instances were reported, this 
resulted in delays in starting work, in making wage payments to
workers, and in paying government functionaries.
Delays can occur at any or all of three stages: the transfer of 
funds from the central ministry to districts; the release of the state 
share to districts; and the transfer of funds from the district to the 
GPs. We analyzed administrative data on the request for and receipt 
of central and state funds by districts in 2010/11 to identify bottle-
necks in the fl ow of funds.25 Given the somewhat patchy condition
of these data, this analysis can only be indicative of the nature of 
delays and shortfalls in fund transfers between the central ministry 
and the districts.
We fi nd that, for all 38 districts, the sanction of the fi rst tranche 
by the Ministry of Rural Development occurs within two days of the 
request being made (typically at the start of the fi scal year in April).
Very little delay in receipt of the fi rst tranche from the central min-
istry seems to have occurred for the 25 districts for which we have 
information. On average, funds were received within 17 days from 
the sanctioning of the fi rst tranche; the maximum time was 30 days. 
By mid-May, all 25 districts for which we have this information had 
received the fi rst tranche.
However, there were delays in the release of subsequent tranches.
The second tranche was received by 29 districts by July or August 
2010, another three districts received funds by September or October,
while the remaining fi ve districts received funds only in January or 
February 2011. During this period, some districts made repeated 
requests for funds. In the 19 districts for which we have informa-
tion on the dates of both tranches, the average gap between the two 
tranches was 115 days. 
We do not have information at the district level on the additional 
time it may have taken for these funds to reach GPs. However, a fi eld 
visit to a block in Bhojpur district indicated further delays in trans-
ferring funds to GPs: in October 2010, about 181 GPs (83 percent of 
GPs in the district) had less than Rs 1 lakh in available funds at the
time.26 The peak BREGS season is the fi rst quarter of the calendar 
year, so delays in the receipt of funds until this time make it diffi cult 
for GPs to open worksites. Furthermore, low funds availability also 
leads to prioritization of smaller works with estimated costs of less 
than Rs 1 lakh. 
An additional concern is the shortfall between the amount
requested by districts and that received in each tranche from the 
central ministry. In all of Bihar’s 38 districts, the amounts received 
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were signifi cantly lower than that requested. For instance, the aver-
age labor budget was Rs 1,162 million while the average amount 
received in the fi rst tranche was Rs 188 million. Combined with the 
funds already available at the district level from the previous year, 
these disbursements amounted to only 28 percent of the requested
labor budget. 
On paper, the fi rst tranche can be up to 50 percent of the labor 
budget. However, in 2010/11, the actual amount released was based
on the expenditures during the fi rst six months of the previous fi s-
cal year. This amount was released only if all documentation for 
the previous year was complete; otherwise only a partial amount 
was released. Districts then had to request release of the remaining 
amount of the fi rst tranche. 
Linking the current release to expenditures in the previous year is 
a problem in a demand-driven scheme such as BREGS, particularly 
when current circumstances (such as a drought) may result in higher 
demand than in the previous year. By the end of fi scal year 2010/11,
the amount released combined with the amount available from the 
previous fi scal year came to only about 60 percent on average of the
labor budget requested.
The main cause for these delays and shortfalls appears to be the 
limited fi nancial management capacity at the district and lower 
levels. For instance, the above data indicate that shortfalls in the 
amounts released varied substantially across districts, ranging from 
18 percent of the labor budget in Madhubani to 91 percent in 
Muzaffarpur. This variance likely refl ects the differences in capacity
across districts, blocks, and GPs for managing funds and prepar-
ing accurate reports on use. Delays in the submission of accurate 
documentation by any one GP can delay the entire district’s receipt 
of funds. 
In addition to the problems of insuffi cient and untimely funds 
availability, Bihar has often been unable to fully absorb available 
resources (central and state) in the past. This was the case when 
BREGS was fi rst introduced. In 2006/07, expenditure as a share 
of total available funds was only 38 percent. Utilization rates have 
improved signifi cantly since then; in 2010/11, about 82 percent of 
available resources were spent. This improvement occurred even 
as the total quantum of resources increased more than 2.5 times. 
However, expenditures on the scheme can be expected to increase 
even further as the delivery system becomes more responsive to 
the currently unmet demand. In the future, addressing the varying 
capacities of districts to absorb available funds will be critical. As 
fi gure 8.3 indicates, not only do utilization rates vary across districts, 
they also vary from year to year within districts.
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Several initiatives are under way to improve fi nancial manage-
ment. Because funds are transferred directly from the center to the 
districts, the state’s administrative role to date has been somewhat
limited to coordinating between the districts and the central ministry.
In recent years, the Rural Development Department, government of 
Bihar, has increased its oversight of the fl ow of funds and has intro-
duced systems for better fi nancial management. The government has 
mandated the appointment of a funds manager in each district to 
manage releases to GPs and simultaneously introduced a system of 
fortnightly monitoring of funds available to GPs. The objective is to 
ensure that no GP has a balance of less than Rs 1 lakh at any time. 
Transfers are made on the basis of these reports, with utilization 
certifi cates being submitted subsequently. The government also rec-
ognizes the need to build fi nancial management capacity simultane-
ously at the district and lower levels. 
A State Employment Guarantee Fund has also been established 
according to the provisions of the national guidelines. Once this 
state-level corpus fund is fully functional, funds from the central 
government are expected to be transferred to it and then directly 
to GPs, thereby reducing the delays that occur in transfers from 
the district to GPs. In addition, a rolling fund has been provided to
minimize delays in wage payments to workers through paying agen-
cies, whether it be post offi ce or bank accounts or other modality
of payment. 
Figure 8.3 Utilization of Available Resources across Districts
Annual scheme expenditures as a percentage of total available 
funds
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An IT-enabled system for centralized funds management was 
also introduced in 2010. This system provides access to informa-
tion on BREGS account balances in the more than 9,000 district, 
block, and GP implementing-agency bank accounts on a nearly 
real-time basis. As a result, the state is able to monitor and respond 
when cash balances in BREGS accounts in GPs fall too low. This 
system has introduced transparency in BREGS fi nancial manage-
ment and enabled the state to monitor and manage its resources 
across districts. In addition, the modifications planned with 
respect to accounting applications should also facilitate accurate 
and timely creation of utilization certifi cates by districts.
These two initiatives—creating a state level corpus fund and 
 putting in place a centralized funds management system—are
expected to smooth funds fl ows to implementing agencies and sim-
plify accounting requirements at local levels, thereby limiting one 
potential source of the rationing of work. 
Monitoring
There is a strong emphasis on monitoring in BREGS, in contrast with 
previous such schemes. The National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act provides for several mechanisms to increase transparency and 
accountability. Intensive monitoring and evaluation of program out-
comes is therefore critical to learning whether the strengthened pro-
visions have had the intended impact. 
In Bihar, BREGS implementation is monitored largely through 
monthly and fortnightly progress reports submitted by districts 
and through monthly review meetings. These monthly meetings 
are held at the block, district, and state levels to review progress 
and resolve bottlenecks in the delivery of the scheme. The scheme
guidelines call for Vigilance Committees to be established in all 
GPs. However, these committees rarely exist or function. Field-
based process and outcome monitoring is limited, partly as a result 
of the absence of a clearly defi ned strategy and partly because of 
the lack of capacity. Social audits are mandated by the scheme
guidelines, but, as in most states, progress in undertaking such 
audits has been slow. The few instances in which NGOs have mobi-
lized communities for social audits in some districts in Bihar have 
unearthed discrepancies.
The monthly progress reports are district-wide reports on pre-
defi ned indicators of fi nancial and physical progress in implementing
the scheme. The reports are sent by districts to the state and uploaded 
on the national website (http://nrega.nic.in) in the fi rst week of every 
month. Although a useful source of information on progress, there 
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are two areas of concern. First, only aggregate data, such as the 
total number of households provided employment and the number 
of person days of employment generated, are available at different
administrative levels. Detailed data are not available because these 
district-wide reports are compiled using block-level reports, which, 
in turn, are aggregated using GP-level reports submitted by PRSs.
It is not possible to track benefi ciary-level information through this 
system.
Second, information submitted in the reports is not verifi ed in 
the fi eld. The PRS is tasked with maintaining the various documents 
used for this purpose, including registers for recording applications, 
job card distribution, benefi ciary accounts opened, employment 
 provision, receipt of muster rolls (for attendance), works executed, 
and grievances received. The PRS is also required to maintain the 
cashbook (for recording funds receipts and expenditures). Technical
staff are responsible for maintaining the measurement book for 
recording work done and wages paid. However, there is no clear 
mechanism at the block level to verify the authenticity of data in 
the monthly reports by checking these documents. Field visits to 
blocks in four districts—Darbhanga, Jehanabad, Madhubani, and
Nalanda—indicated that random checks of documents are conducted
in some blocks, but that it is not a uniform practice. Fieldwork for
the BREGS survey and other fi eld visits also highlighted the diffi culty 
of obtaining a complete record of scheme performance because some 
documents were available with the PRS, others with the Mukhiya, 
and some not at all. 
In contrast, the national MGNREGS Management Information 
System (MIS)—NREGAsoft (available online at http://nrega.nic.in)—
makes data available on the scheme at the benefi ciary level. However, 
the level of disaggregated information required, the large number and
frequency of transactions to be recorded, and the limited IT infra-
structure at the block and lower levels present a challenge to making
information available in a timely fashion. For instance, because of the
lack of adequate IT support and connectivity at the block level, hard 
copies of documents such as muster rolls and measurement books 
must be brought to the district headquarters by the PRSs for data 
entry into the MIS. As a result, there is a signifi cant time lag before
the data are available online. The timeliness of this information has 
improved because the transfer of funds from the central ministry to
districts has now been linked to the information available on the MIS. 
However, the design of NREGAsoft is such that all transactions 
(such as the issuance of job cards or recording attendance on the mus-
ter roll) remain paper based. Once the paper transaction is complete, 
data are entered offl ine and subsequently made publicly available.
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In contrast, a transactions-based MIS would make data entry manda-
tory at the same time the transaction itself is processed (for example, 
a job card would be printed and issued only when the relevant infor-
mation is recorded in the MIS). This would make data available in 
real time so that they can be used to inform  management decisions. 
Andhra Pradesh has been using a transactions-based IT system since 
the introduction of the scheme in 2006.
Grievance Redress Mechanisms
Bihar has made a commitment to making the BREGS delivery mech-
anism more accountable to the public and citizens can  submit griev-
ances through multiple channels.27 Citizens can submit grievances 
related to BREGS in person, in writing, by telephone, or through 
public meetings (janta durbars). The chief minister, as well as most 
government functionaries at the state and district levels, holds public 
meetings every week at which citizens can voice their grievances and 
register petitions (about BREGS as well as other issues). Field visits 
to Madhubani district in 2011 indicated that about 80 to 120 com-
plaints, on average, were received at the district meeting and that it 
took at least three months to complete the entire grievance redress
process at the district level.
An Information and Public Grievance Cell has been established 
to receive and follow up on complaints received at the state-level 
meetings. BREGS-related complaints are then forwarded to the rel-
evant authorities for redress. Bihar has also introduced the statewide
Bihar Public Grievance Redress System that works directly under 
the supervision of the chief minister’s secretariat. This system regis-
ters complaints on BREGS and other issues received from different
sources (including public meetings and the online portal) and directs
it to the relevant authority for redress.
BREGS-related grievances can also be received verbally or in 
writing. At the block level, the PO maintains a grievance register 
to record complaints. Often, verbal complaints go unrecorded and 
only the complaints received by the PO in writing are recorded. 
To deal with this issue, a call center was piloted to record verbal 
grievances and to ensure that grievances are resolved quickly and 
effi ciently. To be effective, the call center needs to be more closely
integrated with the Rural Development Department’s grievance 
redress process. 
The above channels have enabled proper registration of com-
plaints, but further work is required to promote a coordinated and 
effective response to address the reported grievances. 
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Learning from Experiences Elsewhere
The experiences of similar public works programs in other coun-
tries, such as Argentina and Colombia, is instructive. For instance, 
the Trabajar program in Argentina uses standardized designs for 
projects and relies on monthly meetings to approve and priori-
tize  project proposals, including for projects proposed by NGOs. 
Colombia carries out a series of spot checks to assess how the pro-
gram procedures are being carried out. In both cases, benefi ciary-
level data (rather than just aggregate information by district) are 
available for monitoring.
In addition, innovations in implementing MGNREGS are emerg-
ing in many states across India, and there are opportunities for learn-
ing from these experiences. The main innovations are with respect to 
streamlining planning processes, improving worksite management, 
making timely wage payments, and ensuring transparency. 
Several states have introduced various innovations to strengthen
the planning process in a manner that is best suited to the state-
specifi c context. For instance, Kerala has used its strong PRIs to 
promote decentralized, comprehensive planning for village assets. 
Andhra Pradesh has leveraged its relatively decentralized admin-
istrative structure and its mature network of self-help groups and 
 village organizations for community mobilization and participatory 
planning. These groups undertake annual labor demand assessments
and land surveys to determine the village assets to be created and the 
availability of labor for MGNREGS during the course of the year. 
As noted earlier (box 8.1), Gujarat is piloting the use of geographic 
information systems for village resource mapping to provide commu-
nities with the appropriate technical inputs for planning purposes. 
Andhra Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh have developed standardized
work estimates for a wide range of MGNREGS works to overcome
technical staff shortages at the village level. States such as Karnataka 
and Andhra Pradesh encourage communities to plan MGNREGS
works to be undertaken sequentially across identifi ed areas within a 
village rather than simultaneously in scattered locations across the 
village. In each of these areas within a village, a comprehensive set
of works is undertaken in a logical sequence.
With respect to worksite management practices, states such as 
Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan have introduced the concept of fi xed 
labor groups that work together on worksites. Such groups can help 
mobilize workers and enable them to collectively voice their demands 
and improve work effi ciency. Moving to group measurement of 
work at the site suggests that wages can vary depending on group 
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effort, thereby providing incentives to monitor individual effort 
within the group. The number of group members varies; Andhra 
Pradesh has groups of 10 to 30 members, while Rajasthan promotes
5- member groups. The process of group formation also varies across 
states. In Andhra Pradesh, group members are typically workers 
who have worked together on more than one worksite for at least 
10 days. To prevent exclusion in the group formation process, work 
is allocated separately to general groups and to those with disabled 
individuals. In contrast, Rajasthan allows workers to form their own 
groups. Field visits to these states suggest that there is greater owner-
ship among workers that work in groups, but further mobilization 
and awareness generation would be required, in partnership with 
NGOs and community-based organizations (MART 2010). 
In addition, several states have introduced various mechanisms 
for the selection, training, and performance management of mates 
who are responsible for managing worksites in lieu of contractors.
Some states, such as Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan, maintain per-
manent pools of mates per GP, with worksite allocation on a rotat-
ing basis. Andhra Pradesh has an incentive-linked payment system
for mates to encourage better performance. Rajasthan provides a 
tool kit to mates to help them in record keeping and measurement
at the worksite (MART 2010).
Some states have successfully streamlined the fl ow of funds to 
implementing agencies and set up appropriate disbursement mecha-
nisms to ensure timely wage payments. For instance, Andhra Pradesh 
has a centralized electronic funds management system that allows 
near-real-time tracking and funds management across implementing
agencies. Full integration of this system with the management infor-
mation system and a tightly monitored delivery process ensures that
wage payments are made within a week of work completion. Some 
states, including Madhya Pradesh, make advance funds available 
(linked to the volume of estimated MGNREGS work) to GPs, thus 
making it easier to open worksites in response to demand. Others
have placed advance funds, or a “fl oat,” with post offi ces to enable
wages to be paid into benefi ciary accounts while waiting for funds 
to be transferred from the implementing agencies.
Several states have put mechanisms in place for strengthened 
monitoring, transparency, and accountability in implementation. 
For instance, Rajasthan is well known for implementation of vari-
ous transparency safeguards. Muster rolls are present at most work-
sites, daily attendance is taken in front of workers, wages are paid 
based on group work and measurement, and job cards are updated 
at the time of payment. An active civil society, the Mazdoor Kisan
Shakti Sangathan, has strongly encouraged community monitoring 
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through social audits. Andhra Pradesh has established a strong
IT-enabled management information system to restrict the possibili-
ties of corruption and manipulation. This web-based system has a
local language interface that handles registration, work planning, 
worksite management, and wage payments, and allows public access
to reliable, timely, and comparable information from the fi eld.28
Andhra Pradesh was the fi rst state to institutionalize social audits as 
early as 2006, with a focus on follow-up action by the administra-
tion in the aftermath of such audits. Tamil Nadu has used admin-
istrative monitoring effectively through daily audits of the muster 
rolls. Inspection offi cers visit worksites regularly to check the infor-
mation reported in the muster rolls, thereby reducing the scope for 
“ghost workers” (World Bank 2011).
In several states (for example, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, 
Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, and West Bengal), the district admin-
istration has partnered with civil society organizations to mobilize 
communities for demand registration, participatory planning of 
works, and grievance redress and monitoring (National Consortium
of Civil Society Organizations 2009, 2010). These innovations 
across India present an opportunity for poor states to make the 
MGNREGS delivery mechanism more responsive to demand and 
thereby reduce the rationing of work on the scheme. 
Notes
 1. For further discussion of the importance of asset creation to the cost-
effectiveness of workfare schemes, see Ravallion (1999).
 2. Nearly two-fi fths of households reported no Gram Sabha had taken 
place in the Gram Panchayat (GP) in the year preceding the survey in 
2009/10. A further 16 percent of households were unaware of whether a
Gram Sabha had been held in their GP. Among households that reported 
that a Gram Sabha had taken place, about half attended the meeting. In 
2009/10, the majority of men (78 percent) and women (86 percent) per-
ceived no benefi ts to participating in Gram Sabhas as they are currently
held.
 3. See Sunai (2009) and Indian Grameen Services (2009) for Bihar; 
PRIA (2007) for other states.
 4. For a broader discussion of this issue in light of evidence from other 
programs, see Mansuri and Rao (2013).
 5. Note that this could also be attributed, at least in part, to the poor 
quality of administrative data on assets created under the scheme. The GP
questionnaire (see chapter 2) was used to collect data on fi ve assets created 
under BREGS in the preceding year in the surveyed village. All individual 
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respondents were asked questions on these fi ve assets. The study did not 
survey worksites or investigate the quality of assets.
6. See also Indian Grameen Services (2009).
7. These include projects for water conservation, drought proofi ng 
(including plantation and reforestation), minor and micro-irrigation, land 
development (including on the individual land of Scheduled Tribe and 
Scheduled Caste households, small and medium-size farmers, and other speci-
fi ed groups), renovation of traditional water bodies, fl ood control and protec-
tion (including drainage in waterlogged areas), rural connectivity, and others.
In 2012, the list of permissible projects was expanded to include agriculture,
livestock and fi sheries, rural sanitation, and watershed-related projects.
8. Flood Management Information System (FMIS), Water Resources 
Department, government of Bihar, available at http://fmis.bih.nic.in/history
.html. There were severe fl oods in six districts in the two northern zones in 
2008/09. In contrast, rainfall was scant during the 2009 monsoons, and 
drought was declared in 26 districts.
9. Indira Awaas Yojana is a cash transfer to poor rural households to 
enable them to construct or repair their houses.
10. The Backward Regions Grant Fund is an untied grant to GPs in 
backward districts that can be used at their discretion for building assets 
such as roads and school buildings.
11. The survey’s village questionnaire indicates the peak months of agri-
cultural activity in Bihar to be March and April (wheat harvest), June–
August (paddy planting), and October–December (paddy harvest and wheat
sowing).
12. States such as Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan 
have made concerted efforts to streamline and shorten the process for 
obtaining approvals for the annual shelf of works and to ensure that at least
some of the projects listed in the shelf of works have the necessary admin-
istrative and technical sanctions. As a result, worksites can be opened 
promptly in response to demand (MART 2010).
13. Unsurprisingly, in R2 nearly three-quarters of men and women who 
reported instances of interruption of work at the last worksite at which 
they worked also felt that BREGS work was not available when they 
wanted it.
14. The mate is a BREGS worker who is assigned the responsibility of 
managing the worksite, including taking attendance and overseeing daily 
operations.
15. The muster roll is a record maintained at the worksite of the daily 
attendance of workers and payments made for the period of a week or
fortnight.
16. Chapter 4 also reports information on wage payment delays, but 
based on responses averaged across all worksites that the household mem-
bers worked on in the year preceding the survey.
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 17. The rates are intended to be such that an able-bodied worker can 
produce the output that could earn him or her the stipulated scheme wage.
 18. See Drèze and Khera (2009) for a discussion of the downsides of 
reliance on post offi ce and bank accounts.
 19. Studies from other states note that women may not have access to 
their earnings if the bank account is opened in the name of the male house-
hold head. In Andhra Pradesh, household accounts are opened in the name
of the woman.
 20. A study of six northern states speculated that contractors are likely 
to step in and run worksites when funds are delayed because they can ensure
timely payments and keep the work going (Drèze and Khera 2009).
 21. See, for example, Ambasta, Shankar, and Shah (2008) for sugges-
tions on the appropriate technical and administrative staff strength required
to adequately implement the scheme.
 22. Information from the Rural Development Department, government 
of Bihar, as of December 2011.
 23. Total scheme expenditures in 2009/10 were Rs 26,320 million (Rural 
Development Department, Government of Bihar); there are 8,463 GPs in 
Bihar.
 24. In theory, these, in turn, are derived from the labor budgets put 
forward by GPs as developed during the bottom-up planning exercise.
 25. These data were made available by the Rural Development 
Department, government of Bihar, and compiled from letters from districts 
to the Ministry of Rural Development for fund releases and data on receipt 
of funds from the Central Plan Scheme Monitoring System. The data are 
somewhat patchy. For the first tranche, we have information on the 
dates of the requests and the amounts requested and received for all 
 38  districts, but we have information on the dates of the receipt of funds 
for only 25 districts. Comparable information across tranches restricts us 
to 19 districts. 
 26. One lakh equals Rs 100,000. Analysis of road construction work-
sites in two GPs in Kishanganj district indicated that it took about a month
for the block to receive funds from the district and a further four or fi ve 
months to release these funds to the GPs. However, it is possible that this
delayed transfer to the GP was not due to bottlenecks in the funds fl ow but
deliberate because the worksites could be opened only after the rainy season
was over (Development Alternatives 2009; Sunai 2009).
 27. Bihar is one of the forerunners in the implementation of the Right to 
Information Act in India and in enacting the Right to Public Services Act in
2011. Under the Right to Public Services Act, citizens are entitled to stan-
dards in public service delivery, and civil servants are held personally
accountable in the event of failure to comply with these standards. This pro-
vides another channel for ensuring improved service delivery, although 
BREGS does not yet come under the ambit of this act.
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 28. See National Consortium of Civil Society Organizations (2009) for 
an assessment of how such integrated end-to-end IT systems can contribute
to improved MGNREGS outcomes.
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Glossary
Block The administrative level above the Gram
Panchayat and below the district.
Block development
offi cer (BDO)
A civil servant responsible for the
administration of a block. 
Block program offi cer
(PO)
Hired on contract by the state government for
overseeing and monitoring the Bihar Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme (BREGS)
implementation in the block.
BPL ration card The “Below Poverty Line” card that defi nes
the poverty status of rural households and
determines entitlements to various government
programs.
District The administrative level above the block and
below the state.
Gram Panchayat (GP) A cluster of villages; the lowest unit of 
administration. Also used to refer to the
elected body at the panchayat level.
Gram Sabha A meeting that includes all the adult citizen 
residents of the village. The Gram Sabha elects
representatives to the GP.
Kutcha Crude or temporary structure (usually used to
describe housing or road quality).
Mahadalit In Bihar, Mahadalits, comprising the poorest
and most disadvantaged among Scheduled
Castes, have been notifi ed as a separate sub-
category by the state government.
Mate A BREGS worker who is assigned the
responsibility of managing the worksite,
including taking  attendance and overseeing
daily operations.
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Mukhiya The elected leader of the Gram Panchayat,
responsible for the implementation of 
development  programs at the panchayat level. 
Muster roll A record maintained at the BREGS worksites 
of the daily attendance of workers and
payments made for the period of a week or 
fortnight.
Panchayat bhawan A building where the GP conducts its offi cial
work.
Panchayati Raj
Institutions (PRIs)
The group of locally elected bodies in the
three-tier (GP, block, and district) system of 
local government.
Panchayat rozgar
sewak
Hired on contract by the state government for
implementing the scheme at the GP level.
Pucca A solid, permanent, or proper structure 
(usually in the context of the roof or walls of a 
house, or a road). 
Sarpanch The elected leader of the panchayat judiciary
body.
Schedule of Rates The payment rates for various tasks, intended
to be such that an able-bodied worker can
produce the output that could earn him or her
the stipulated daily MGNREGS wage.
Shelf of works Annual list of MGNREGS projects for each GP.
Ward A division of a GP, which has representation
in the GP elective body.
Ward member The representative of the ward in the Gram
Panchayat.
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